


SEPTEMBER  
1950  
thirty cents

# MARINE CORPS GAZETTE



## SEPTEMBER 1950

### CONTENTS

A SOVIET SATELLITE By <i>SqdrnLdr John Gellner, RCAF</i> .....	12
THE MILITARY COMMISSAR—AN ENIGMA By <i>LtCol J. D. Hittle</i> .....	18
A GEOLOGICAL APPENDIX By <i>TSgt W. T. Grubbs</i> .....	21
THE PROBLEM OF POST-WAR CHINA By <i>Bertram Vogel</i> .....	22
RIFLES FOR MARINES By <i>Maj Anthony Walker</i> .....	29
LET'S LOOK AT TTU By <i>1stLt Marion W. Morrisset</i> .....	30
THE ATOMIC BOMB IN TACTICAL WARFARE By <i>1stLt Nicholas A. Canzona</i> .....	34
THE \$10,000 QUESTION By <i>MSgt John Bois</i> .....	38
PROTECTION FOR THE INFANTRYMAN? By <i>Capt David R. McGrew</i> .....	42
WOTC By <i>1stLt Herman C. Bainer</i> .....	47
MARINES AT MATACHIN By <i>Capt J. M. Ellicott, USN (Ret)</i> .....	52
THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE By <i>Col James C. Bigler</i> .....	56

**Opinions expressed in the Marine Corps GAZETTE do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the Navy Department nor of Headquarters, United States Marine Corps.**

**THIS MONTH'S COVER:** One of the first planes to arrive at Quantico this summer with a Reserve unit for summer training brought Battery C, 6th 105mm Howitzer Battalion. After a moment's pause while transportation moved up to the plane, the Waterloo, Iowa battery was taken out to Camp Barrett for intensive training.

Picture credits: All pictures official Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps photos unless otherwise credited

### THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

Professional Magazine for the United States Marines  
JOURNAL OF THE MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION  
Offices: Box 106, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia  
Telephone: Extension 4780 or 2112

BrigGen Randolph McC. Pate..... Editor-in-Chief  
Maj James A. Pounds III..... Editor and Publisher  
Capt James R. Stockman..... Managing Editor  
Capt Paul F. Bent..... Business Manager

EDITORIAL BOARD: Col Albert D. Cooley, LtCol Kenyth A. Damke, LtCol Rathvon McC. Tompkins, LtCol William G. Thrash, Maj Anthony Caputo, Capt George M. Bryant, 1stLt Coleman C. Jones.

EDITORIAL STAFF: Cpl Norval E. Packwood, Miss Rosemary Leadman.

BUSINESS STAFF: Sgt Joseph C. Folmar, Sgt Thurman Albertson, Cpl Samuel F. Fusaro, PFC James L. Ashley.

ADVERTISING: Capt Murray Martin, USMCR, 2 West 46th Street, New York 19, N. Y. Phone LUxemburg 2-1540.

**THIS MONTH AND NEXT**—If you are an acute observer, it will be unnecessary for us to tell you that this issue of the GAZETTE is the largest of the year, with 72 pages rather than the usual 64. The issue was expanded for two reasons: first, to include a story on the young ladies who are training at WOTC for future emergency service with the Corps; and secondly, to bring the reader up to date on book reviews.

We believe this issue also is one of the best in editorial contents. We would like to call to your attention Capt David R. McGrew's *Protection For The Infantryman?*, a discussion of armor for the walking Marine; and *The Atomic Bomb In Tactical Warfare*, by 1stLt Nicholas A. Canzona, who proposes one use of "the bomb" to support ground troops. Our first three articles constitute what might be termed our Russian "section."

VOLUME 34, NUMBER 9. Published monthly by the Marine Corps Association, Box 106, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va. Copyright 1950. Entered as second-class matter at the post office at Quantico, Va., under the act of March 3, 1879. Single copy, 30 cents; subscription rate, \$3.00 a year. Subscriptions of all members or honorably discharged former members of the Armed Forces include membership in the Marine Corps Association. Articles, photographs, book reviews, and letters of professional interest are invited. If accepted, these are paid for at prevailing space rates. Material may not be reproduced without written permission.



E  
es  
N  
ia

A Business

---



With 200,000

---



Employee-Owners

---



**NOW MORE THAN 200,000 BELL TELEPHONE EMPLOYEES  
ARE AMONG THE 970,000 OWNERS OF THE BELL SYSTEM**

**A Business Democracy** — The telephone business is an outstanding example of a business democracy. Nearly everybody uses the telephone. More than 550,000 men and women operate the business. And 970,000 people own it.

**Big Gain in Employee Stockholders**—About one American Telephone and Telegraph Company stockholder in every five is a telephone employee. These 200,000 men and women think enough of the business to in-

vest their savings in it. In the next year or so, many thousands of other employees will complete payments on stock under the Employee Stock Plan.

**Good for Telephone Users**—It's the investments of hundreds of thousands of small stockholders in all walks of life in every section of the country—all put together—that provide the dollars that build, improve and expand the best telephone system in the world for you to use at low cost.

**BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM**



*About one family in every fifty in the United States now owns A. T. & T. stock.  
No other stock is so widely owned by so many people.*

# Message Center

## FSCC . . .

DEAR SIR:

Maj "Hank" Reichner in his *FSCC, Another Empire* (June GAZETTE) has walked in where "angels fear to tread." I believe, however, that the angels have a slight advantage, since they are reliably reported to have wings with which to fly away and live to fight again another day. This subject has been a controversial one ever since the last shot of World War II was fired.

I believe the time has come, however, to choose up sides and answer the question at the conclusion of this excellent article. Although the author has tried to present both views of this vital question as to how the big stick of coordination should be wielded, he has openly favored the FSCC in the role of advisory and planning agency only. I for one am happy to enlist on the side of the forces who want the Commander and the G-3 to have the FSCC as an "assist," rather than a separate agent whose powers (particularly in peacetime, if that's what you call the present recess), may swell to the proportions of a Frankenstein.

The Navy has been faced with a similar problem in determining the proper role of the Combat Information Center; for a short while known as the Combat Operations Center, and now reverted by order of CNO to CIC. It appears that skippers of combatant ships were running a dead heat with COC(CIC) to determine just who was in command of the ship!

Apart from the relations of the FSCC to command and operations is the advisability of requiring the Artillery Officer (Commander) to don a third bonnet by saddling him with the responsibility of coordination. In a completely stable situation he may have time to wear all three hats with an air of aplomb. In a fluid situation, he is primarily a tactical commander, clearly charged by the book (and the CG) with the tactical command of his artillery. Under the latter circumstance one or more of his hats is likely to fall off completely or at the least, get badly out of shape.

I unhesitatingly cast my vote in favor of an FSCC within the command headquarters, operated by a Coordinator, not the Artillery Commander; in the status of an advisory and planning agency, dedicated to assisting the Commander and his general staff.

A. L. BOWSER, JR.  
Col, USMC

## Guerrilla . . .

DEAR SIR:


In Part I of Col Griffith's scholarly *Guerrilla* in the July GAZETTE there appears the statement: "The airplane proved in the last war that it can be an important instrument for the support of guerrilla operations; it is of little if any use in directly combatting them." It is with the latter part of this statement that I wish to take exception because, I believe, it



When 600 West Point cadets began re-embarking at Quantico's post docks recently, after a visit to nearby Fort Belvoir, the editors of the GAZETTE were quick to furnish them with some first-class reading material for their down-river cruise on the USS *Okanagan*. Note the interest in Col Samuel B. Griffith's *Guerrilla*, one feature of the August GAZETTE.

represents a dangerous inflexibility which should not take root in our still embryonic doctrine for guerrilla counter-measures. A theory for the suppression of guerrillas must be implemented by techniques tailored to all factors such as terrain, population, composition of guerrilla forces, armament and tactics. Accordingly, I submit that in a situation composed of the right ingredients of the foregoing factors, the airplane may be an instrument of great effect. In some cases it can best provide the mobility and destructive effect necessary to attack skillful bands whose basic tactic is elusiveness, and if the airplane be teamed with other sufficiently mobile arms, correspondingly greater success may be achieved.

My conviction stems from experience in northern Greece during that country's recent stubborn guerrilla war. There, I learned that the severest casualties were inflicted on the guerrillas when surprise and initiative could be gained over them,



Canal Barge Company's M/V WHITE GOLD

## Sperry Radar . . . "pays for itself,"

Says Barge Line Official



Capt. D. H. Clark of the M/V White Gold operates Sperry Radar

**S**perry Radar will "pay for itself" in any single fog season, says Harry B. Jordan, Vice President of the Canal Barge Company, of New Orleans, by permitting operation "when otherwise tows would be tied to the bank... buoys and approaching tows can be seen with clarity."

► "Equally as helpful in aiding night navigation in narrow channels and swift currents, Sperry Radar has materially reduced the number of accidents in our

night operation on the inland waterways," Mr. Jordan adds. "Wheel damage has been lessened due to the radar's quick spotting of heavy drift masses... making it a simple matter to cut off the engines while passing over the drift."

► Canal Barge Company vessels have gained in operating efficiency, both at night and in fog, since the installation of Sperry Radar on its boats. This operating efficiency reflects the experience of Sperry-equipped craft operating

on rivers, inland waterways and open seas all over the world. On the crowded waterways, Sperry Radar clearly shows shorelines, boats tied to the bank, bridges, powerlines, locks, docks and buoys . . . truly a river pilot's "friend."

► Supplementing all Sperry equipment is Sperry Service — service that pays off in better performance, greater economy. Our Marine Department will be glad to give complete details.

# SPERRY

## GYROSCOPE COMPANY



disrupting guerrilla plans and timetables sufficiently to allow modern weapons to be brought to bear on them while most vulnerable. The airplane was the most eminently suited modern weapon.

Col Griffith says, "In a study of guerrilla war in history we find definite patterns constantly recurring"—and I couldn't agree with him more. But the technique of combat, based on principles of mobility and flexibility, is as varied as geography and peoples themselves. Hence I venture that on the basis of one situation, at any rate, the airplane properly used has more than "little" if any use in directly combatting" guerrillas.

E. G. ATKIN, JR.  
Major, USMC

#### Marine Admirer . . .

DEAR SIR:

I have kept a complete file of my copies of the Marine Corps GAZETTE for a good many years; and recently I loaned the series of four articles covering the fall of Bataan and Corregidor, which appeared in the Nov-Dec '46 and the Jan-Feb '47 numbers, to a former Navy Hospital Corpsman (now a CWO HC USN) who served with our Fourth Marines at that time—and who was taken prisoner with them. He would like very much to obtain the above-mentioned copies of the GAZETTE for his own personal files. If they are available, would you be good enough to mail them to the undersigned and bill me? I should like to make him a present of

them but do not like to break up my collection of Marine Corps GAZETTES.

My admiration for the U. S. Marines is of long standing—a lifetime of some 54 years; and I take pride in being as well informed as possible regarding their accomplishments throughout the history of these United States.

The GAZETTE (with the exception of articles such as those on logistics, etc., which are too technical for this Medical Secretary) and the *Leatherneck* are read from cover to cover, and then are loaned to Marines and others in the Naval Hospital where I am now privileged to work. The series on the fall of Corregidor, Fletcher Pratt's *Marines in the Pacific*, and superb shorts such as *Nostalgia for War* by J. G. Lucas, are some of the many outstanding and worthwhile articles to be found in this age of mass production of literary trash. With the assistance of the GAZETTE's *Passing in Review*, *Check List*, and *Bookshop*, I am gradually acquiring a *Marine* library of which I am very proud. It is a pity that the vast majority of our voting population does not turn to this type of reading material and thus have brought home to them the great truth so ably expressed by General Smith in *Coral and Brass* when he said, "We, as a grateful people, build magnificent memorials to our war dead but we begrudge spending a nickel for defenses strong enough to insure that we shall have no more dead heroes."

MRS. D. R. JACK,  
Oakland, Calif.

#### ID Card Again . . .

DEAR SIR:

It seems that the time has come for some one to at least partially rebut the gripes of Col Heintz and Lt Stiles regarding the excessive amount of identification cards which the average active duty Marine must carry.

Both of them seem to have lost sight of one or two pertinent facts in their anxiety to get themselves on the record. It seems to me that the first thing to be remembered is the fact that during the demobilization after the last unpleasantness with the Axis Powers, many of the Duration of War ID cards were allowed to leave the service with their bearers. Although the Marine Corps separation officers contributed to this oversight, the primary offenders were in some of the other Armed Services. When the fact was discovered, all the Armed Services conferred, drafted a new ID card which is still common to all the Services, and placed their order therefore with the Government Printing Office. Apparently the GPO had matters of higher priority, as it is still an item expected at some future date. However, until that time, anyone should be able to visualize what might happen if the ID card was the only requirement to establish eligibility to enjoy some of our remaining privileges. The exchanges, commissaries, clubs and messes would be snowed under with local residents who had contributed anything from 30 days to four years of active wartime service. Complaints which would no doubt be re-

**RUGGED  
and  
RELIABLE**



#### The S&W Combat Masterpiece

With standard hammer and grip adapter—List: \$66.75, to military personnel: \$54.40. . . . Shipped C. O. D. express collect to any air or railway express office. . . . Holsters to fit the military pistol or cartridge belt: Berns-Martin (the speed holster)—\$12.00. . . . Myres Border Patrol—\$5.50. . . . 150 rounds of Western Super-X (Hi-Speed, Metal-Piercing, and Mid-Range) included with the Combat Masterpiece: \$8.55. . . . S&W K38 Target Masterpieces and all models of High Standard 22 Pistols immediately available!

**EVALUATORS LTD.**  
**Quantico, Va.**

Showroom:  
Woodlawn Drive,  
Triangle, Va.

Telephone:  
Triangle 80-J

# T

Transmitters

Microwave Links and Relays

Transmitting Antennas


Lead-in Cables

Receivers—*The Incomparable Capehart!*

Power Supplies—Selenium Rectifiers

*and Now...*

A NEW LONG LIFE TV PICTURE TUBE



...all from **I T & T**

A pioneer in television, International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation now adds another important item to its long line of equipment for the television industry...from transmitter to home receiver.



**INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CORPORATION, 67 Broad Street, New York, N. Y.**  
U. S. Manufacturing Associates—Federal Telephone and Radio Corporation and Capehart-Farnsworth Corporation

## Leatherneck

By Marines • About Marines

- Marines of all ranks find reading the *Leatherneck* a pleasant means of keeping in touch with the Corps today. Training, personalities, Reserves, Posts of the Corps, and Sound Off.

Keep your hand on the pulse of the Corps  
Subscribe Today!

The Leatherneck  
P.O. Box 1918  
Washington 13, D. C.

Please enter my subscription to Leatherneck to the below address:

To.....  
Name

Address.....  
Street or RFD

City..... Zone..... State.....

### Check below

- ☐ 1 Yr.—\$2.50
- ☐ 2 Yr.—\$4.50
- ☐ 3 Yr.—\$6.00

### Check below

- ☐ Remittance enclosed
- ☐ Send bill later
- ☐ New subscription
- ☐ Renewal

Signature..... Z

## MARINE OFFICER'S GABARDINE SHIRT & PANTS

100% Crease-resistant Rayon — \$19.50 per set  
Regulation Shade



Name .....

Street .....

City .....

Please send me \_\_\_\_\_ sets of  
your Gabardine shirts & pants

### Shirt:

Neck Size .....

Sleeve Length .....

### Pants:

Waist .....

Inseam Length .....

**S. W. RICE CO.**

1423 Pennsylvania Ave., N. W., Wash., D. C.

Quantico Phone: Triangle 34W

ceived from the local merchants by their members of Congress would then be used as an impetus to push exchanges, commissaries, clubs and messes into the nearest ashcan. Just relax, you gripers; when the GPO gets the new ID cards to us, you should be able to throw away the bulk of your cards tucked into your wallet. But when you do, play safe—burn them!

One other point for Lt Stiles—I am not familiar with Quantico's regulations concerning the Camp Motor Vehicle Operator's Permit, but I assume that he was required to take a fairly rigid Navy Driver's Test to obtain it. If so, he should be able to see why the State permit is not sufficient in itself. If the various States required that test or a similar one, then I could agree with him. The Navy test does determine whether or not an individual knows the technical requirements for propelling a vehicle satisfactorily which is more than I can say for any State test with which I am familiar. Of course, when they evolve a test to determine the common sense on the highway of the applicant, then we will have many fewer drivers but safer highways.

G. L. PINES,  
1stLt, USMC

## WINNERS

Last month the GAZETTE offered a two-year subscription to the first person writing in and correctly stating the period in which John Philip Sousa was leader of the Marine Band.

In addition to forcing the GAZETTE to choose two winners instead of one the entries produced some enlightening information.

Of the total number of entries submitted 45 per cent were from non-subscribers. This fact strongly indicates what we have long suspected—that many more people read the GAZETTE than our circulation figures indicate.

The person who produced the first correct answer on the Sousa question is so physically close to the GAZETTE that the staff decided to have two winners. Col E. O. Price, Director of the Extension Division, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, delivered the correct answer almost before our presses had cooled off. It seems Col Price got the jump on most readers by saving some of the GAZETTE staff from a rainy walk and receiving in return a copy of the August issue before it had been mailed.

The earliest postmarked entry, and also a winner, came from MSgt J. F. Mills of the NROTC Unit, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago.

Correct answers also were received from TSgt John Phillip Zeller, Lt J. R. Hansen, Arthur F. Macey, 2d Lt R. J. Coyne, TSgt Eddie E. Evans, and Sgt Robert J. Chadwick.


For those who do not know when Sousa was leader of the Marine Band and many other interesting features about this famous musical organization we refer you to the GAZETTE's Anniversary Issue in November.

GCT Score . . .

DEAR SIR:

Re LtCol Mason's article, *Shades of the Past—Administratively Speaking*, in the June edition of the GAZETTE, I would





*The Ship Control Console  
is another important example of  
RCA's skill in research and engineering.*

## **SHIP CONTROL—at your fingertips!**

**F**ORTY-NINE INSTRUMENTS and controls . . . formerly scattered in confusing array about the pilot house . . . now consolidated in this compact console. Not only is this a great simplification of the problem of ship control, but a real saving in topside weight and space.

This new convenience, developed in close co-operation with the U.S. Navy, represents the most modern advancement in the progress of ship control . . . a process which has been going on since man first ventured on the open sea. With the passage of years, every new device which has been introduced to the ship's bridge has consumed a little more of the steadily diminishing area of deck and bulkhead space.

With the Ship's Control Console, the first step has been taken in the direction of consolidating the most essential instruments and controls on a single console . . . within an arm's length, and within the view of a single pair of eyes.

• • •

Consideration of problems such as were presented by the Ship's Control Console are the daily concern of RCA engineers. The activities of RCA embrace all phases of research and engineering in the science of radio communications and electronics on land, sea, and in the air.



**RADIO CORPORATION of AMERICA**  
**ENGINEERING PRODUCTS DEPARTMENT, CAMDEN, N.J.**

In Canada: RCA VICTOR Company Limited, Montreal



### Service

To Warrant and Commissioned

Officers Only

**United Services Life Insurance Company**

1600 Twentieth Street, N. W.

Washington 9, D. C.

## EVERYTHING MARINES NEED

In Uniforms, Suits and Accessories

*Alfred Bolognese will have uniform displays at:*

Camp Lejeune.....	September 11, 12
Cherry Point.....	September 13, 14
TTU Lant, Little Creek.....	September 25
Hq., FMF Lant, Norfolk.....	September 26
Depot of Supplies, Norfolk.....	September 27
Parris Island.....	October 9, 10

We have complete Marine Corps swords  
available now for immediate delivery

**A. M. BOLOGNESE & SONS**  
**Tailor and Haberdasher**  
**Quantico, Va.**

Marine Outfitters Exclusively

like to pose a question and invite comments from other readers on the subject.

The question: "Is the GCT score of the men who were tested at the RandR center immediately after their arrival in the United States an accurate grade of their ability?"

I have spoken to many Marines about the accomplishment of this test in the RandR Center. Some vaguely remember the test, (terrible hangover, etc.) others say they had no idea what the test was or the value of it to them. It seems the primary concern of everyone was to receive their leave papers and start toward home.

In view of the fact that the GCT score is entered in the individual's service record book and that many of our service schools require a certain score for entry, I feel that many of these Marines should be re-tested so that the GCT score on their records actually indicates their true ability.

JOSEPH E. MUIR,  
2dLt, USMC

### Destroy Our Democracy? . . .

DEAR SIR:

As a political science major, I found the article of Mr M. H. Williams entitled *First Line of Offense* in your July issue, particularly interesting and enlightening. The fundamental weakness of our past foreign policy as contrasted to our present complete about face in foreign policy planning was very clearly stated. In describing our foreign policy in terms of taking the lead in solving the political and economic problems of the world by ". . . consultation and collaboration with friendly governments and peoples . . .", Mr Williams did an outstanding job of summarizing the progress we have made in eliminating the basic weakness of our past foreign policy. At the same time, his summation of that basic weakness was in my opinion, almost perfect. The concept of coalitions as was stated by Mr Williams ". . . permits the formation of coalition for the prosecution of a war against a common enemy by nations who have widely divergent political and economic aims." This concept as synonymous with geopolitics, power politics, and alliances of conflicting ideologies for the prosecution of wars has been disproven as a sound foreign policy as demonstrated by World War I and II.

I take issue with only one minute part of Mr William's article. The sentence I have reference to is where he states "in the process of preparing for and conducting another global war, we might permanently destroy the bulwarks of our democracy." I do not consider this even a remote possibility. Regardless of the "rigid regimentation" that might be necessary during a national emergency, the President of the United States will continue to be elected every four years and he will remain commander-in-chief. As a further check, our representatives who are also elected at regular intervals, have the power of impeachment to handle any tyrannically minded president. This old "bogy" about the ease of military domi-





# For 1/5 Rail Time... *fly!*

**Air Travel** in 1/5 rail time shrinks distance, draws the Official Traveler's destination 5 times nearer—frees 4 hours out of 5 for important Defense business!

**Air Travel**, then, saves four-fifths in Government funds spent for travel-time salaries and per diem allowances—adds further savings by cutting high costs of tiresome layovers, extra meals and sleeping accommodations. And the cost of flying is about the same as rail with pullman—sometimes less!

**Air Travel's** frequency of schedules, more direct service between 500 cities and principal military installations—plus the Scheduled Airlines' vast Non-Stop network—makes air travel the common sense transportation for the greatest portion of Defense business.

**Air Travel** means far more efficient utilization of both personnel and funds—means "more satisfactory service to meet the military requirements" of the Department of Defense!

---

**10% DISCOUNT** for personnel of the Department of Defense traveling on official business using Government Transportation Requests.

---

## THE **Scheduled Airlines** OF THE U.S.A.

ALL AMERICAN AIRWAYS  
AMERICAN AIRLINES  
BRANIFF AIRWAYS  
CAPITAL AIRLINES  
CHALLENGER AIRLINES  
CHICAGO & SOUTHERN AIR LINES  
COLONIAL AIRLINES  
CONTINENTAL AIR LINES  
DELTA AIR LINES

EASTERN AIR LINES  
EMPIRE AIR LINES  
INLAND AIR LINES  
MID-CONTINENT AIRLINES  
MONARCH AIR LINES  
NATIONAL AIRLINES  
NORTHEAST AIRLINES  
NORTHWEST AIRLINES  
PIEDMONT AIRLINES

PIONEER AIR LINES  
ROBINSON AIRLINES  
SOUTHERN AIRWAYS  
SOUTHWEST AIRWAYS  
TRANS-TEXAS AIRWAYS  
TRANS WORLD AIRLINES  
UNITED AIR LINES  
WESTERN AIR LINES  
WISCONSIN CENTRAL AIRLINES

---



## Good Lodging and Excellent Food



**Our Coffee Shop**  
*specializes in seafood and steaks.*

**RIVERVIEW HOTEL**  
Quantico, Va.

nation is fallacious thinking by the misinformed and those unfamiliar with the developments of our constitution, the mechanics of our government, and our constant alertness to fight for freedom. To "... Permanently stultify personal liberties and free enterprise" would, in my opinion immediately cause an armed uprising by an American people who have been ingrained with the inherent freedoms as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.

It is gratifying to have read such an article as *First Line of Offense* in a professional magazine for the U. S. Marines. As long as we are exposed to such outstanding broad articles, our thinking will never become narrow.


J. W. STANHOUSE,  
2ndLt, USMC

Each month the GAZETTE pays five dollars for each letter printed. These pages are intended for comments and corrections on past articles and as a discussion center for pet theories, battle lessons, training expedients, and what have you. Correspondents are asked to keep their communications limited to 200 words or less. Signatures will be withheld if requested; however, the GAZETTE requires that the name and address of the sender accompany the letter as an evidence of good faith.

# BG *Symbol of Dependable Service Since 1917*

Long experience in the special field of aviation ignition is one of the notable reasons for the dependability of BG Spark Plugs. Their high quality has led to their present widespread use in all types of aircraft the world over. Whether for reciprocating or jet engines, — you may avail yourself of our experience by discussing your particular needs with BG engineers.

FOR AIRCRAFT ENGINES . . . AIRCRAFT SPARK PLUGS  
**THE BG CORPORATION**  
NEW YORK 19, N. Y.



Train Travel is  
***FIRST*** *with the SERVICES!*  
 —and here are four good reasons why!..



**MEMO TO  
 TRANSPORTATION OFFICERS**


When you issue a meal ticket to be honored by a railroad—you know you're taking care of your men . . . giving them the meals they're entitled to—real, substantial meals, well planned, expertly prepared, and properly served. Railroad meals are famous—a top travel value! And remember . . .

**10% DISCOUNT**

from regular passenger fares is allowed by the railroads for all personnel of the Department of Defense traveling on transportation requests.

Today as always, the railroads are ready, willing and able to serve one man, a division, or more. America's greatest transportation strength lies in

**THE  
 RAILROADS  
 OF THE  
 UNITED STATES**







Wide World

# A SOVIET

• IN THE LAST 10 YEARS THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS doubled the territory, and quadrupled the number of people, under its control. The communist part of the world now embraces about one quarter of the world's surface inhabited by almost 40 percent of the world's population. From being the capital of the Soviet Union, Moscow has become the capital of a vast Empire. The question arises, of what value the member-states of the Empire—the Soviet satellites as we call them, the “people’s democracies” as they call themselves—are to the mother-country, the USSR. In the 20th Century, empires have often tended to be a liability rather than an asset. By judicious decentralization, while there was still time, the British Empire has preserved much of its coherence and strength in the new form of the Commonwealth of

Nations. On the other hand, the French and Dutch Empires have, of late, brought to the mother countries little advantages and much political and military embarrassment. Nazi Germany tried to establish a European Empire rather similar to that which the USSR has now created in Eastern Europe, but the Germans, too, found that the difficulties in many fields outweighed the economic advantages which their system of satellite states brought to them. Can the Russians do better? Can they so organize their part of the world that the satellites will work and produce for the mother-country; that they will be loyal; that they even will provide the USSR with dependable soldiers, if and when another war comes?

Of the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, the potentially most valuable to the USSR are Czechoslovakia and Poland. They lie so close to the “Iron Curtain” that the loyalty of their citizens may well be put to the test in the very first days of a war. They are comparatively

---

**By SqdrnLdr John Gellner, RCAF**

---



← **Vaclavské Square, in the center of Prague, Czechoslovakia's capital, takes on a carnival air for the Communist Party Congress of May a year ago. Cheering workers were told that by their cheers they ratified a stronger union with Russia.**


highly industrialized. Their production of manufactured goods and, in certain special fields, of raw materials is essential to the USSR. They are inhabited by 35 million people, well educated by Eastern European standards, and thus most valuable as allies and very dangerous as enemies. For all these reasons, Poland and Czechoslovakia lend themselves particularly well to an examination of the Soviet Union's hold on its satellites. If we have chosen Czechoslovakia for the subject of this study, it is because Czechoslovakia is, if anything, even more important to the USSR than Poland. In fact, Czechoslovakia is probably an *indispensable* adjunct of Soviet power.

At present, the Communist government of Czechoslovakia has only a very slight hold on the minds of the 12 million Czechs and Slovaks. The former, inhabiting the two western provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, have been brought up in a queer mixture of native, German, and French culture. Czech schools used to be among the best in Europe, and from these schools the average Czech brought into his life the tendency to be analytical like a German, skeptical like a Frenchman. Propaganda does not go down well with the Czechs; national leaders are more often laughed at than admired; explanation is often accepted (after much discussion), but compulsion is al-

ways resented. While the average Czech is politically stubborn because of his mental make-up, the average Slovak is even more stubborn because of his innate loyalty to his convictions. Roman Catholicism is the predominant religion in the whole of Czechoslovakia—in Slovakia there is a religious fervor comparable to that which we encounter, for instance, in the Roman Catholics of Quebec. Also, nationalism goes generally deeper with the Slovaks than with the more cosmopolitan Czechs. The government has shown little imagination in its quest for the souls of the Czechs and Slovaks. In the standard Communist pattern it has applied the carrot and the stick, but, as it saw the former refused again and again, it has come to wielding the stick more energetically lately.

☛ AS IN EVERY other dictatorship, in Czechoslovakia too the government has tried to lift the dictator onto a pedestal, to offer him as a demi-god to the adulation of the people. The chosen subject of worship in Czechoslovakia is the President, Mr Klement Gottwald. To say that the attempt to give to Mr Gottwald a kind of Stalinesque aura has been unsuccessful, is an understatement. Gottwald himself lacks color; to make things worse for him, he has a dumpy, extremely homely-looking wife. Poor Mrs Gottwald has become the butt of the witticism of Czechs, who have precious little to laugh about otherwise. Innumerable jokes are being told about Mrs President's lack of education, her struggle with the literary language, her pretentiousness. This storm of laughter drowns all the attempts of the Ministry of In-

# SATELLITE



Observers say that Armageddon will be upon us when Russia decides to make Czechoslovakia a federal state of the USSR. The author explains the reason

formation to picture Mr Gottwald as a paragon of civic virtue, political foresight, and literary genius. The popular reaction toward the other Communist leaders is mixed: the prime minister, Mr Zápotocký, an old trade-union worker, seems to command a degree of respect—on the other side of the scale, the “eminence grise” in the government, the representative of the Cominform, Fritz Geminder, is violently hated both for what he stands for and because he is a German. It is perhaps significant that the Soviet leaders were ready to accept this popular indignation over the appointment of a foreigner, and a German of all things, in return for having a truly loyal man in the Czechoslovak administration. The great number of Jews in top positions has kindled anew the always latent anti-semitism of the Czechs and Slovaks. The Secretary-General of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, Mr Slánský, is a Jew. So is (or was, if, as is rumored, he was liquidated) the recently dismissed chief editor of the party’s newspaper “Rudé Právo,” Mr Nový. So is the head of the Secret Police, Col Rejcin; the foremost theoretician of Marx-Leninism in Czechoslovakia, Mr Reiman (also allegedly “purged” in recent days); and many high officials in the Czechoslovak foreign service, like, for instance, the ambassadors to London (Bystricky), to Warsaw (Richard Slánský), to the (East) German Democratic Republic (Dr. Fischl), to Communist China (Dr. Weisskopf). That Jews are rather prominent in the Czechoslovak administration, is exemplified by the fact that among the four Czechoslovak officials who, in the last months, were expelled by the United States and by the Canadian governments respectively, two were of Jewish origin (Dr. Munk, Bergmann). Very few Jews remained in Czechoslovakia after the horrors of Nazi persecution; very few of them have taken office under the Communist government. Thus the high proportion of Jews in the highest places shows how much the educated Czechs and Slovaks are distrusted by the Communists.

The Czechoslovak government has handled its fight

**Left to right: Antonin Zapotocky, Klement Gottwald, Villiam Siroky, and Bohumil Lausman at cabinet meeting. Opposite page: Harvest time in Bohemia.**

Wide World



against the Churches in the heavy-handed and clumsy manner adopted by the governments of all the Soviet satellites. It has followed the Nazi pattern in that it has not yet dared to assail the high dignitaries of the Roman Catholic church but, instead, has severely persecuted the minor clergy. There have been a few defections, but in general Catholic priests and laymen have held firm. The renegade priests who have made common cause with the government, like the Minister of Health, P. Plojhar, have been excommunicated by the Vatican, and are abhorred by the people. Government attempts at infiltration have been too obvious to be successful: the new government-sponsored “Catholic Action” and the newspaper “Bulletin of the Catholic Clergy” have been easily recognized as Communist fronts. The new church law, which became effective on November 1st, 1949, makes the churches agencies of the state, and the clergy state employees who are required to give an oath of allegiance to the regime. This law has done no more than give a thin legal mantle to state interference in religious affairs. Equally abortive have been attempts to create a national Catholic Church on the pattern of the wholly subservient Orthodox Church in Russia, or to propagate the latter in Czechoslovakia (the recent official visit to Prague of the three top personalities of the Soviet Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Nikolaj, Archbishop Makarij, and Bishop Cvetkov, was undoubtedly made to establish Orthodoxy in Czechoslovakia. In Slovakia there have been minor riots, when Slovak peasants tried to protect their priests from arrest. So far the Churches have, if anything, gained ground in Czechoslovakia, as is usually the case in countries where there is religious persecution.

Among the grown-ups, the propaganda efforts of the Ministry of Information have, so far, evoked more mirth than enthusiasm. Again the Communists have been too clumsy, their lies too blatant, their promises too fantastic. Some headlines taken at random from the controlled Czechoslovak press tell the tale: “Miners will live in skyscrapers”—“Fresh chicken on every table throughout the year”—“The members of the SNB” (the universally-detested police, organized on the pattern of the MVD-troops) “the best friends of the workingman”—“A castle for the wives of miners.” This is a country where living standards are falling steadily, where the police is omnipotent, food is scarce, and the housing-shortage acute. Much more successful is the Communist propaganda among the youth. The usual devices of all dictatorships are employed, from the re-writing of the school-books to instructing the children to spy on their parents; from nursery rhymes in the vein of


“We have bread and cakes,  
And very big ones.  
Three go into a hat,  
Stalin sent us the flour for them,”

to para-military training for schoolboys. Two years are



not enough to bring much of the youth onto the Communist side, but with every year there will be more enthusiastic followers of the regime among the young.

Traditionally, Communist regimes are based on the "workers, peasants and soldiers." These are the classes which are supposed to take part in the "dictatorship of the proletariat." In Czechoslovakia, the peasants are very decidedly opposed to the government, and so are still the majority of the industrial workers and soldiers. To separate the farmers from their land, to induce them to till diligently soil owned by the state, has been as hard a nut to crack for the Czechoslovak government as it has been, and still is, for all the other communist regimes. No law nationalizing small land holdings has so far been passed. Instead, the farmers are being forced by various devices to surrender their land voluntarily to the Czechoslovak equivalents of the Russian "kolchozes." How this is done depends largely on the local National Committee. In some regions farmers who owned more than 20 hectares (app. 50 acres) of land were simply arrested and deported to labor camps as "enemies of the people." Usually, subtler methods are employed. A very common one is this: Before the war, the small Czechoslovak farmers were organized in agricultural co-operatives which bought and rented the heavy farm machinery (combines, tractors) which the individual member could not afford, and which also looked after the marketing of the farm produce. The Czechoslovak government nationalized these co-operatives (thus confiscating the shares which the individual farmers held in them) and transformed them into state tractor stations. Then it divided the farmers into four categories: first, those who have not entered collective farming groups; secondly, those who co-operate with collective farming groups; thirdly, those who carry out collective sowing; fourthly, those in completely collectivized communities. Charges for work done by the tractor stations vary with the category into which the individual farmer belongs. For instance, for deep ploughing a first-category farmer pays 603 crowns (\$12) per hectare, a fourth-category farmer 302 crowns (\$6). As all produce has to be turned over to the government at very low standard prices, the farmer who holds on to his property is soon driven into bankruptcy. Lest he cultivate only the part of his farm which he can work by hand, he is given a quota which he can meet if he calls for the services of the tractor station. If he does not meet the quota, he is punished and his land confiscated. Another device resorted to by the administration is to pay the price of the produce, which the independent farmer has delivered, into an account at a state bank. The latter first deducts taxes, compulsory insurance, and compulsory contributions to the State Agricultural Fund, and then withholds the balance until the desperate farmer is utterly without means and sees no other recourse than to join the "kolchoz." It will be remembered that the collectiviza-





tion of the farms in the USSR during the First Five Year Plan led to widespread disorders; to the savage suppression and wholesale deportation of the "hulaks" (well-to-do-farmers), and to famine. Yet the problem which faced the Soviet government was a comparatively simple one, as the "kulaks" had only acquired their land after the Revolution of 1917 and there was no tradition of small free landholdings in Russia. In Czechoslovakia, families have held their farms for generations; the sentimental attachment to the soil is very strong; to own land has always conferred social standing. Thus it is not surprising that the Czechoslovak farmers have become bitter opponents of the regime, that they are joining the "kolchozes" only if they can hold out no longer, and then with gnashing teeth.

As in all Communist countries, the industrial worker is also in Czechoslovakia the "fair-haired boy" of the regime. Apart from high government officials, some scientists, artists, and doctors, the miners are the highest-paid individuals in the country. Still, there is an undercurrent of dissatisfaction even among the industrial workers, a dissatisfaction born of compulsion, continuous increases of the work norm (made possible by the employment of government "scabs," or "shock-workers" in Communist parlance), scarcity of consumer goods. Working morale is comparatively low as demonstrated in the steady increase of absenteeism in Czechoslovak industries. The government is very much perturbed by this trend; a never-ending stream of exhortations to work harder comes from the Communist leaders and from the Communist press.

**After the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 the government claimed that workers celebrated by working "victory shifts" for no extra pay, as exemplified above by stone-cleaning girls.**

Wide World



Compulsory military service brings the bitterness of the farmers and the low morale of some of the industrial workers into the Czechoslovak Army. The latter's fighting value has been further impaired by the big purge which in the two years since the Communist coup of February 1948 has eliminated (by "liquidation," imprisonment, and dismissal) most of the regular officers' corps. Things have become so bad that reliable workers have been posted as subalterns to regular units after a two-months' course. The senior ranks are filled after a fashion by political appointees, and by some old-time officers who were sly enough to persuade the government of their loyalty and are now intent on nothing but to avoid suspicion. In general, the Czechoslovak Army of today has little value as a fighting unit; the Army's air component is almost totally valueless, as there the morale has been lowest and the purges most violent.

THE Czechoslovak government knows, of course, that it has comparatively little support in the country, and that it cannot gain support unless it abandons some of its Marxist policies in the economic field, and unless it takes the national line in its domestic and foreign policy. These things the Czechoslovak government dares not do. There remains only one alternative: repression. Political persecutions always have a tendency to snowball, to spread far beyond that which was intended. The Communist Czechoslovak government began gingerly with the arrest of comparatively few of the outstanding democratic leaders, and with some personal vendettas (the trial and execution of Gen Pika falls into this latter category). Soon, however, the hysteria, which is common to all dictatorships, made it see enemies and conspiracies everywhere. There is hardly an issue of a Czechoslovak daily which does not report on a spy trial, usually involving 10 or more accused. Everybody in Czechoslovakia knows, of course, that there just are not as many agents working for the Western powers in the whole world as there are already convicted spies in Czechoslovakia. Everybody also knows that foreign secret services would hardly employ this medley of students, inkeepers, postal clerks, and the like, as stands week after week in front of Czechoslovak judges. Still, the spy trials grind on. There can be no other explanation for this persistence on the part of the government to call every malcontent it wishes to "liquidate" a spy, than that it hopes to generate a xenophobia among the people by these daily tales of sinister foreign plots against the country. The sentences are savage—death, or terms of imprisonment so long that, under the conditions in which they are carried out, they are tantamount to death sentences. Methods of investigation prior to trial vary, but there is much evidence of extreme brutality. Czechoslovak emigré papers have printed accounts, complete with all details and with the names of the torturers, of investigations conducted in the worst Gestapo manner.

The majority of the prisoners are, of course, immediately sent—by an administrative order of the local National Committee—into “work-” and “re-education-” camps. For instance, those arrested in the great round-up of persons belonging to the middle classes in October 1949 were sent in short order to corrective camps. To provide some impression of legality they were handed mimeographed sheets which read as follows:

“You are arrested on . . . , because it was found that you belonged to a capitalist environment, that you lived according to its principles, and that you have never assumed, nor have you tried to assume, a positive attitude toward the popular democratic order in the Republic. It follows that you are to a dangerous degree prejudiced against our state. The Commission No. . . . has therefore decided to register you as a prisoner of a labor camp.

“The Commission constituted under sections 3 and 10 of the Law No. 247/48, by its decision dated . . . , has ordered under section 2 of the above law that you be sent to the labor camp at . . . for a period of . . .

You can appeal against this decision in writing, within 14 days, to the Ministry of the Interior. The appeal has no suspensive effect.”

There is no record of an appeal ever having been successful. Very few probably ever dare to submit an appeal.

Among the corrective camps is the one in Jáchymov which provides the forced labor for the uranium mines which still produce most of the basic materials used in the Russian atomic experiments. The Jáchymov area is a Soviet enclave in Czechoslovak territory, administered by an Area Headquarters of the MVD. Research is carried out on the spot by a group of Russian, German, and Czechoslovak atomic scientists under the direction of Professor Vladimir Kirtusov. Working and living conditions among the slave laborers are probably the worst of all the Czechoslovak corrective camps. A recently published list of some of the persons confined in Jáchymov contains the names of well-known Czech industrialists, businessmen, hotel owners, and lawyers.

✿ ECONOMICALLY, Czechoslovakia is of the utmost value to the Soviet Union. No other satellite country, except Poland, produces goods that the West will buy for hard (in relation to the rouble) currencies which the USSR needs. No other satellite possesses the efficient transportation system, the trained labor force, the industrial know-how, the plant equipment of Czechoslovakia. And, above all, there are the uranium mines of Czechoslovakia, the old ones of Jáchymov, and the new deposits found near Příbram. Under no circumstances will the Soviet Union allow itself to be deprived of the huge asset which to her is Czechoslovakia. The local government is expected to deliver the goods, and to do so it must overcome the resistances inside the country. There is no organized, effective underground in Czechoslovakia,



Wide World  
When Prague celebrated its liberation back in 1946 many of the city's women put on native costumes.

even if one hears from time to time of acts of sabotage and even of attentates against Communist leaders. One could hardly expect that there should be an underground: without hope of help from abroad, only an utterly desperate man would attempt to fight with arms against the all-powerful government. On the other hand, there is much passive resistance, expressed in low production, negligent handling of machinery, loss of, and damage to, equipment, deliberate recourse to “red tape” to avoid work. If a war should come in the near future, Czechoslovakia would undoubtedly become more of a liability than an asset to the Soviet Union, especially if the war was fought on the European continent. This will probably remain so for quite a number of years, certainly until the children of today have taken over from their parents. What is the USSR going to do about her so important and so reluctant satellite? There have been signs that the Soviet leaders are becoming impatient, that they are dissatisfied with the inability of the Prague government to make the Czechs and Slovaks work to the utmost of their capacity for the good of the communist motherland. Some well-informed persons have predicted that in the near future there will be staged in Czechoslovakia a plebiscite, which will decide for the incorporation of Czechoslovakia in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Then Russian taskmasters will take over, there will be wholesale transfers of population, and Czechoslovakia will become a huge Soviet industrial area like the industrial areas behind the Urals. The same persons assert that Czechoslovakia may well be a bellwether: that, as long as the Russian leaders do not contemplate war, as long as they are satisfied to let time work for them in their Empire, Czechoslovakia will retain its present brand of quasi-independence; but that Armageddon will be upon us when the Soviet leaders decide to make Czechoslovakia a federal republic of the USSR.

USMC





# The Military

By LtCol J. D. Hittle

✿ IT IS EXTREMELY DOUBTFUL IF THE WESTERN MILITARY mind, trained as it is in what we consider sound and orthodox command and staff principles, will ever really understand the peculiar status and function of the Russian military commissar.

Yet, in spite of the elusiveness of the "logic" of the commissar system, it must be recognized that it constitutes a major feature of the world's largest military force. For that reason alone, a brief review of the inception and development of the military commissar system should help in understanding the salient characteristics of this uniquely Russian organizational device.

From the outset of the Russian Revolution the critical need of the Communist forces was able military leadership. Revolutionary zealots could furnish enthusiasm for revolt, but they could seldom provide the trained military know-how required to bring victory in battle against the anti-revolutionary armies. Because of the Red Army shortage of capable military leadership former Tsarist officers were encouraged to take service under the Red Banner.

Eventually the number of former Imperial officers who joined the Communist forces became so large that a major policy dispute developed within the Red hierarchy. Lenin and Trotsky appear to have been the principle figures in the argument over what to do with this influx of Tsarist officers into the anti-Tsarist armies.

Trotsky realistically appreciated that success of the revolutionary forces depended upon able direction by officers of all grades. For that reason, he sought to induce—with no little success—former Imperial officers to join the revolution. Stalin viewed the matter, as he did other

issues, differently than did Trotsky. In the course of the dispute, Stalin carried the argument to Lenin. Apprehensive of such a policy regarding Imperial officers, Lenin is said to have enquired as to the practicability of "sacking all of them." To this Trotsky pointed out the utter impossibility of such drastic action, saying that there were over 30,000 former Tsarist officers in the Red Army. Trotsky's argument proved persuasive.

Many of the officers who thus accepted service under the Red leadership considered themselves to be military specialists rather than revolutionaries, and justified their action on the basis that they were still serving the Russian government.

Thus, even in its inception, the Red Army was officered to a surprisingly large degree by former Tsarist officers. It was this group that effected continuity of military thought and method between the armies of the old and new regime, transfusing into the Communist forces the doctrine and institutions of the Imperial Army. It was only natural, therefore, that the staff system with which this large number of former Tsarist officers were acquainted should be utilized by them when those officers assumed, in various capacities, the leadership of the Communist forces. The number of Tsarist general staff officers joining the Red Army was high, possibly amounting to well over half of the strength of the general staff corps at the beginning of the revolution.

The fact that the Red high command realized the necessity for trained top-level military management is brought out further by the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, which states that the main offices of the old Tsarist general staff continued to operate even after the October (1917) Revolution.

Nor were former Imperial officers limited to low ranking positions. On the contrary, some of them rapidly achieved positions of considerable authority and were able to play a major role in forming Red military policy. Col S. Kamenev was among the first to join the Communist forces, and by 1919 was designated commander in chief of all the armed forces of the Soviet Republic. He later served as inspector of the Red Army, and then as the chief of staff. Other staff officers included: Vasetis, who became an instructor in the General Staff War Academy in 1919; Kork, a former graduate of the Nicholas Academy and who later became director of the Communists' War Academy; and Shaposhnikov, later to become the chief of the general staff during the initial years of World War II. Another influential former Tsarist officer was A. A. Svechin, a former major general of the Imperial General Staff Corps. Svechin became a dominant figure

---

—This article is based on Chapter 6, *The Military Staff—Its History and Development*, LtCol J. D. Hittle, Military Service Publishing Co., Harrisburg, Pa., 1949.



# Commissar—An Enigma

Imagine a system in our armed forces whereby every commander has to have every order countersigned by a political representative of the party currently in power. Such a system is and has been commonplace to Red Army commanders during campaigns

in the Red hierarchy, becoming Chief of the Soviet All Russian Supreme Staff (the immediate successor to the Imperial General Staff) and later was honored by appointment to the Chair of Military History at the War College. Little wonder that some dyed-in-the-wool Communists were apprehensive of former Tsarists holding such powerful positions in the Red Army.

Although Trotsky prevailed in the dispute concerning the placing of former Tsarist officers in high command and staff positions in the Red Army, the Communist leadership was not unmindful of the paradoxical situation resulting from such a policy.

While former Tsarist officers were eagerly accepted by the Red Army, Communist leaders still retained a deep and abiding suspicion of those officers, constantly fearful that they might attempt counter revolutionary moves. This paradox of Imperial officer leadership of the Communist military forces led directly to another incongruity, the military commissar. Any study of contemporary Russian military organization, and particularly command and staff procedures, sooner or later runs full tilt into the unique and militarily illogical commissar system of the Red Army. Although the Communists accepted to a large degree the command and staff doctrine of the Imperial Army, they added to it the commissar system. In so doing they created a system that has continued to puzzle western military students. Furthermore, the evidence is quite clear that the commissar system has also been a source of puzzlement to the Russians.

The commissars originally were created for the purpose of detecting and preventing any counter-revolutionary activities by the former Imperial officers. The exact date at which the commissars were first introduced is difficult to determine from documentary evidence. However, as White\* points out, the official Soviet publications indicate that military commissars were functioning even during the first months after the birth of the Red Army. An order of the People's Commissar for War dated April 6, 1918, was the first directive promulgated by central Communist authority relative to the definition of the status and functions of the military commissars.

This directive ordered that the commissars were to

assure that the army did "not become a thing apart from the entire Soviet system and that the military establishments do not become a foci of conspiracies or instruments against workers and peasants." It went on to specify that the commissars were to observe carefully all activities of the "military specialists," the term euphemistically applied to former Imperial officers. Subsequent portions of the directive established the commissar as much more than a monitoring agent, for it was specified that commissars were to receive jointly with the commanders all correspondence. Also, the commissars were charged with the duty of countersigning all orders. The purpose of the commissar signing operational orders was, quite clearly, to attest that there was no counter-revolutionary purpose behind the order. In addition to countersigning orders, the commissar was responsible for the expeditious execution of the orders.

THOSE who drafted this first directive on the status and functions of military commissars must have realized that they were establishing a militarily illogical agency, for it is obvious that a serious attempt was made to draw a line of demarkation between the functions of the commander and his commissar. But regardless of how the Communist leaders strove to make it clear that the commander alone was responsible for the determination of purely military matters, and so avoid a conflict in command authority, the practical result was that the commissar by the very nature of his duties became concurrently a joint commander and a staff officer. The commissar, whose signature was required to make any order valid, and who was responsible for the execution of that order, was, in spite of technical language to the contrary, a *de facto* partner in exercise of the functions of command.

The commissar's dual status of a commander and a staff officer, rather than diminishing, was accentuated with the passing of time. The line of demarkation between the commander's operational responsibilities and the purported nonoperational authority of the commissar that the April 1918 directive attempted to draw became hazy very rapidly. In the fall of 1918 Trotsky stated in a letter that the commissar was *not* prohibited from interfering in the dispositions of the commander.

In July, 1919, Trotsky further explained the status of

\*Dr D. Fedotoff White, author of *The Growth of the Red Army*, 1945.



the commissar by stating that although such an official was not expected to replace the commander or head of the supply service, "he is called upon to *supplement* them . . . by direct initiative, a direct creative effort, hand in hand with the commander or head of the supply service." The commissar's joint command and staff status was further strengthened by the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party in March 1919, at which time the supply function was clearly placed under the dual direction of the commanders and the commissars. It might be noted parenthetically that again, in a sense, the Russian military mind seemed oblivious to the fact that there is an inalienable alliance between tactics and supply. So, under the Communists, as under the Tsars, Russian command and staff doctrine failed to effect a unity of logistic and operational planning under one responsible person.

As might be expected, there was no noticeable improvement in the supply of the Red Army as a result of the commissars' joint assumption of that function. With few exceptions the combat units continued to live off the country. As late as 1927, the daily calory allowance of the Red soldier was still below that in the latter days of the Imperial army. Supply inefficiency remained the chronic affliction of the Russian military forces, Imperial or Red.

By 1919 the commissars were strongly entrenched not only as political agencies within the army, but also as partners in command. Vested with a joint authority over supply matters, they were an unusual, but nevertheless powerful, adjunct to the staff as it had previously existed under the Imperial army. In spite of frequent modification of the role of the commissars, this group of politico-military officials managed to retain intact the essentials of their authority as it had existed in 1919. In fact the decree of August 15, 1937, relative to the status of military commissars was much in the way of a reiteration of the powers given almost 20 years before. The joint command status of the commander and commissar was continued with the commissar countersigning all orders. Also, he was still intimately involved with the supply of the unit.

AFTER the not too impressive showing of Russian military prowess in the war with Finland, the commissars as military officials were abolished by decree on August 12, 1940. But their absence from the Russian military forces was not prolonged, for the system was hastily reintroduced after Hitler's attack on Russia.

This reintroduction of the commissar resulted from the Soviet defeats at the hands of the German Army in the

initial operations of the war (1941-42). Apparently the Red high command felt that the commissars were needed to prevent further disintegration of morale and discipline. Although reinstated for what was ostensibly a non-operational purpose, the commissars were again given the duty of countersigning all orders, which meant in effect that they still had the power of veto over the commander's plans. By being able to say what *wouldn't* be done they possessed, in effect, the power to say what *would* be done. From the practical standpoint, they still enjoyed much of what amounted to a joint command status.

As the Red Army continued to suffer reverses, Soviet leaders in October of 1942, apparently seeing the need for giving military commanders an unhampered authority, again ordered that the commissars be abolished. As on previous occasion when such action was directed, the commissars lost their joint command functions, and became assistant commanders for political affairs. At the same time they were supposed to lose their purely military authority, the commissars were awarded military rank.

THIS awarding of military rank to commissars accomplished two things: the more obvious problems resulting from the commissar's former clearly established status as a co-commander were partially eliminated; at the same time party control over the armed forces was not reduced. Under the new policy, trusted party stalwarts could be given high military rank. Simply by assigning such individuals to key positions the grip of the party over the military was retained. Yet in spite of the October 1942 decree, it is difficult to believe that the commissars, in the form of political officers, have relinquished entirely the influence that they previously exerted over the manner in which the commander discharged his functions.

Actually, available information indicates that the commissar system for political control of the armed forces is very much a part of Communist war organization. The Main Political Division of the Armed Forces is the Party's agency for working in the military field. It is, in effect, a largely autonomous organization within the military structure, as it receives its directives from Party officials and possesses its own independent channels of communication down to and including the battalion level. Thus the political officers, successors to the commissars, are even freed from using the normal organizational communication system. It is certainly not difficult to imagine the complications and suspicions that would arise from the political officers possessing private means of communication not subject even to the authority of their respective "commanding" officers.

There can be little doubt that the commissar system, regardless of the name it may now go by, is still far from being eliminated in the Russian forces. And as long as it remains part of the Russian war machine, the incongruous commissar will remain an enigma to the Western military mind.

US MC



# A Geological Appendix?

By TSgt W. T. Grubbs



✿ IT IS MY BELIEF THAT INTELLIGENCE ANNEXES FOR the Marine Corps should have a Geological Appendix included thereto. This appendix should be prepared by those who have sufficient knowledge of geological processes to give a good conception of terrain to be encountered, water supply, type of rock, or mineral structure that produces the topography, availability of material that could be used for engineer construction, trafficability of soil, and natural obstacles.

I have reference to Military Geology, a course offered by the Marine Corps Institute, which by all means, should be utilized by all Marine Corps intelligence officers. After a study of this very thorough course, an intelligence officer should be able to glean almost complete geological information about a possible theater of operations. The course itself consists of 25 well prepared lessons, which are arranged to prepare the student to identify practically all types of landforms from merely scanning a topographic map. Included in the course are 14 topographic maps, and a panorama of physiographic types designed to give the student a representation of all the landforms encountered in the study of geology, with the exception of those that are too small to be shown by contour interval used.

An intelligence officer schooled in this subject should be able to decipher the pattern of contours to tell what type of landform is represented. For example: From a topographic map you may definitely establish from the pattern of the contours that a certain landform is a volcano, and as such you may make a fairly accurate estimate of the soil to be encountered, since from geology, we associate various types of rocks with volcanic territory, certain rocks with faulted mountains, plains, plateaus, domes, badlands. You may also make a fairly good estimate of the climate to be encountered, water supply, natural obstacles, etc. Numerous examples of the helpfulness of such studies may be cited. During the past war, the American Army Forces in Sicily were being bombed by the Germans from an unknown airfield, which remained hidden after persistent search by air force. The geologists were brought into the picture and they set forth the most likely places for construction of airfields, on the basis of actual geological studies of the terrain. The airforce then found the airfield and destroyed it forthwith. During the first World War, a defensive position was chosen somewhere in France, but upon con-

ferring with the geologists, they were discouraged from using this position as these geologists informed them that the position was once covered with a very thin mantle of limestone underlain by very resistant rock, which made it impossible to entrench troops due to light entrenching tools. To have entrenched here would have required the efforts of a unit comparable to a highway construction company. Thus, a complete disaster was averted through the insight of these geologists who know the terrain better than anyone.

✿ ALSO, of particular interest to the Marine Corps intelligence officer from the standpoint of amphibious warfare would be the parallel study of the relatively new field of submarine geology. This gives a thorough treatment of the geological study of various types of beaches to be encountered throughout the world, which should be of decided interest and usefulness to the Marine Corps. I regret that I am not familiar enough with this relatively new science to enable me to cite some possible applications to Marine Corps use, however, from a very brief examination of a text on this subject, I am of the belief that it would better aid an intelligence officer in giving more precise details on the topographic and hydrographic details that are likely to be encountered on a landing beach.

We do not want a Marine Corps full of scientists because our platoon leaders will find it hard to interpret a complicated geological report. We do, however, need men who can interpret the terrain, and then transmit it to the platoon leaders in the form that they understand. We must remember that a dome mountain, or folded mountain, underlain by sedimentary stratum, is still just Hill 709 to them, and must be taken by blood, sweat, and tears; however, it would be of particular interest to them to know that Hill 709 was composed of material that facilitated "digging in," or that its terrain could not be traversed by tanks. Also, the engineers would like to know if the ground will support a runway for aircraft, and whether building aggregates are available locally.

I quote from Capt Ralph Ingersoll's book, *The Battle Is the Payoff*, in which he states, "Other things being anywhere near equal, the victory will go to whichever understands the terrain best." How else can we better understand the terrain than from geological appendices?

US ✿ MC



Chinese Communists staged amphibious landing on the island of Hainan last April. Despite the fact that these are supposed to be assault troops, they wear no helmets.

Wide World photo

☛ ONE OF EX-AMBASSADOR PATRICK J. HURLEY's favorite stories is that concerning a barber shop which was inexpediently situated at the rear of an Oklahoma saloon in the days before Hopalong Cassidy had got around to establishing law and order in that part of the country. On one occasion, it seems, a new customer was having his hair trimmed, when suddenly a few of the local gentry took to playing with their six-shooters. As the shots whizzed angrily back and forth, the customer in the barber chair bolted upright and prepared to take off. But the barber, a hardier soul, held him firmly by his twitching shoulders. "Lean back, brother," said the barber, "lean back. There ain't nobody shootin' at you."

For several years now, the United States has been in the position of the man in the barber's chair. Nobody has been shooting at us—and yet we may very well get hurt.\* This is particularly true of our relationship with China. For we have had the misfortune to see the recent fall of post-war China to Communism, and it is no secret that democracy and Communism are incompatible not only as political philosophies but as practical ways of life.

There are many persons who believe that we stood by idly while China fell. There are many others who are as firmly convinced that we made a very real and very great effort to prevent that fall. Relatively few persons, however, are completely acquainted with the objective facts of the case. For, in the final analysis, China has long been, for most Americans, a remote land of mystery.

Thus, it is perhaps expedient at this time to review the situation in regard to China, and to reconsider our own position in our now increasingly tenuous relationship with China. For if the history of the 1930s and the world

*\*ED: The Korean war began after this article was submitted.*

conflict of the 1940s is any criterion by which to judge the future, there is no nation in the world at the present time whose status—and whose future—is more ominously significant to the United States than the China of today.

I

☛ BECAUSE SOME KNOWLEDGE of the modern political history of China is a requisite to an understanding of China, it might be helpful to begin with a brief summary of the forces responsible for China's modern destiny.

In reality, China's emergence as a modern nation was

## The Problem of Democracy

first planned in 1892, when Dr Sun Yat-sen founded the Hsing Chung Hui (Regenerate China Society), a revolutionary society which failed and which was absorbed in 1905 by the Tung Men Hui (China Brotherhood Society). The latter, established in Tokyo during Dr Sun's exile there, and considerably strengthened by its intimate association with two powerful secret societies which had a large following among the local social groups, immediately undertook numerous revolts. Thirteen of those revolts proved to be failures. The 14th, however, in 1911, overthrew the Manchu regime and in 1912 Dr Sun assumed the position of provincial president of the Republic of China.

At this point the history of the Chinese National Party (originally the Chung Kuo Kuomintang, but now known simply as the Kuomintang) begins. Various National Congresses were held, local governments were set up, and the Three People's Principles were adopted as to the ideological basis of Kuomintang rule.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The Three People's Principles (San Min Chu I) include the Principle of Nationalism, the Principle of People's Rights, and the Principle of People's Livelihood. Certain of Dr Sun's ideas

Members of the "Night Tiger" Battalion of the famed Chinese Eighth Route Army, shown on drill field at Yen-an. These men are veterans of seven years of war.

Wide World photo

Ironically enough, it was the Kuomintang itself which originally made overtures to Communism. Early in 1924, the Kuomintang decided to permit certain Chinese Communists to hold membership in the Kuomintang—for the avowed and stated purpose of strengthening the revolutionary forces within China. In return for the concession of membership in the Kuomintang, the Chinese Communists promised to obey Nationalist principles and to adhere to established discipline. What actually happened should be obvious in the light of Communist tactics

everywhere. The new Chinese Communist members immediately undertook to control the Kuomintang themselves, and through effective sabotage, impeded Nationalist progress. Finally, in 1927, when Kuomintang leaders sought to purge the Communists from their ranks, open armed conflict commenced. Essentially, this conflict continued until 1936, when the Chinese Communists, now employing new tactics, appealed for a reconciliation with the Kuomintang in order to withstand Japanese aggression.

At a plenary session held in Nanking in February, 1937, the Kuomintang agreed to effect reconciliation—provided, however, that the Chinese Communists would agree to four terms: (1) abolition of the Red Army and its incorporation into the united command of the nation's armed forces; (2) dissolution of the so-called "Chinese Soviet Republic" and similar organizations and unification of government power in the hands of the Central Government; (3) absolute cessation of Communist propaganda and acceptance of the Three People's Principles; and (4) stoppage of class struggle.<sup>2</sup> The Chinese Communists not only accepted the terms but in September of the same year—two months after Japan had attacked North China—they announced in a declaration to the entire Chinese nation that, among other things, both the Communist policy of insurrection intended to overthrow the Kuomintang and the Communist policy of propaganda were to cease. It was an old tune, of course, but for the time being Chiang Kai-shek was prepared to dance to it.

Nevertheless, the Generalissimo was determined to keep a careful Chiang v to encro 1941, a tionalist

<sup>2</sup>As listed in MacMillan

## Post-War China

concerning these Principles might be summarized as follows:

Concerning Nationalism: China's population has remained static. If the West continues to grow, China will be swallowed up. . . China must revive nationalism to fight for mankind against injustice—a divine mission. . . European superiority is not in political philosophy but in material goods. . . China must therefore learn science from the West, leave Western culture alone.

Concerning People's Rights: Protection and sustenance comprise people's rights. . . China must choose democracy to follow the world trend. . . Political power must be given to the people.

Concerning People's Livelihood: The term is used instead of socialism. . . The condition can be effected by equalization of land ownership and by control of private capital. . . State power must build up enterprises if China wishes to avoid the expansion of private capital and the emergence of a great wealthy group. . . China must make only gradual changes in capitalism rather than attempt to overthrow it immediately.

Later, in 1935, 12 dicta were adopted for all Kuomintang members. Because of their rather unusual nature, they are quoted here: 1. Loyalty and courage are the basis of patriotism. 2. Filial devotion is the foundation for family discipline. 3. Good will and kindness make for harmony among men. 4. Faithfulness and integrity are the basis of a useful career. 5. Peace is the basis of smooth social relationships. 6. Courtesy makes for a good administration. 7. Obedience is the key to a high sense of responsibility. 8. Diligence and thrift make for competent service. 9. Orderliness and cleanliness are the basis of good health. 10. Helpfulness makes for happiness. 11. Knowledge makes for usefulness to mankind. 12. Perseverance effects achievement.

Fourth Army Incident." Chiang maintained that he had ordered the Communist New Fourth Army to meet the Japanese in the Yellow River sector north of the Yangtze, and that the Communists had refused because the order conflicted with their desire to take over new territory to the south. He had therefore ordered that they be disarmed. The Chinese Communists, on the other hand, stated that the Nationalists had sought deliberately to place the New Fourth Army in a military position from which there could be no escape. In any event, from that point on friction continued—and in a large sense the incident marked the real beginning of the present civil war in China.

## II

☛ DURING the 20th century United States policy toward China has been based largely on two principles—equality of commercial opportunity and maintenance of Chinese territorial and administrative integrity and independence. Thus, although the United States has hoped ardently for the development of a stable and democratic Chinese nation, it has nevertheless maintained a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China. Surely few other nations in the world have been as honorable in their intentions toward China as have ours. Japan's actions in China are well known, and Russia's plans for the exploitation of China have been manifested in countless ways for many, many, years. Precisely because of our attitude of fairness in regard to China's internal affairs, however, we have been at a disadvantage—particularly in thwarting the maneuvers of the Soviet in China.

Thus, for example, in June, 1944, when President Roosevelt sent the then-Vice President Wallace to China to try to coordinate China's war effort against Japan, Generalissimo Chiang complained bitterly that the Chinese Communists were destroying Chinese morale. He made the justifiable statement that he and other leaders considered the Chinese Communists internationalist revolutionaries rather than Chinese, and that Chinese Communist talk about mere "agrarian reform" was nothing but a smoke screen of Communist propaganda. In view of that, Chiang urged that the United States remain aloof toward the Communists and thus strengthen the Nationalist position in China. Mr Wallace's reply was that no situation should be permitted in China which might bring about a conflict with the Soviet.

Several days later, as Chiang accompanied Mr Wallace to the airport, the Generalissimo again expressed his feelings concerning the Communist situation. He said that he would personally welcome an effort by President Roosevelt to settle the Communist problem, even though the problem was an internal one. Nevertheless, he warned Mr Wallace that the Communists could not be trusted.

Shortly after that, on August 18, 1944, MajGen Hurley was appointed Personal Representative of the President to China, and, after a conference in Moscow with Soviet

officials, he arrived in Chungking early in September. By that time, according to various American military and civilian observers in China, the breach between Nationalist and Communist views had become so marked that Chinese efforts against Japan were almost entirely ineffectual.

Chiang himself appears to have had a more astute realization of the situation in China at that time than many of our own officials were then inclined to believe. Certainly Chiang understood the Chinese Communists—and their intentions—better than did many "detached" outsiders, and several of his views, expressed in a letter of August 31, 1944, from our Ambassador Gauss to Secretary of State Hull, are worth quoting:

"Yesterday evening President Chiang Kai-shek sent for me. For an hour and a half he talked about the Communist problem, stating that it is not understood in Washington, and it is my duty to be sure the problem is understood. Set forth below are the principal points of the argument which Chiang constantly emphasized and repeated, in addition to the usual charges of bad faith and treachery against the Communists:

In the matter of world problems, China is disposed to follow our lead; and it is not unfriendly for us to suggest that China should improve relations with the Soviet Union. China should receive the entire support and sympathy of the United States Government on the domestic problem of Chinese Communists. Very serious consequences for China may result from our attitude. In urging that China resolves differences with the Communists, our Government's attitude is serving only to intensify the recalcitrance of the Communists. The request that China meet Communist demands is equivalent to asking China's unconditional surrender to a party known to be under a foreign power's influence (the Soviet Union) . . . The United States should tell the Communists to reconcile their differences with and submit to the national government of China.

Answering a question as to whether I believed the people of China favor the Communists, I replied that I did not. However, I remarked that at the present time, the Communist Party is reported not to be practicing or preaching communism, but to be following and supporting the Kuomintang principles of improvement of conditions of the masses and democracy. My statement was that, if I might speak frankly, many believe the Kuomintang Party in power has not in recent years kept their principles first and foremost in mind, and the Embassy has not failed to hear of some of the disaffection, both in military and in other circles, which resulted. The Generalissimo stated that only the Communists obstruct and defy his government, and if reports or suggestions of dissatisfaction exist at other points, it is merely the machination of Communists utilizing stooges removed from themselves to convey propaganda of this nature.<sup>3</sup>

In essence, Secretary Hull's reply was that China had to resolve its political differences and fight Japan.

The situation was perhaps further confused by a report may by Gen Joseph Stillwell to the Chief of Staff in Washington late in September, 1944. Stated Stillwell:

"Chiang Kai-shek has no intention of making further efforts to prosecute the war. Anyone who crowds him toward such action will be blocked or eliminated. . . Chiang Kai-shek believes he can go on milking the United States for money and munitions by using the old gag about quitting if he is not supported. He believes the war in the Pacific is nearly over, and that by delaying tactics, he can throw the entire burden on us. He has no intention

<sup>3</sup>This and other quoted documents to follow are from the Department of State's *United States Relations with China*, released for publication late during 1949.





Wide World

**Chinese Communist soldiers captured during the fighting on the Suchow front, nearly two years ago. In the ensuing period, Chiang Kai Shek's forces have been defeated in China and have taken refuge on Formosa, which has recently been threatened. American dollars and good intentions were not enough to forestall defeat.**

of instituting any real democratic regime or of forming a united front with the communists. He himself is the main obstacle to the unification of China and her cooperation in a real effort against Japan. . . I believe he will only contribute his policy and delay, while grabbing for loans and postwar aid, for the purpose of maintaining his present position, based on one-party government, a reactionary policy, or the suppression of democratic ideas with the active aid of his gestapo.

Later, in a final report to the War Department, Gen Stillwell asserted that Chiang was too preoccupied with "the security of domestic supremacy," and that the Kuomintang party itself, once the expression of sincere nationalistic feeling, had become "an uncertain equilibrium of decadent, competing factions, with neither dynamic principles nor a popular base." Washington was hard-pressed to know what to believe—and, even more, to what degree to believe it.

In the meantime, Gen Hurley, who had flown to Moscow with Donald Nelson, chairman of the War Production Board, had been given certain "off-the-record" assurances by Mr Molotov. As subsequent events proved, Mr Molotov's assurances must have been very far off the record—and off the cuff, too. For, according to Molotov, the Soviet Government "had turned its back on the Chinese revolutionary groups." Moreover, he informed Gen Hurley, the Soviet had "unjustifiably" been held responsible for internal developments in China; he stated that some Chinese who called themselves Communists "were related to Communism in no way at all," and that the Soviet did not intend to take any interest in Chinese government affairs. Gen Hurley did not realize it at the time, of course, but he had received an exceedingly slick lesson in diplomacy.

Gen Hurley's mission in China was to unify Chinese

forces in the war against Japan. Nevertheless, Gen Hurley had been sufficiently impressed by Molotov's remarks to have conveyed some of his belief in those remarks to Chiang himself. Thus, for example, by the end of 1944, Gen Hurley reported to the United States that Chiang's views have changed considerably. In December, 1944, Gen Hurley stated: "At the time I came here Chiang Kai-shek believed that the Communist Party in China was an instrument of the Soviet Government in Russia. He is now convinced that the Russian Government does not recognize the Chinese Communist Party as Communist at all and that (1) Russia is not supporting the Communist Party in China, (2) Russia does not want dissensions or civil war in China, and (3) Russia desires more harmonious relations with China. These facts have gone far toward convincing Chiang Kai-shek that the Communist Party in China is not an agent of the Soviet Government." Not only had Gen Hurley been fooled by Molotov; he was now being fooled by Chiang.

Although there is no doubt that Gen Hurley was playing in a league too fast for him, it must be admitted in all fairness to him that he was chiefly concerned with the need to get China to fight Japan. And it must be similarly recognized that when, in January, 1945, Gen Chu Teh requested a 20-million-dollar loan from the United States Army, it was Gen Hurley who insisted that no arms be given to Communist forces, and that "all such requests, no matter how reasonable they may seem to be, be universally refused until or unless they receive the sanction of the National Government and of the American Government." For, as he pointed out, it was, after all, American policy not only to prevent the collapse of

**Gen. Stillwell in 1944: "... request that China meet Communist demands is equivalent to ... surrender to a party ... under a foreign power's influence. ..."**

the National Government but to maintain Chiang as president of that government. And finally, when recommendations for direct aid to Chinese Communist forces were later made by others in our Department of State, it was Gen Hurley who was most firm in the stand against such a course of action.

✿ EARLY IN 1945, Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew made it patent that the United States, though willing to be of service to China, had no intention of assuming responsibility as adviser to the Chinese Government in its relations with the Soviet. Nevertheless, on April 15, Gen Hurley, by this time Ambassador to China, decided to hold another conference in Moscow—with Stalin as well as with Molotov. His report of that conference is worth considering:

"My analysis was briefly as follows: 'Molotov said at the former conference that the Chinese Communists are not in fact Communists at all. Their objective is to obtain what they look upon as necessary and just reforms in China. The Soviet Union is not supporting the Chinese Communist Party. The Soviet Union does not desire internal dissension or civil war in China. The Government of the Soviet Union wants closer and more harmonious relations in China. The Soviet Union is intensely interested in what is happening in Sinkiang and other places and will insist that the Chinese Government prevent discriminations against Soviet Nationals.' Molotov agreed to this analysis. I then outlined for Stalin and Molotov existing relations between the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party. I stated with frankness that I had been instrumental in instituting conferences and negotiations between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Government. . . I informed Stalin that both the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party claimed to follow the principles of Sun Yat-sen for the establishment of a government of the people, by the people and for the people in China. I continued that the National Government and the Chinese Communist Party are both strongly anti-Japanese and that the purpose

of both is to drive the Japanese from China. Beyond question there are issues between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Government, but both are pursuing the same principal objective, namely the defeat of Japan and the creating of a free, democratic and united government in China. . . I made clear American insistence that China supply its own leadership, arrive at its own decisions, and be responsible for its own policies. . . I informed him that President Roosevelt had authorized me to discuss this subject with Prime Minister Churchill and that the complete concurrence of Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden had been obtained in the policy of endorsement of Chinese aspirations to establish for herself a united, free, and democratic government and for the unification of all armed forces in China in order to bring about the defeat of Japan. To promote the foregoing program it had been decided to support the National Government of China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. Stalin stated frankly that the Soviet Government would support the policy. He added that he would be glad to cooperate with the United States and Britain in achieving unification of the military forces in China. He spoke favorably of Chiang Kai-shek and said that while there had been corruption among certain officials of the National Government of China, he knew that Chiang Kai-shek was "selfless," "a patriot" and that the Soviet in times past had befriended him. . . In short, Stalin agreed unqualifiedly to America's policy in China as outlined to him during the conversation."

There were those, however, who felt that Hurley was still much too optimistic in his acceptance of Soviet promises and assurances. Thus, George Kennan, who at that time was our Charge d'Affaires in Moscow, objected almost immediately to Hurley's report. In a personal telegram to Ambassador Harriman, who had left Moscow for Washington, Kennan stated:

"... I do want to let you know that it caused me some concern to see this report, the Hurley report, go forward. I refer specifically to the statements which were attributed to Stalin to the effect (1) that he expressed unqualified agreement with our policy in China as Ambassador Hurley outlined it to him, (2) that this policy would be supported by the Soviet Government and (3) that we would have his complete support, in particular, for immediate action directed toward the unification of the armed forces of China with full recognition of the Chinese National Government under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. . . .

There was, of course, nothing in Ambassador Hurley's account of what he told Stalin to which Stalin could not honestly subscribe, it being understood that to the Russians words mean different things than they do to us. Stalin is of course prepared to affirm the principle of unifying the armed forces of China. He knows that unification is feasible in a practical sense only on conditions which are acceptable to the Chinese Communist Party. . . .

Actually I am persuaded that in the future Soviet policy respecting China will continue what it has been in the recent past: a fluid resilient policy directed at the achievement of maximum power with minimum responsibility on portions of the Asiatic continent lying beyond the Soviet border. This will involve the exertion of pressure in various areas in direct proportion to their strategic importance and their proximity to the Soviet frontier. I am sure that within the framework of this policy Moscow will aim specifically at: (1) Reacquiring in substance, if not in form, all the diplomatic and territorial assets previously possessed on the mainland of Asia by Russia under the Czars. (2) Domination of the provinces of China in central Asia contiguous to the Soviet frontier. Such action is dictated by the strategic necessity of protecting in depth the industrial core of the USSR. (3) Acquiring sufficient control in all areas of north China now dominated by the Japanese to prevent other foreign powers from repeating the Japanese incursion. This means, to the Russian mind, the maximum possible exclusion of penetration in that area by outside powers including America and Britain. . . .

It would be tragic if our natural anxiety for the support of the Soviet Union at this juncture, coupled with Stalin's use of words



which mean all things to all people and his cautious affability, were to lead us into an undue reliance on Soviet aid or even Soviet acquiescence in the achievement of our long term objectives in China.

Ambassador Harriman agreed that Stalin would not cooperate indefinitely with Chiang, and he made his views to that effect known in Washington. In November of that year, Ambassador Hurley, very much displeased, with "the wide discrepancy between our announced policies and our conduct of international relations," and believing that we had been "sucked into a power bloc on the side of colonial imperialism against Communist imperialism," resigned his position as Ambassador.

### III

IN A SENSE, the Marshall Mission undertaken in December, 1945, represented a final effort on the part of the United States to establish peace in China. The Mission is too well known to need detailed consideration here. It will suffice perhaps to state that Gen Marshall's instructions, directly from President Truman, were to help adjust China's internal differences by peaceful means, to help solve unification in a manner that would give all political elements "fair and effective" representation in the Chinese Government, and to make clear that there would be no American military intervention in China's civil war.

That Gen Marshall was doomed to failure almost from the outset is more obvious today, in retrospect, than it was in 1945 and 1946. At that time we had just concluded a war of our own, and the optimism of our domestic situation made us exceedingly sanguine in our hope for peace elsewhere. Moreover, we had more confidence in Soviet intentions at that time than, for very apparent reasons, we have now. Nevertheless, there were many indications even then that internal peace in China could not be effected under existing conditions. For one thing, neither side had even the vaguest trust in the other. For another, the nature and methods of Communism should have been patent even then. And for still another, constant changes in the situation in China made it virtually impossible to develop terms that would be any more stable than conditions themselves. As Gen Marshall himself stated later, the Chinese had attempted to use him chiefly as a battlefield umpire, and, diplomatically, he had been wedged in by the opposition to his plans on the part of extreme reactionaries and by constant Chinese Communist misrepresentations of United States policy and purpose. Thus, in 1947 American efforts at mediation in China were terminated. The Chinese were on their own.<sup>4</sup>

Finally, on May 5, 1949, Gen Li Tsung-jen, the Acting

<sup>4</sup>When in 1949, the Chinese Foreign Minister once again requested American aid in negotiations with the Communists, the U. S. reply recalled the events of earlier years. Accordingly, the United States refused to act as an intermediary.

Gen Hurley had been given certain "off-the-record" assurances by Molotov. Subsequent events, says the author, indicate they were very far off the record.

President, summed up China's position in a letter to President Truman:

"Throughout our war of resistance against Japanese aggression, the United States of America continuously extended to us her moral and material assistance, which enabled our country to carry on an arduous struggle of eight long years until final victory was achieved. The sincere friendship thus demonstrated by the United States has contributed not only to strengthen further the traditional ties between our two countries but to win the deep gratitude and unbounded goodwill of the people of China.

This policy of friendly assistance was continued when some years ago when Gen George C. Marshall, under instructions from your good self, took up the difficult task of mediation in our conflict with the Chinese Communists, to which he devoted painstaking effort. All this work was unfortunately rendered fruitless by the lack of sincerity on the part of the then Government and the Chinese Communists.

In spite of this, your country continued to extend its aid to our Government. It is regrettable that, owing to the failure of our then Government to make judicious use of this aid and to bring about appropriate political, economic and military reforms, your assistance has not produced the desired effect. To this failure is attributable the present predicament in which our country finds itself.

The statement constitutes a tragic truth. There is no doubt that the Chinese have deceived themselves. They have chosen to consider an international Communist movement as nationally-inspired reform. From any democratic point of view, and, for that matter, from any point of view consonant with the hope of world peace, their decision is exceedingly unfortunate. As for us, we have once again learned a bitter lesson: that American dollars and good intentions are not enough, and that we cannot judge others by ourselves. It is a lesson not without significance. And it constitutes a good talking point for the even greater development of a muscular right arm.

US MC




PRESENT LIMITATIONS ON COMBAT STRENGTH OF THE Marine Corps are reflected drastically in the rifle units of the Marine infantry battalion. Although the headquarters and weapons units of the battalion have maintained most of their former strength, the number of rifle companies per battalion has been reduced from three to two and the number of rifle platoons per company from three to two.\* Thus, within the present Marine infantry battalion with a total strength of 27 officers and 543 enlisted there are but four rifle platoons, one officer and 43 men per platoon or a total of four officers and 172 men per battalion. The thin red line of assault has grown very thin indeed.

To the Marine infantry officer the short term disadvantages of such an organization are overshadowed by its long term effect on the point of view and character of the Marine Corps as a whole. With experience as a rifle platoon commander available to a small fraction only of our junior officers, a strong tendency toward specialization will exist in spite of career planning and other attempts at counteracting this tendency.

The rifle platoon commander and the rifle company commander are concerned primarily with the leadership of men rather than with supervision over the operation of weapons or machines. As potential combat commanders, they deal with tactics as a whole, both fire and maneuver, and are not limited in their perspective to a particular tactical or technical specialty. Their experience forms a firm basis for later command over units of combined arms. All that can be said regarding the value of

*\*Peacetime tables of organization.*



# RIFLES FOR MARINES

By Maj Anthony Walker

Although this article deals with manpower use in organizations operating on peacetime tables, many of the points made by the author deserve every reader's serious consideration. Like charity, economy of force is something that should begin at home

training with rifle units to junior officers applies with equal force to non-commissioned officers as well.

In the past, the point of view of the Marine infantryman has been the point of view of the Marine Corps: A belief in the value of discipline, a strong sense of responsibility towards subordinates as well as superiors, a consuming interest in weapons and tactics, aggressiveness, confidence, and the desire to break through red tape and petty restrictions and "to get the job done." Without the opportunity for our junior officers and non-commissioned officers in large numbers to gain experience with rifle units, the point of view of our Corps may well change and in fact is changing toward that of the administrator, the service trooper, and the specialist.

Assuming that limitations on total strength of FMF units will remain in effect, additional rifle companies and platoons, if formed, must of necessity be organized from present strength to the greatest strength possible. A suggestion aimed at providing additional rifle platoons with a very minor increase only in total strength of infantry battalions is outlined below.

THE PRELIMINARY STEP is to reduce the strength of the smallest rifle unit, the fire team, from four to three men, thus requiring the fire team leader to perform a dual function as leader and rifleman but still maintaining the triangular organization of the fire team. Those Marines who fought with the Raider Battalions in the early part of the war can attest to the effectiveness of three man fire teams in combat.

In addition, eliminate the sergeant guide and all but one messenger from a rifle platoon headquarters. The sergeant guide was originally the only sergeant in a rifle platoon with corporals for squad leaders. Today, the three rifle squads of a platoon are led by sergeants and the billet of sergeant guide although of some value in war time can well be eliminated during peace. Duties of the sergeant guide can be performed by the platoon sergeant and by the senior squad leader.

Wartime strength included three messengers within platoon headquarters. The practice developed of sending one of these messengers to company headquarters to be used in carrying messages from company to platoon. The remaining two messengers were employed in carrying messages from platoon to company and from the platoon commander to the rifle squad leaders.

In view of the present shortage of personnel, the practice of company requiring the presence of one runner from each platoon at the company command post

should be discontinued. Messages from company to platoon can be carried by personnel of company headquarters.

One messenger within platoon headquarters is quite sufficient for the requirements of the platoon commander, provided the platoon commander and platoon sergeant control the fire and maneuver of the platoon as much as possible through personal contact with the rifle squad leaders. This method of control is in practice adopted by able and aggressive platoon commanders regardless of the number of messengers available.

By incorporating the above changes into the organization of a rifle platoon, there results a platoon with one officer and 32 men total strength as opposed to the present rifle platoon of one officer and 43 men. Thus a reduction in strength of 11 men is effected within the platoon while all key positions are maintained intact.

A RIFLE COMPANY at present strength consists of six officers and 158 enlisted including two rifle platoons of one officer and 43 men each. *Remove the two rifle platoons of present strength and substitute three rifle platoons of one officer and 32 men each. The organization and strength of the rifle company is effected as follows:*

By the addition of one officer and 10 men to the present strength of a rifle company, the triangular organization of the company can be restored. Further, the effect of such a change in the present T/O on the Marine infantry battalion is to provide 24 additional positions of leadership for junior officers and non-commissioned officers at a total increase in strength for the battalion of only two officers and 20 men.

This modest recommendation if adopted would alleviate but would by no means eliminate a situation harmful to the combat efficiency of our Corps. Every opportunity should be grasped to increase the number of rifle units within presently authorized infantry battalions. Only by affording a larger percentage of our junior officers and non-commissioned officers the opportunity to train as leaders within such rifle units can the Marine Corps hope to maintain the high standards of combat leadership responsible for past victories in war and high esteem in peace.

USMC

*Maj Walker is a Yale graduate, Class of '39. He enlisted in the Corps that same year and received a commission in 1941. He is a veteran of the New Georgia, Guam, and Okinawa operations. At the present time, Maj Walker is the exec of the Reserve Training Battalion, Camp Lejeune.*



# Let's look at



By 1stLt Marion W. Morrisset

WITH THE GROWING EMPHASIS ON AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, it became evident early in World War II that an amphibious training command was necessary. This organization was needed to further the training of the troop units and their naval components destined to participate in the predominantly amphibious type of warfare that was then being conducted in the Pacific. To make this necessity a realization, the Amphibious Training Command, Pacific Fleet, was established in the summer of 1943. Three years later in April of 1946 a similar Amphibious Training Command was activated at Little Creek, Norfolk, Virginia.

## Mission and Organization

DESIGNATED the Amphibious Training Command, Atlantic Fleet, this new establishment was and is directly responsible to the Commander Amphibious Forces, Atlantic Fleet, and is assigned the specific mission of "conducting amphibious training for assigned ships, units, and personnel of the Armed Forces, including reserve elements thereof, and for military personnel of certain designated foreign countries, in order to support amphibious operations and training and to develop and maintain maximum combat preparedness in amphibious warfare of the units of the Armed Forces assigned."

In order to accomplish this mission, the Training Command has been divided into three subordinate units of equal command level: Troop Training Unit (TTU) which is primarily concerned with the amphibious training of troops, Naval Amphibious Training Unit (NATU) which conducts amphibious training predominantly naval in character, and the Naval Amphibious Base (USNAB) which is charged with the logistic support of both training agencies.

TTU's organization is similar in form to that of a Marine divisional staff. BrigGen Robert H. Pepper, USMC, the present and fourth Commanding General, has a bal-

---

*Lt Morrisset is a Texan and NROTC graduate from Miami U. He first served with the 2nd Marines at Camp Lejeune and is now in the Intelligence Section of TTU Lant, Little Creek, Virginia.*

anced general and special staff augmented by a complement of commissioned instructors and a requisite number of enlisted personnel. His present command consists of 38 Marine officers and 101 Marine enlisted men.

## Location and Training Facilities

TWO IMPORTANT FACTORS that aid TTU in accomplishing its assigned mission are its ideal location and the training facilities available. The Naval Amphibious Base, an integral part of the Hampton Roads naval establishment, provides ready access to the ships and landing craft of the Amphibious Force, U. S. Atlantic Fleet. Such a unique training advantage is not found elsewhere on the Atlantic coast.

For classroom instruction a complete training aids library is maintained with many training aids that are peculiar to amphibious type instruction. To add realism to training, a decommissioned APA (*Burleson*) is used for many phases of training. Other training aids and facilities used by TTU include scale models of all types of amphibious ships and craft, charts, slides, training films, sand tables, prototypes of landing craft and vehicles, equipped classrooms, theaters, and approximately six miles of landing beaches located on the shores of Chesapeake Bay at Little Creek and on the Atlantic coast at Camp Pendleton (Virginia Beach), Virginia.


Landings made at these two beaches offer experience to trainee units in landing on both an ocean coast and on a sheltered or bay coast. The beaches at Camp Pendleton, bordering the Atlantic Ocean, provide trainees with the surf and beach conditions of the ocean while the beaches at Little Creek, being located on Chesapeake Bay, are relatively sheltered and offer trainees the experience of landing on a bay coast. Both beaches are ideally suited



**ABOVE:** TTU Lant's Commanding General, BrigGen Robert H. Pepper, shown with members of his staff and two West Point cadets, having a look at the situation map during the most recent of the CAMID exercises.



**ABOVE:** TTU's Demonstration Boat Team shows a group of Army amphibious students the organization and functioning of the boat team prior to the students' practical work. "Dry net" mock-up is one of the many used by TTU at the Little Creek amphibious base.



**BELOW LEFT:** Capt Rex Z. Michael, Jr., TTU instructor in waterproofing course, points out techniques used on a motor. **BELOW CENTER:** An enlisted TTU instructor conducts an outdoor class on island of Vieques. These are Army students from the 65th Infantry Regiment at San Juan, Puerto Rico. **BELOW RIGHT:** The intricacies of transport rigging are explained while an Army student tries his hand at loading on a scale model.



for amphibious training as they are typical of suitable landing beaches found on the coasts of most land masses and islands throughout the world.

### How TTU Accomplishes Its Mission of Troop Training

TTU's MISSION of amphibious troop training is accomplished by providing a complete amphibious curriculum of instruction that is formulated to cover two specific phases of the amphibious operation: the ship-to-shore movement and the seizure of the initially assigned objective ashore. Planning for and the execution of phases necessary to accomplish the ship-to-shore movement comprise most of the syllabus of training and instruction. Included within this syllabus is the problem of embarkation in accordance with the plans for the ultimate tactical and logistical ship-to-shore movement.

Instruction in tactical planning stresses coordination of boat assignment tables, the landing diagram, the initial scheme of maneuver ashore, and the air, artillery and naval gunfire support plan.

Combat loading of all types of amphibious ships and craft and a complete administrative plan to support the operation plan are included in instruction on logistical planning.

TTU is equipped to provide amphibious training to units up to and including the size of an infantry division. Facilities of the Naval Amphibious Base are adequate for the logistic support of 5,000 men and 300 officers. Therefore, in training an infantry division, the division is divided into three equal training increments, each approximately the size of a reinforced regimental combat team.

Training is divided into two phases—ashore and afloat. A total of 10 training days is usually required to train each increment. Normally, upon the completion of the ashore phase training of one increment, the next succeeding increment will begin its ashore training while the preceding increment undergoes its afloat phase of training. This overlapping of the training of troop elements results in a shortened period of training for the division. The training period for an infantry division has been reduced to 32 training days or 44 calendar days.

Before any troop element receives troop amphibious training, it must have completed both basic infantry training and the amphibious specialist schools.

TTU is prepared to provide amphibious training for troop units either at the U. S. Naval Amphibious Base or at the home base of the trainee unit. The decision as to which location will be used for training is usually based upon three basic considerations. These are: (1) time available for amphibious training, (2) facilities and training aids available at or near the base of the trainee unit, and (3) the scope of the amphibious training desired.

Elements of the 2d Marine Division receive refresher amphibious training from TTU yearly at Little Creek and at Camp LeJeune, North Carolina. U. S. Army troops

of the 65th Infantry Regiment, the 2d Armored Division and the First Separate Infantry Battalion have been given amphibious training at their home bases. The 3rd Infantry Division (Reinforced) has received amphibious training at its home bases and at Little Creek. Army amphibious training commitments have been fulfilled at Fort Devens, Massachusetts; Fort Benning, Georgia; Camp Hood, Texas; Tyndall Field, Florida; San Juan, Puerto Rico; Fort Gulick, Canal Zone; and Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland.

Three Canadian Army cadres and a class of Venezuelan Marines are examples of TTU's students from friendly foreign governments. Observers from other friendly foreign governments have witnessed particular phases of amphibious training and instruction as presented by TTU.

Special troop amphibious training has been conducted for composite groups of the United States armored forces. Typical of units that have received this training are the officer students from the Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; the Ordnance School, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; the Chemical Corps School, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland; the Transportation School, Fort Eustis, Virginia; and the Quartermaster School, Fort Lee, Virginia. Due to the limited time that these officer students are at the Amphibious Base, their training is concentrated. In a period of approximately five days they receive a familiarization course covering all phases of amphibious training. So that they may see and inspect the tools of amphibious warfare they tour the Norfolk Naval Base and the West Annex of the Amphibious Base. This tour helps the students to better understand the capabilities and limitations of the implements of amphibious warfare. The training received during this special amphibious course is not provided for elsewhere in the curriculum of their respective schools.



Once a year during their summer vacation, the Cadets from West Point and the Midshipmen from Annapolis receive special amphibious troop training. This amphibious troop training is in preparation for CAMID, a joint service academy amphibious operation held annually for the last four years. During CAMID Cadets and Midshipmen fill the billets of the officers and men of the Landing Force. By doing this, these future officers of the Armed Forces gain a practical viewpoint usually unobtainable in the classroom or on the demonstration field.

## TTU's Amphibious Specialist Courses

THE REGULARLY established amphibious courses of TTU are primarily amphibious specialist courses. The Shore Party Course, Transport Quartermaster Course, Amphibious Communications Course, Advanced Troop Amphibious Intelligence Course, Waterproofing Course, Troop Amphibious Staff Planning Course, Troop Supporting Arms Course (Naval Gunfire-Air-Artillery), and the Basic Troop Amphibious Course are examples of these schools. Students in these courses are representatives of all branches of our Armed Forces.

Special Staff Officers from units designated as future trainees of TTU usually matriculate in the Quarterly Transport Quartermaster School. In this school the students not only learn the fundamentals of amphibious logistics and loading but receive actual experience during the periods of practical work while loading a simulated unit's equipment aboard a decommissioned APA (*Burleson*). Graduates of this school, who are fully qualified troop transport quartermasters, have learned the technique of formulating embarkation and loading plans in sufficient time to aid them in the preparation of their own units' embarkation and loading plans.

All Marine officers assigned to duty as transport quartermasters (TQM) aboard the ships of the Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force must complete TTU's TQM School prior to reporting aboard ship. TTU's TQM School is the only one of its kind on the East Coast. Another TQM School is organized on the West Coast as a part of TTU Pac.

Special sub-courses within the Amphibious Specialist Courses are designed to give refresher amphibious training or to emphasize specific phases of amphibious instruction. For example, U. S. Naval Officer students from the Navy Intelligence School at Anacostia, D. C., receive a special troop amphibious intelligence course from TTU. Subject matter presented to these students is not covered elsewhere in their school's curriculum.

Elements of the U. S. Air Force receive specialized training in the procedures and techniques involved in providing close air support to an amphibious operation. Necessary organization and equipment, communication procedures and operational techniques are included in the course presented to the Tactical Air Control Parties.

## Summer Training of the Marine Corps Reserve

THE SUMMER Reserve training period of 1950 marks the third year that selected Reserve units of the Marine Corps have been trained by TTU in the technique of amphibious warfare. Time allocated to planning for their summer training has increased in proportion to the number of units and individuals designated to receive amphibious training.

The training syllabus presented to Reserve units is

modified yearly to meet the requirements of each individual unit and is revised yearly to incorporate newly developed techniques and equipment. In addition to the complete training curriculum given at Little Creek, the extensive facilities of the firing range at Dam Neck, Virginia, are available for required practice firing. Each individual is afforded the opportunity of proving his marksmanship on the firing range.

The spring and fall training pattern indicates that the end of the 1950 training season will see approximately 4,450 officers and enlisted men of the Reserve component added to the roll of TTU students.

## The Evolution of TTU's Yearly Pattern of Training

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS of the experience gained while presenting troop amphibious training to units and individuals has resulted in the evolution of the training pattern presently used by TTU. The resultant of this analysis is the chronological presentation of training to the following units and individuals:

1. Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve officers and enlisted men—amphibious specialist schools.
2. Organized Marine Corps Reserve units—infantry, artillery, and engineer—troop amphibious training.
3. NROTC midshipmen—familiarization amphibious training.
4. Elements of the U. S. Air Force—amphibious specialist schools
5. Elements of the Second Marine Division—refresher amphibious training.
6. West Point Cadets and Annapolis Midshipmen—amphibious training in preparation for CAMID.
7. Second Marine Division—refresher troop amphibious training.
8. Elements of the U. S. Army—designated in accordance with the policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for troop amphibious training.

In addition to the training given these units, TTU instructors give special instruction to classes of the Naval Amphibious Schools at Little Creek. For this instruction a reciprocal exchange of Naval instruction is received.

## In Conclusion


SINCE THE ORGANIZATION of TTU Lant in April of 1946, its staff of 38 Marine officers and 101 Marine enlisted men, augmented during peak loads as necessary, has given amphibious training to 12,000 officers and 43,000 enlisted men of the Armed Forces. A breakdown of this box score shows that for every officer or enlisted man on the staff of TTU, over 400 officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces have received amphibious training from TTU. This figure alone gives you the accomplishments of your Troop Training Unit. USMC



# ATOMIC BOMB In Tactical Warfare

By 1stLt Nicholas A. Canzona

Figure 1



There has been a great deal of clamor about the strategic importance of the atom bomb, but little mention of its tactical significance. The author says the bomb will play a decisive role in the tactical operations of any major future war

RECENTLY I WAS PRESENT AT A CLASSROOM DISCUSSION of general tactics between a group of junior officers of all services and a lieutenant colonel of the Air Force. In presenting his material for discussion, the colonel mentioned the atomic bomb as a factor to be considered in future combined operations. This apparently timely statement brought about an immediate verbal outburst from one student who contended that the atomic bomb, like its deadly sisters, poison gas and biological agents, would never again see strategical usage let alone tactical employment. According to this student, the brutal, far-reaching effects of the bomb would cause both sides to withhold it out of pure terror of reprisal. Much to my surprise, several other members of the class joined in the discussion with similar arguments.

Previously I had heard this same humane approach to the subject of atomic warfare from many civilians but few military personnel. I certainly did not realize that this viewpoint was being so rigidly adhered to by many officers who might someday hold responsible positions in the National Defense.


The purpose of this writing is to present an opinion concerning the feasibility of the tactical employment of the atomic bomb in future military operations. If its employment is feasible, then it is at the same time both possible and probable. I hope that the ideas presented here not only will bring about responses from others who have studied the subject, but also will encourage those who have thus far ignored it to give it the careful consideration it deserves.

I maintain that the atomic bomb and other atomic weapons will play a prominent, probably decisive, part in the tactical operations of any future major war. Further, I contend that any conclusions to the contrary are the products of dangerous wishful thinking.

Modern warfare provides an all-too-appropriate setting for atomic weapons; consequently, the warring faction that hesitates to use them in the field may find itself quickly vanquished by one audacious, surprise stroke of its enemy.

Should both sides employ atomic weapons from the outset of hostilities, the resulting tactical considerations by commanders will cause to ensue a mode of warfare similar to that which existed in large theaters during

"... They'll never use them on us out of pure terror of reprisal. . ."



Circle indicates the total area devastated by the atomic bomb strike on Hiroshima, Japan in 1945.

World War II. All things being equal, mobility will be the prime requisite for a victorious campaign, with the ultimate in tactical air support running a close second. The supporting roles played by logistic, engineer, medical, and other such services will have greater significance than ever before.

While certainly not to be underrated in the defense, the atomic bomb is obviously an ideal tool for the aggressive commander. Regardless of whether the progress of science brings the atom to company level or reserves it for army, fleet, and wing use, it will still be more advantageous to the attacker than to the defender. To illustrate this all-important point, I have drawn up a simplified, theoretical situation which might possibly exist in the field of a future war.


Referring to Figure One, we see a 34-mile sector of a



# ATOMIC BOMB In Tactical Warfare

By 1stLt Nicholas A. Canzona

Figure 1



There has been a great deal of clamor about the strategic importance of the atom bomb, but little mention of its tactical significance. The author says the bomb will play a decisive role in the tactical operations of any major future war

RECENTLY I WAS PRESENT AT A CLASSROOM DISCUSSION of general tactics between a group of junior officers of all services and a lieutenant colonel of the Air Force. In presenting his material for discussion, the colonel mentioned the atomic bomb as a factor to be considered in future combined operations. This apparently timely statement brought about an immediate verbal outburst from one student who contended that the atomic bomb, like its deadly sisters, poison gas and biological agents, would never again see strategic usage let alone tactical employment. According to this student, the brutal, far-reaching effects of the bomb would cause both sides to withhold it out of pure terror of reprisal. Much to my surprise, several other members of the class joined in the discussion with similar arguments.

Previously I had heard this same humane approach to the subject of atomic warfare from many civilians but few military personnel. I certainly did not realize that this viewpoint was being so rigidly adhered to by many officers who might someday hold responsible positions in the National Defense.

The purpose of this writing is to present an opinion concerning the feasibility of the tactical employment of the atomic bomb in future military operations. If its employment is feasible, then it is at the same time both possible and probable. I hope that the ideas presented here not only will bring about responses from others who have studied the subject, but also will encourage those who have thus far ignored it to give it the careful consideration it deserves.

I maintain that the atomic bomb and other atomic weapons will play a prominent, probably decisive, part in the tactical operations of any future major war. Further, I contend that any conclusions to the contrary are the products of dangerous wishful thinking.

Modern warfare provides an all-too-appropriate setting for atomic weapons; consequently, the warring faction that hesitates to use them in the field may find itself quickly vanquished by one audacious, surprise stroke of its enemy.

Should both sides employ atomic weapons from the outset of hostilities, the resulting tactical considerations by commanders will cause to ensue a mode of warfare similar to that which existed in large theaters during

"... They'll never use them on us out of pure terror of reprisal..."



Circle indicates the total area devastated by the atomic bomb strike on Hiroshima, Japan in 1945.

World War II. All things being equal, mobility will be the prime requisite for a victorious campaign, with the ultimate in tactical air support running a close second. The supporting roles played by logistic engineer, medical, and other such services will have a significance greater than ever before.

While certainly not to be underrated in the defense, the atomic bomb is obviously an ideal tool for the aggressive commander. Regardless of whether the progress of science brings the atom to company level or reserves it for army, fleet, and wing use, it will still be more advantageous to the attacker than to the defender. To illustrate this all-important point, I have drawn up a simplified, theoretical situation which might possibly exist in the field of a future war.

Referring to Figure One, we see a 34-mile sector of a



main defense line which we shall assume is approximately 300 miles wide. The "Defender," on the north bank of the river, is defending either his homeland or an allied territory against the "Aggressor" to the south.

A state of war has existed for a few months, but to date neither side has made a major effort in the field. The conduct of the war has thus far been restricted to strategic and tactical air operations and submarine action against naval surface forces and shipping.

The governmental agencies and supreme command of the Defender have a stockpile of atomic bombs at their disposal and know that the enemy has a similar supply. Although it is common knowledge that the amount of bombs in possession of both the Defender and the Aggressor is limited, neither side knows the exact number held by the other.

The Defender erroneously considers that his enemy will not employ atomic bombs either strategically or tactically for fear of reprisal. In other words, the Aggressor is being given the opportunity of deciding the issue.

Both sides are wary enough to have maintained maximum allowable dispersion of forces; however, in order to defend effectively, the Defender is bound to more narrow limits of dispersion.

By virtue of his position as would-be attacker, we can assume the Aggressor to have an edge in numbers and air superiority.

Planning a dawn attack of major proportions along the entire front, the Aggressor decides to attempt critical penetration in the ABLE-BAKER-CHARLIE sector, for the purpose of flanking the Defender line and paving the way for a decisive breakthrough.

Designating 0600 as H-Hour, the Aggressor Commander orders atomic bombs exploded at high altitudes over the ABLE, BAKER, and CHARLIE areas at midnight prior to the attack. These air explosions will afford him desirable blast effect but will minimize radiation hazards. He knows that the Defender will have difficulty in determining the heights of the explosions and will consequently have to consider maximum radiation dangers.

In addition, the Aggressor will explode a fourth bomb over SUGAR which is a desirable dropping zone for parachutists and a fifth over XRAY, the sector communication center. These last bombs are dropped simultaneously with the others.

The solid circles in Figure One show approximate areas that will be totally destroyed, and, with miraculous exceptions, everyone within these areas will be killed. Outside these areas but within the limits of the broken circles, damage and casualties will be staggering.\* Communications, laterally and in depth, for the entire sector

\*Calculated from results of atomic bombs already exploded. The much-publicized Hydrogen or "Super" Bomb would of course affect a much greater area.

will be either destroyed or reduced to temporary impotency. Those front-line troops and local inhabitants still alive will be demoralized, and, needless to say, hopeless confusion will envelop the entire sector.

Throughout the hours of darkness before and after the explosions of the bombs, armored and mechanized Aggressor shock units speed to common jump-off points from widely dispersed and well concealed assembly areas. At 0600 lighting diversionary thrusts are made at BAKER and CHARLIE while the main effort, with maximum artillery, guided missile, and air support, is directed at the ABLE area.

THE Aggressor Commander knows that by 0600 radiation will have been dissipated to the extent that his forces can pass through the ABLE area with few future casualties due to radioactivity. Another important point to consider in this respect is this: *If the Aggressor Nation is one that has an extreme abundance of manpower and is not averse to sacrificing quantities of personnel, the Aggressor Commander could exploit the bombed areas even sooner—in fact, shortly after the explosion of the bombs.\**

At dawn an Aggressor airborne division is dropped into the SUGAR area. It meets no resistance in the devastated area and thus is able to organize quickly and drive to the east to work in conjunction with forward armored and mechanized units attacking through ABLE. This airborne division might

also be given the mission of establishing a temporary perimeter around but outside the danger area of SUGAR so that other airborne Aggressor units would have time to land and organize.

You will note from Figure One that the Aggressor is channelizing his attack in this sector through an edge of the decimated ABLE area. Remember that this channelizing can take place over several thousand yards of blasted ground; therefore, a considerable degree of dispersion can still be maintained, especially with the Aggressor's ultra-mobility.

Once beyond the emptiness of the bombed area, the attacking elements will spread into three pincers, one to roll the Defender's exposed eastern flank, another to effect deeper penetration, and the third to join the airborne units for a drive to the east.

\*Two or three hours after an atomic explosion, the over-all intensity of radiation falls off quite sharply. Length of time of exposure and intensity of radiation are among the primary factors in determining casualties. If a man enters a radioactive area five or six hours after an atomic explosion (high altitude) and remains not longer than one or two hours, he probably will not be affected physically to any great extent. On the other hand, if a group of people enter a radioactive area soon after the explosion and remain for any length of time, all will eventually become ill and some will die. It must be realized also that radiation sickness under these circumstances is a "delayed action" affair, so people being harmfully exposed can be useful for several hours or even days before succumbing to the effects. There are numerous variables involved in these considerations, and proper treatment of them would involve lengthy and detailed discussion and explanation. The author here has merely touched on generalities to illustrate his points.

Naturally the supply and engineer problems of the Aggressor would assume a very delicate nature at this point, especially if the Defender were willing to drop atom bombs on his own territory in order to cut off advance Aggressor forces. Therefore, to cope with any possibility, the Aggressor Commander has supplementary (or even primary) provisions for supplying and reinforcing the attacking units by air.

It must not be forgotten that the Aggressor has initiated offensive action along the entire 300-mile front and that the various auxiliary attacks might possibly be aided with atomic explosions also. The Defender of course cannot neglect other portions of his line in order to employ his total reserve of manpower and weapons against the critical threat in the ABLE-BAKER-CHARLIE sector.

\* \* \*

☛ THERE is no need to provide further developments or a final outcome for this hypothetical battle. I believe this simple breakdown of a possible tactical situation illustrates how atom bombs could be employed in an important offensive action.

Experts or specialists on the theory of defense can immediately bombard the foregoing example with the bombshells of their extensive knowledge and experience. I have left innumerable questions unanswered. What about the Defender's atomic weapons? Would the Defender sit back and allow the Aggressor to occupy the bombed areas? What is the Defender's air force doing during the attack? What about the roads and bridges in the bombed areas?

In answer let me remind the reader once again that this presentation is meant to stimulate interest concerning a possibility that may materialize next month or next year. For those who think that I have lost my point by not inserting the myriad of realistic variables and offering feasible solutions to the multitude of problems they present, I say this: In every war these same basic questions have hung over the heads of the warring factions, and yet one side has always won. In World War II, Germany, Italy, and Japan had armies, navies, and air forces just as the Allies did, but the Allies won. And somebody will always win, despite the complexities brought about by variation and innovation in methods and weapons.

A simple sketch and a few paragraphs of hypothesis aren't meant to establish a criterion of warfare. In fact, no book, volume of books, or even war itself has succeeded in giving us all the answers. Nevertheless, with reasonable foresight, study, and training, we can prepare to meet eventualities with confidence rather than fear, intelligent decision rather than dubious hesitation, and effective methods and weapons rather than obsolescence.

The enemy will be ready. Let us be also. USMC



# The \$10,000 Question



BILLION DOLLAR, our stock into a et? How much of \$10,000. Ri- ll group of near- such a corpora- 10,000 and—be- last August—you e return on your

verybody knows y enough. How nsurance? Have For that matter, ce you have?

on other service 9 billion dollars' e show that less ons, still retain during the war. ve not been con- e.<sup>2</sup> These figures s that the "total arbor to V-J Day eriod there were d in accidents."<sup>3</sup>

pay a specific se an intangible rable to security rders on financial a social science efore, too often yond the under-

5, amount \$10,000) e than 70% of the

stration on 1 Octo-

1947.

---

**By MSgt John Bois**

---

standing of the average person. This, more than any other single reason, has caused over 10 million persons to let their insurance lapse and become almost<sup>4</sup> worthless.

Within the next six months approximately 441,000 term insurance policies, issued under the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940, will expire. Every term policy issued prior to 1 January 1946 provides coverage for a full eight years. Therefore, if your term policy was issued about eight years ago, you must soon decide whether you want to renew it, convert it to a permanent plan, or drop it completely.

The Veterans' Administration is notifying policy holders, by letter, of the expiration date of each term policy and it is providing forms for renewing the insurance for an additional five-year term, as authorized by Congress. If you are in the service and are paying your term insurance premiums by allotment, you should receive this information and the forms through the Disbursing Officer handling your pay accounts. Authority has been granted the Disbursing Branch to discontinue your present allotment and institute a new allotment for the increased premium without immediate approval from you. If you receive notification from the Disbursing Officer that this action has been taken to prevent a lapse of coverage, you can sanction such action by completing and returning the Veterans' Administration form you will find enclosed with the notification, or you can stop your allotment by request and all monies already deducted will

quired. The proper remittance is determined by consulting premium rate tables and determining what the proper monthly premium is for your age at the time of renewal. Premium payments or renewed policies will be somewhat higher than those previously paid.

Three out of every four policies now in effect are still five-year level premium term insurance.<sup>5</sup> If you are one of the policy holders who have resisted or postponed converting to a permanent plan, you are probably going to ask several pertinent questions when you receive notification that your present term policy is about to expire. Since the advantages and disadvantages of term insurance vary according to individual needs and desires, you should know what term insurance really is so that you can make an intelligent decision regarding your own particular insurance problem.

When National Service Life Insurance was first authorized in 1940 it could only be purchased on the term plan. This is "cheap" life insurance with all the trimming sheared. For a few cents per thousand per month, you insure your life for any amount up to \$10,000 in multiples of \$500. On the first of the month this small premium is deducted from your pay and credited to the U. S. Treasury Department for the NSLI trust fund. That premium buys your beneficiary a lottery ticket on your life for thirty days. If your number is called during



you are still alive, it is apparent that you have nothing to show for the money you have already spent.

Are you guaranteed cheap protection as long as you want it and pay for it? Legally you are not. The guarantee extends only through the term period set by Congress. It took a separate act of Congress<sup>7</sup> to extend NSLI term insurance for its second five-year period. The law makes no provision for future terms and when this second term expires another act must be passed before you can renew NSLI term insurance for a third term. If such acts are passed<sup>8</sup> you will continue to pay an increased premium each time you renew your term insurance.

☛ YOUR TERM POLICY does not have any cash value nor any extended coverage value other than a 30-day grace period. On the other hand, there are some important features about term insurance that are very much in its favor. The inexpensive monthly rate is one already mentioned. More important to many of you is the possibility of increasing the value of your estate. This is done by carrying term insurance and investing the premium savings. This investment must be planned and continuous. The end result will be an increased estate available to your beneficiary at the time of your death.

For example, suppose you convert to 20-year endowment at age 30. You will pay \$41.55 per thousand per year for the next 20 years. If your policy had a face value of \$10,000 and you died 10 years after converting, you would have paid in \$4,155. Your estate would be worth, and your beneficiary would receive, \$10,000, but \$4,155 of it would be accumulated premiums, your own money.<sup>9</sup> However, if you renew term insurance at age 30, you will pay \$8.41 per thousand per year for five years and \$9.00 per thousand per year for the next five years. If you should die 10 years after renewing your term policy, you will have paid in \$870.50 for \$10,000, a difference of \$3,284.50. Therefore, if you will just hoard this difference under your mattress, your estate at death will amount to \$13,284.50. Invested soundly, the return on \$328.44 per year for 10 years will amount to several hundred more dollars.<sup>10</sup> Your estate might well equal \$14,000 to \$15,000. These facts are true, although on a smaller ratio, if you invest the dif-



ference between your term insurance premium and the premiums for any other type of permanent plan.

In view of the above figures, why should you convert? The answer might very well be that you shouldn't. You should not convert if: (a) you can actually carry out a planned savings or investment program based on premium savings resulting from term coverage because, as previously stated, you can increase your estate value by retaining term insurance; (b) your age is much over 40 because at 40 your life expectancy is 31.05 more years and at 50 it is reduced to 22.98 more years, which probably means that you, personally, could not benefit by a change to permanent insurance and your beneficiary would actually lose because a part of the insurance proceeds would really be money you saved; or, (c) your family conditions are such that you need heavy coverage temporarily, because you can take the difference between permanent and term premiums and purchase additional civilian term coverage with it.

Conversely, if your personal case falls outside the above listed generalities, or if your income is higher than average, or if you know that it is not probable that you will meet the requirements of planned savings and investments, you should certainly convert your policy to the permanent plan that best suits your needs.

When you convert a term policy to a permanent plan you are in effect, engaging in a form of planned savings and investment. Beginning with the effective date of such a policy, your premiums are no longer a total loss. They begin to earn interest; they begin to accrue into a cash reserve; they begin to build an extension period during which you are insured without further payments; and, they begin to establish "paid-up insurance," insurance that requires no payments to keep it in force for the rest of your life. As important as any of the preceding, is the fact that by paying higher premiums you actually reduce the cost of your coverage in ever increasing amounts.

For example, suppose both you and Xray (any other Marine) have \$10,000 term insurance policies. You are

<sup>10</sup>This is not a haphazard guess. Figured at 4 per cent interest, \$328.45 invested yearly for 10 years would return \$3,943.42. The New York Stock Exchange has published figures on dividend yields which prove that 566 companies, or over 55 per cent of all the common stocks listed on the Exchange, have made dividend disbursements for at least 10 consecutive years. The average annual dividend yield is a little over 6 per cent for most of these stocks. The Exchange admits that stock investment is not guaranteed, but pointedly states, "... dividends do usually return a better than (bank) interest income."

<sup>7</sup>Public Law 838, 80th Congress.

<sup>8</sup>As they continually have been for U.S. Government Life Insurance term policies.

<sup>9</sup>These figures, and all similar figures in this article, do not include interest (dividend) payments.

both 30 when your term policies expire. Xray renews his term insurance, but you convert yours to ordinary life. Ten years later you and Xray compare insurance facts and figures.

☛ YOU HAVE PAID monthly premiums of \$15.60, a total of \$1,872 while Xray has paid only \$882. At first glance it would seem that Xray has had a much better deal. After all, it cost you \$990 more for the same amount of coverage. However, you purchased a lot more than coverage. You can cash your policy in for \$1,201, plus any accumulated dividends. If you do, you have actually paid less than \$671 for your 10 years of insurance protection. This is \$211 less than Xray paid under the term plan. Or, you can exchange your policy for a paid-up insurance which will pay your beneficiary \$2,614.20 when it matures at your death. Since the paid-up policy cost you \$1,872 in premiums, the net gain would amount to \$742.20. If Xray stops paying premiums, his beneficiary will receive nothing when he dies. A net loss of \$882.

Under another option, at your request, your \$10,000 insurance protection would continue for 13 $\frac{1}{3}$  more years at no further premium costs to you. In effect you thereby purchase full coverage, under two different plans of insurance, for a total of 23 $\frac{1}{3}$  years at a total cost of \$1,872. If Xray continues his term insurance for 13 $\frac{1}{3}$  more years, he would pay a total of \$2,494 in premium payments for total coverage. His term insurance would cost him \$622 more than your ordinary life. Term insurance is not *always* the most inexpensive type of coverage.

☛ THERE are still other advantages available to the holder of a permanent policy. Think of the time, trouble, and money that can be saved by utilizing the loan value of a permanent policy. It takes the Veterans' Administration about 14 days to process a loan application. You are entitled to borrow up to 94 per cent of the cash reserve value of your policy at the low interest rate of four per cent per year. No collateral is required and your insurance coverage continues as long as you keep paying the monthly premiums.<sup>11</sup>

If you decide that conversion would be beneficial in your particular case, you will want to know which of the six available plans best suits your needs. Ordinary life, 30-pay life, and 20-pay life are life insurance plans, while 20-year endowment, endowment at 60, and endowment at 65 only provide insurance until they mature, at which time the full face value of your endowment policy is available either in one lump-sum or in annuity payments.

Ordinary Life provides insurance protection by the payment of a fixed premium throughout your lifetime.

<sup>11</sup>Some veterans who had converted their term insurance found that loan benefits offered an alternative to waiting for their dividend payments.

Under the other life insurance plans you need only pay the fixed premium for twenty or thirty years.<sup>12</sup>

Premiums for all policies are based on age, amount of insurance, and type of coverage. In the life insurance plans, Ordinary Life is the least expensive and Twenty-Pay Life is the most expensive. The most expensive policy for those under 40 is the Twenty-year endowment plan. Those over 40 will find that endowment at age 60 is the most expensive.

Some indication of the popularity of various plans was given by the Veterans' Administration which released the following breakdown of NSLI policies held by World War II veterans on 1 October 1949:

20 Pay Life .....	863,110
30 Pay Life .....	296,900
Ordinary Life .....	272,130
20 Year Endowment .....	125,830
Endowment at 60 .....	59,650
Endowment at 65 .....	27,450

The amount of insurance you should carry depends on your financial status, your family obligations, and other provisions you have made to protect and provide for your family in case of death. A recent insurance survey shows that 89 per cent of those families whose income falls between \$3,000 and \$5,000 per year are insured.<sup>13</sup> In 1948 the families in this group carried an average of \$3,300 to \$4,700 worth of insurance.<sup>14</sup> These figures will help you decide how much protection you should carry. Remember that your insurance dollar buys more than the civilian insurance dollar. Remember, too, your death will deprive your family of your income and the money they receive for the next several years will, in all probability, result only from your insurance foresight. Of course, if your death is service-connected, the government provides nominal allowances for your widow and your dependent children.<sup>15</sup>

Generally speaking, a professional Marine would be in better shape, insurance-wise, if he carried the maximum \$10,000, in either term or Ordinary Life, rather than a smaller amount in one of the higher premium plans of insurance.

If you have carefully read this article you now know some of the more important facts about government insurance and you should realize that a government insurance policy is in truth a valuable and liquidable asset.

USMC

<sup>12</sup>This meets a popular demand which feels that protection should be completely paid for during the income-producing years.

<sup>13</sup>Taken from a survey of consumer finances conducted for the Federal Reserve Board by the University of Michigan in 1947.

<sup>14</sup>Figures furnished by the Institute of Life Insurance, based on data from the Spectator Year Book, Bureau of Census and Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 1948.

<sup>15</sup>Rates of monthly payments under Public Law 2 and the general law for dependents of deceased veterans for service-connected deaths which occur during peacetime and not as a result of armed conflict, extra hazardous conditions, etc.: widow, no child, \$60; widow, one child, \$84; each additional child, \$20.



# Protection For The

By Capt David R. McGrew

---

*Capt McGrew is a test officer with the Ordnance Section, Marine Corps Equipment Board, MCS, Quantico, Virginia.*


---

UP UNTIL THE PRESENT TIME PROTECTION FOR THE individual infantryman has consisted of wearing a helmet and digging in. It seems that a little thought on this subject might afford the individual a little more protection without sacrificing something now considered essential. The first two considerations which are readily apparent are an improved helmet, and body armor.

The history of the helmet as a device of modern warfare started in the early phases of World War I at the instigation of Gen Adrian of the French Army. On a visit to a hospital he found that a soldier's life had been saved because he had been wearing a metal mess bowl in his hat. The general then designed a metal helmet which was soon adopted by the French Army. The first objection to this device was the same as has been raised by the infantryman since time immemorial—the soldiers complained of the increased weight that they would be required to carry. However, the General's helmet was soon found to provide protection more than sufficient to compensate for the discomfort and fatigue resulting from its use. Another attractive feature of this helmet was that it was attractive to the soldier and gave him an added martial distinction.

In 1915 both the British and the German Armies adopted helmets of their own design. When the United States entered World War I the Army selected the British helmet for its use, primarily because over 400,000 of them were available. This helmet was designated the Helmet, M1917, and later models of this helmet manufactured in the United States proved to be ballistically superior to the British version.

A project was initiated shortly after World War I to develop a new helmet for the American Army. Several types were developed and tested, the most popular of which was the 5-A, however when it was service tested by the Infantry Board at Fort Benning, it was found to be unsuitable. As a result, a modification of the M1917 was recommended and when completed the standard helmet was designated the Helmet, M1917A1. This was the standard helmet of the Army and the Marine Corps when pre-World War II expansion of the Armed Forces started. At this time helmet improvement was again considered, and as a result the Helmet, TS-3 with the Hawley liner was



developed and later standardized as the Helmet, M1.

Shortly after the standardization of the M1 helmet several minor defects were encountered and remedied. The "D" rings were improved to prevent them from breaking off during periods of rough handling. A slight change was made in the metallurgical make-up of the helmet to prevent longitudinal cracks from appearing near the visors. T-1 chin straps were developed and standardized in order that worn chin straps could be replaced in the field. The rim of the helmet was replaced with a non-magnetic stainless steel rim, which in turn was later replaced with a non-magnetic Hadfield manganese steel rim when difficulties were encountered with the paint chipping off of the stainless steel. Release chin straps, which were designed to uncouple automatically when a concussion pressure of about 15 pounds was encountered, were developed and standardized in 1945. The M1 helmet with the above described modification is still standard in the Army and the Marine Corps.

What is wrong with the currently standard M1 helmet? During the last war troops complained that: (1) it was too heavy and tended to give the head a "pendulum effect" when the head was suddenly and rapidly turned;



# Infantryman?



Infantryman---  
2000 A.D. ?

(2) the helmet had a "sound box" or "sea shell" effect which interfered with auditory perception; (3) the helmet pushed forward over the eyes when the wearer assumed a prone position; and (4) the silhouette was too high with a resulting high center of gravity. The Department of Army Ordnance considered that it was possible to develop a helmet with none of the undesirable features of the M1 and to include in the design a reduction of weight in addition to an increase in ballistic performance.

As a result several types of new helmets have been designed and tested, none of which have been completely satisfactory. The design of these helmets have included both one and two-piece types, however American troops have been so accustomed to using the helmet as a utility vessel that it is now considered that a helmet of one-piece design would no longer be acceptable.

✻ HOW EFFECTIVE is the M1 helmet and how effective will a new helmet be? Many reasons have been advanced as to why some men were inclined to throw their helmets away in action. The two most popular reasons that have been advanced are: (1) it was heavy and uncomfortable to wear, and (2) the wearer had little faith in the ability of his helmet to afford protection against small arms fire and shell fragments. There is some reason for the first

statement as the helmet is heavy, and while not as uncomfortable as the M1917A1, it is uncomfortable to wear for long periods of time. The second reason advanced is the fault of lack of education of the wearer in just what to expect from his helmet. Many men involved in the fighting of the last war were convinced that their helmets were "no good" because they had seen the helmet penetrated by rifle fire or shell fragments. The M1 helmet will afford reasonable protection against low velocity shell fragments and low velocity bullets. Reducing that statement to something tangible, the helmet will afford no protection against the fragments of a 105mm shell detonated 60 feet from the wearer. The ballistic limit of the Hadfield manganese steel of the thickness provided in the helmet is such that almost all shell fragments of the 105mm shell have a velocity at 60 feet from the burst which is greater than the ballistic limit of the steel. However it is reasonable to believe that the M1 helmet should provide as much as 50 per cent protection against the fragments of a 105mm shell at 200 feet from the burst. The helmet will afford no protection against rifle or machine gun fire at any but extreme ranges. It will afford adequate protection against pistol fire at point blank range and submachine gun fire at ranges of 100-200 yards. Helmets have been, and will be designed which



will perform better than the M1 helmet, but the improvement in performance will not be apparent to the wearer nor is it expected that he will be completely satisfied with the finished product insofar as ballistic performance is concerned. The increase of 200 feet per second in the ballistic performance of an armor material represents a major achievement for the engineer, but it leaves the wearer a bit cold as he is inclined to consider the worth of any helmet not from the standpoint of the number of fragments that it will stop, but from the standpoint of the number of fragments that it will not stop. If the troops who wear the helmet were given to understand that it is impossible to stop a shell fragment with a velocity of some 3000 feet per second and a kinetic energy of about 50,000 foot pounds unless the helmet is constructed from a material which weighs in the neighborhood of 40 pounds per square foot, then it is possible that they might be more inclined to be satisfied with a helmet which is as light as is consistent with its ballistic performance. In short, we will probably get a new helmet which will be lighter, more comfortable to wear, have a lower silhouette and corresponding lower center of gravity, afford the wearer better auditory perception, and give better ballistic performance than the M1 helmet; but only the designer will be able to tell that the ballistic performance is better.

Is THE consideration of body armor for Marine Corps use in amphibious operations a step in the right direction? Although body armor was considered in both World War I and World War II, it wasn't until the advent of the VT fuze that military planners became aware of the urgency of the requirement for additional protection for the individual. The worth of any armor as such is incontestable. However when that worth is balanced against the resulting loss in efficiency and mobility of the wearer, it is possible that the worth of the armor might be a secondary consideration when analyzing the problem of individual protection.

As well as being responsible for the development of the modern helmet, Gen Adrian also considered and developed several types of body armor during World War I. Of all the types developed by the General, only the steel shoulder type was used to any extent and the use of that armor was unquestionably the means of avoiding casualties. The British used several types of flexible and rigid armor for ground troops during World War I most of which was in the form of breast and back plates. These received only limited use since the rigid types were all too heavy and the flexible types did not afford adequate protection.

At Tarawa the attacking Marines had no protection other than the cover offered by shell holes, battle debris, and captured Jap emplacements.



In 1917, Gen Pershing informed the Army Ordnance Department that it was important that body armor be developed for use by American ground troops and as the result, a study of some 30 types of armor was made. Heavy armor was designed to provide protection against rifle and machine gun fire, such as the Brewster Body Shield which weighed about 40 pounds. In 1918, the Metropolitan Museum of Art designed a heavy breast plate modeled after 15th century armor. It consisted of several plates which totaled 27 pounds, but when it was tested it was found that it was noisy, induced fatigue, inhibited movement, and that its disadvantages outweighed its advantages. Light body armor was developed by the Engineering Division of Army Ordnance to meet the needs of the infantryman. This armor was made from manganese steel, weighed 8½ pounds, and was able to resist revolver ammunition at a velocity of 850 feet per second. At a later date, leg and arm protection was added to this combination. There is no record of any extensive use of this armor during World War I. The United States entered World War II with no body armor.

Both the Marine Corps and the Army recommended that body armor for ground troops be developed during World War II. Certain types of Japanese body armor were evaluated in the field, and as a result of this evaluation it was decided that there was a requirement for body armor for the individual American soldier. Several types of body armor were developed by both the Army and the Navy to satisfy this requirement. The Army type was tested by the Infantry Board at Fort Benning and the Navy type was tested by the Marine Corps Equipment Board. Although neither of the types were completely satisfactory, models were manufactured and sent to theaters of operations for service tests. The Army received a limited test in the later stages of the Italian Campaign, but the test was not sufficiently conclusive to determine the value of the armor. The Marine Corps and the Army





sent body armor to the Pacific Theater for service tests, but the war ended before these tests could be completed. In spite of the fact that no exhaustive service tests were conducted during the war, it appears that there was a definite requirement for body armor for ground troops during World War II.

A study of the casualty figures of 57 infantry divisions in the European Theater of Operations indicates that the infantry units, which comprise 68.5 per cent of the strength of the division, suffered 94.7 per cent of the casualties of the division. Another study determined that, in the ETO, shell fragments were the causative agent of from 61.3 percent to 80.4 per cent of the casualties. It seems reasonable to assume that any means taken to reduce these casualties merits consideration.

With the advent of the VT fuze, an entirely new problem is presented in the consideration of protective armor for the individual infantryman. Two considerations are immediately apparent: (1) that the prone type fox hole (slit trench) can no longer be considered adequate protection for the infantryman, and (2) that there is an increased need for back and shoulder protection, at the expense of frontal protection if necessary, for the individual. Back and shoulder protection with a ballistic performance equal, or superior to the M1 helmet would materially reduce casualties to infantrymen if they were in a static position in standing type fox holes. Advancing troops present an entirely different problem.

IN ORDER to provide for 100 per cent protection against shell fragments and rifle and machine gun fire, the weight of the individual armor would have to be 40 pounds per square foot. This situation, of course, makes the consideration of 100 per cent protection impractical. However, utilizing any one of several different types of new armor material, it should be possible to provide body armor for the infantryman which would be ballistically equal to the performance of the M1 helmet and still be sufficiently light and flexible to be acceptable to the infantryman. It should be borne in mind however, that any decrease in the weight per square foot of any armor material also causes a decrease in the ballistic performance of that material.

In the determination of a requirement for body armor for the infantryman, the protection afforded must be balanced against the resulting loss in mobility and efficiency of the wearer. Armor of the lightest weight possible and of optimum design will, to some extent, be uncomfortable and inconvenient to wear. The infantry-

man will lose some of his mobility. If the weight of body armor is kept to a minimum consistent with the protection desired, if it is designed in such a manner that it is reasonably comfortable to wear, and if the added weight is compensated for by the equivalent reduction in weight of the total load which an infantryman now carries, there certainly is requirement for body armor for use by the infantryman.

THE NEXT problem to be solved is the manner in which the total load carried by the infantryman can be reduced. How much can a man carry without losing too much of his mobility and efficiency? There doesn't seem to be much question about the fact that 1000 years ago the soldier carried all that was possible for a man to carry and still move. While concepts of almost all other phases of military operations have changed with the passing of the years, there still has been no change in the concept of the load for the foot soldier. It is believed that the infantryman is now carrying the maximum load that he can carry and still retain the mobility necessary to the accomplishment of his objective. There is no chance in the immediate future for any large scale weight reduction in the load to be carried. Lightweight weapons are in various stages of development, but none are in the physical possession of the troops. If the problem is attacked from the angle of collective small savings in weight rather than one or two large savings, it might be possible to provide sufficient weight saving to compensate for the weight of body armor. If as much as one pound could be saved by use of a new helmet, a few ounces by the elimination of the meat pan, a little by the elimination of the bayonet, still more by the reduction in the weight of clothing, elimination of the field shoe and legging combination and replacing them with a lightweight field boot, ounces saved by the use of lightweight materials for ponchos and blankets, pockets placed in a suit of body armor to eliminate the pack—collectively this weight would provide for an overall weight reduction which might be applied to a suit of effective body armor. An improvement in the system of supply to front line troops might reduce the amount of rations, ammunition, and water which is necessary for the individual to carry ashore in an amphibious operation and thereby effect an additional weight saving which is over and above that required for body armor.

As to the utilization of body armor, if our reaction is going to be, "My God, what are they going to hang on us next?", then it will die just as it did in World War I and World War II. However if the problem is approached with the idea in mind that it will certainly reduce casualties, reduce correspondence to the next of kin, and that it is possible to make allowances for the additional weight to be carried, then I believe that we will have something that we can use.

USMC




Officers of women's service groups  
USN; Gen Pate; WOTC student  
and LtCol Cora M. Foster, WAC

Training Class. These candidates  
ents, civilian college graduates,  
regular active duty units, or mem-  
e units, all beginning a six week  
e followed later by another class  
atherneck officers completing the

class points in the nation, colleges  
best, including Phi Beta Kappa  
this preparation. The training of  
es closely parallels that of male of-  
with the exception of most combat sub-  
phases of combat operations are within  
course via lectures and demonstrations.

a WOTC program? Its graduates who  
ly completed the junior and senior courses  
ral ways. For a small select number, com-  
r active duty are granted. The majority re-  
missions in the Volunteer Reserve on call in  
a national emergency. Some of these commis-  
women continue to participate in Marine Corps  
through an organized active reserve unit. A few of  
hem help to form volunteer training groups in their own  
home areas. Marine Corps traditions are strongly fixed  
in the hearts of all the candidates, no matter where or  
how they serve.

(Continued on next page)






**LEFT:** Program for WOTC students begins with their reporting in. First-year students are then given service clothing to replace civilian apparel, and assigned bunks in squad room. **BELOW:** Regular inspections are conducted to see that girls are in proper uniform, are neat, and show military bearing.



**BELOW LEFT:** Here's what you do when you abandon ship at the Schools' enlisted pool. **BELOW RIGHT:** Machine gunners never had it so good before. It's all part of the intensive training the girls receive while at WOTC.







Within a few days after their arrival, Women Marine officer trainees prove their adaptability, stamina, and precision. Wearing the smart white-and-green-striped seersucker uniform, marching briskly, they exhibit the "snap" and spirit of their male counterparts.

Classroom work guided by men and women officers of the Marine Corps Schools is intensive and thorough. To balance the program, there is drill instruction and organized athletics, plus ample opportunity for recreation and relaxation.

What does a Woman Marine learn? That's a big order. First, of course, she learns the purpose of the Women's Reserve and its place in the over-all picture of the Marine Corps and its component parts. Only a few days go by before they are acquainted with Marine Corps history, courtesies and customs of the service, and regulations on uniform, barracks, and post.

Current events aren't neglected either. Physical education, physical fitness, and personal hygiene are accented in the program as well. As examples of the wide scope of this course, there are such subjects as guard duty, personnel administration, first aid, and methods of teaching. Add further some training in the handling of correspondence, keeping fitness reports, plus maintaining files, and you have just half the recipe for a junior course in the Women Officers' Training Class.

In addition, there are studies of the women's services here and in other lands. Details of the Marine Corps organization are learned thoroughly by the candidates. Administrative work dealing with pay, personnel relations, and personnel accounting is covered in the program.

Theory of leadership is presented carefully, and the girls get their chances to demonstrate it. Before long, the girls are quite "salty" in their knowledge of military

**ABOVE:** During a recent visit to MCS, MajGen D. L. Weart, CG, Fort Belvoir (second from right) was shown three-dimensional map used as training aid by Capt John B. Harney, WOTC instructor. Standing in midst of WOTC students is MajGen Franklin A. Hart, Commandant, MCS. **UPPER LEFT:** Senior Class WOTC girls unpack uniforms boxed and left after last summer's training. **BELOW:** Liberty call means time at the club with the men Marines for some of the WOTC students.





**WOTC organized athletics program provides many games and sports for recreation as well as physical exercise.**

terminology. They learn the operations of the military staff, the know-how of recruiting, and the functions of public information work.

To vary the diet, field trips are an important ingredient of the training routines. Demonstrations of Marine infantry weapons, chemical warfare, and rifle platoon tactics provide an interesting picture of some aspects of combat.

Studies of naval law give valuable background information in the important field of naval justice. Some actual presentations of lectures by the students themselves demonstrate knowledge of training principles and leadership.

Punctuating the entire process of preparing these women officers are many exacting inspections and exams. There isn't a dull moment!

For relaxation there are recreational activities in the evenings. Dances are held at the enlisted men's club where the men of the Platoon Leaders' Class join in the fun. The Exchange, with its theater, is a considerable help in easing the stress of the daily chores.

Sports of all kinds, from badminton and golf to sailing and swimming, are a means of relaxation too. As a source of books and periodicals for light summer reading, the post library facilities are in great demand. In the Hobbycraft Shop the girls may work on a variety of

**It's lots of fun to swim but WOTC students also find it desirable to get an even tan.**





**Learning how to sail a boat on the broad Potomac is another feature of the WOTC recreation program.**

popular hobbies for diversion. Athletic games played by Quantico teams provide exciting spectacles for avid sports fans. Sure, life in the WOTC can be tough, but it has its lighter moments!

Six weeks can move almost as quickly as Marine cadence in double time, and the junior course thus ends. Just about the time the junior group "shoves off," a new group of the Women Officers' Training Class appears, a "saltier" bunch ready for the six week senior course.

These big sisters of the junior group "turn to" in an experienced manner befitting their senior training status. Naturally their program is more advanced.

The senior course in the WOTC embraces a more intense study. For example, there is a keen analysis of naval law, from the milder office-hours kind of naval justice to the courts-martial types. The rights of the accused are explained, the preparation of charges and specifications in a trial is examined, and the subject of evidence is clarified. Trial procedures are no mystery after this thorough study.

And so in like fashion does the senior course speed through another six week period full of effort and fun. In the jaunty manner of their brothers, these Marines are ready to give earnest, efficient, and patriotic service to their country.

US MC



**Volleyball is a good game for everyone to enjoy. Students are divided into different teams to encourage competitive spirit.**



# Marines at Matachin

By Capt J. M. Ellicott, USN (Ret)

✿ WHEN THE ISTHMUS OF PANAMA WAS PART OF THE Republic of Colombia there was a treaty between that country and the United States by which the latter was authorized in the event of insurgency on the Isthmus to keep open the commercial transit across it, using such force as might be necessary but maintaining strict neutrality between the insurgents and the Colombian government.

In 1880 the political setup in Columbia consisted of two parties styled Conservatives and Liberals, the latter being in the minority and only able to share in patronage by throwing its votes to the least disliked Conservative candidate. Thus they elected Señor Rafael Nunez but lost their grip at the end of his term when an ultra Conservative succeeded, Nunez going on a vacation to Europe.


But the new President died in office and the Liberals, by again throwing their votes to Nunez, were able to bring him back. Unfortunately his sojourn in Europe had imbued him with totalitarian views which the Liberals could not swallow. It was then that, in 1884, insurrection began to smoulder in various parts of the republic, including the Panama area, which caused anxiety in the United States. It was not until the Spring of 1885, how-

ever, that the smoulder burst into flaming insurrection. Nunez was obliged to concentrate his troops around the Capital and along its communication with the sea, leaving the Isthmus almost unprotected. Immediately an insurgent leader, Aizpuru, seized Panama City and a half-breed lawyer named Prestan seized Aspinwall, now Colon. It was the most formidable uprising since the independence of the country.

The United States sent the USS *Galena*, Cmdr T. P. Kane, to Aspinwall believing that she, and two vessels of the Pacific Squadron at Panama, would be sufficient to take care of isthmian transit.

After the *Galena's* arrival a consignment of rifles and ammunition for the Government reached Aspinwall on a Pacific Mail steamer and Prestan demanded them. Her captain consulted the commander of the *Galena* and Cmdr Kane sent two officers, Lt C. H. Judd and Naval Cadet T. R. Richardson, to investigate. They bravely resisted Prestan's attempt to seize the arms although threatened with violence, and held off his followers with drawn revolvers while sending back a report of the situation to Cmdr Kane who promptly returned an order that the





When insurrection flared out into the open in Panama in 1885, trans-isthmian railroad traffic soon came to a standstill. Adm Jouett immediately sent Marines ashore at Aspinwall with the mission of seizing the little town of Matachin and restoring commercial transit

arms should not be landed. Thereupon Prestan seized Judd and Richardson, threw them into jail and forced them to write Cmdr Kane that they were to be executed if the arms were not released by eight o'clock next morning.

The situation for Judd and Richardson that night was nerve wracking, for they knew the chances were ten to one that Cmdr Kane would not yield and were told by Prestan that if any attempt was made to release them they would be immediately shot.

Judd, a frail, nervous, high strung man in poor health, became almost prostrated. Richardson, a heavy set, calm and iron nerved young fellow, stood the strain better.

Soon after daylight they heard distant rifle fire and discovered their guards were gone and the jail open. As they made their way back to the dock the firing subsided to occasional shots here and there in the city but when they got back to the *Galena* Aspinwall was in flames.


Prestan had been compelled to take all his soldiers to meet a Government force and was completely routed in an encounter on Monkey Hill, whereupon his forces, as they dispersed, set fire to the town, Prestan himself escaping in a small schooner. His second in command, Cocobolo, was, however, caught firing the town by a salvage party from the *Galena* and put in irons in her brig.

The alarming news from the Isthmus brought RAdm Jouett, then at New Orleans, into action with a snap. An additional force of Marines was obtained from Pensacola and the *Tennessee*, flagship, and *Swatara* sailed promptly for Aspinwall.

We found the town almost completely obliterated, nothing but a field of ashes with here and there a scorched palm or bit of twisted ironwork; no structures standing except the Pacific Mail dock and warehouses, the Panama Railroad freight sheds and rolling stock, and a bronze statue of Columbus bogged down in a marsh. A guard from the *Galena* was policing what little property was left. Traffic over the railroad was at a standstill.


To reopen the railroad an expeditionary force was sent

*Capt Ellicott, our oldest contributor, was born at Cross Manor, Md., in 1859 and graduated a star at the Naval Academy. Class of '83. This article covers his first expeditionary service. He served under Mahan on the Chicago in European waters and was presented with him at the Court of St James. He served on the Baltimore in the Battle of Manila Bay and later was commended by Adm Dewey for "skill and bravery" in conducting hazardous boat expeditions during Philippine Insurrection. Progressive deafness from gunfire brought his retirement in 1913 but he was continued on active duty ashore until 1922.*



← Ruins of Aspinwall, showing the buildings saved at the north end of town, with a part of the *Tennessee's* landing force, April 11, 1885.





BrigGen Robert L. Meade, USMC. As a captain, Meade was in command of the Matchin force sent ashore on the Panamanian Isthmus to protect commercial transit.

to occupy the village of Matachin, about halfway across the Isthmus, where trains were watered and switched for passing.

The Matachin force was made up on the *Tennessee* and consisted of the detachment of Marines from Pensacola under Capt Robert L. Meade, USMC, relative of the victor at Gettysburg, and a platoon of artillery under this writer, with Past Assistant Surgeon Richard Ashbridge from the *Swatara* as medical officer. Capt Meade had a lieutenant with him, afterward BrigGen C. A. Doyen, USMC.

Meade, also in time a brigadier general, was a tall, lean man of dynamic energy belied by a melancholic countenance, who had been brevetted for bravery during the Civil War.

Dire threats of ambush and sabotage came from the insurgents, so one gun of my platoon was placed on a flat car ahead of the locomotive behind a breastwork of hammocks and the other under a chief gunner's mate, on another flat at the extreme rear of the train. Next after the locomotive was a freight car with our provisions and camp equipage and behind it were two coaches of Marines. All of us were in light tropical uniforms with pith

helmets, leggings and revolvers. Mosquito netting was not forgotten, having been purchased in large quantities before we left New Orleans.

A little freight and mail for Panama was put on board our train and we were off. Perched on an ammunition box in rear of my gun and a breastwork of hammocks and free from smoke and cinders from the locomotive behind me, I felt for a time that I was a good target for snipers, but apprehension soon gave way to admiration of the luxurious, beautiful, flowering jungle of the Isthmus. From time to time I got a glimpse downward at the ant-like toilers on the canal. Somehow their work struck me as pathetically futile.

We found Matachin nothing but a short line of shacks on either side of the railroad interspersed with Chinese meat stalls where fly-covered meat hung from cross poles drying in the sun. Only native women and children remained in the shacks. On the westerly side of the right of way was a long railroad platform about breast high fronting a baggage room, freight room and office. Next to this structure was a two-story frame building, with an upper balcony, where the American railroad officials lived and messed. Across the tracks on a siding was the railroad pay car which was turned over to us for headquarters. It had two compartments. One of them, furnished with a desk, chairs and a locker, we used as an office and lounging room, and the other, which was bare of furniture, we improvised as sleeping quarters, installing two fragmentary looking glasses and rickety wash stands and equipment; sleeping at night on our hammock bedding spread upon the floor.

WE HOISTED the Stars and Stripes on an unused flagpole and proceeded to arrange camp. Our portable kitchen was set up behind the station and bedding stored in the freight room. My platoon was divided by placing a gun and crew at the extreme ends of the platform while the Marines were to sleep between on their hammocks spread on the flooring, feet outboard, with rifles stacked at their feet and ammunition belts hung over the muzzles. A complete curtain of mosquito netting surrounded the whole platform.

Outposts were established up and down the tracks and flanking the encampment. The railroad officials invited our officers to join their mess which we very gladly did.

Almost immediately we were brought face to face with the dreaded Chagres Fever. We found an old Negro station hand lying on the platform groaning and mumbling in delirium. We asked the station master if something could not be done for him.

"Nothing more than we have," he replied. "We've dug his grave."

Doctor Ashbridge pronounced him dying so we made him as comfortable as possible on a hammock in the baggage room. Early in the night his groans ceased and before morning he was dead.



"He is only one of hundreds dying like that nearly every month down on the canal," said the station master.

After our train had been unloaded for quite awhile we noticed that it did not pull out for Panama, and when Capt Meade asked what was the matter he was told that the engineer and fireman said they would not risk their lives by going any further. Meade stepped to the locomotive cab and called up to them:

"My train guards can run that engine. You may hop out and hoof it back to Aspinwall, and if the insurgents get you God help you!"

They decided to carry on.

AFTER A DAY or two we had gathered some insight into the situation. The natives were nearly all insurgents but even government sympathizers resented our occupying Matachin and hoisting our flag on Colombian soil, claiming that train guards would have been sufficient. The Chinese, however, were very friendly and brought us grapevine information. They said the insurgents were greatly incensed at our imprisonment of Cocobolo on the *Galena* and the hoisting of our flag on Colombian soil, and were holding angry meetings in a nearby jungle village.

"I'd like to clean 'em out," said Meade, "but we must observe strict neutrality."

During one of our morning inspections of the camp some sticks of dynamite were found in a small locker under the floor of the pay car and the railroad officials could not account for it.

Sick call was held at nine o'clock daily but twice a week that call almost turned our stomachs for both officers and enlisted men had to line up before Doctor Ashbridge at the Headquarters Car platform and drink a jigger of quinine and water. Nevertheless some took the fever and were returned to their ships for replacement. As Meade had picked all his seasoned Marines for his first landing force the replacements had to be rather new and raw material. The outcome of this was quite a remarkable and almost serious incident.

One night after some weeks of uncertain security we were awakened by the outpost toward Panama rushing into camp screaming:

"They're coming! They're coming!"

He stumbled along the whole length of the station platform dragging mosquito netting with him and treading on the sleeping men, and the Marines, getting up in confusion and tangled in the mosquito netting which had dragged down many of their stacks of arms went on hands and knees groping for rifles.

Fortunately Meade bumped into the bugler and made him sound the assembly, and in a short time order was restored. When we corralled the panic-stricken sentry he swore that he had seen men creeping toward him behind a row of bushes and he thought he ought to run in and tell us.

"Why didn't you use your gun?" asked Meade.

"I — I didn't think of it, Sir," he said.

"And you a Marine!" said Meade. "Put him under sentry's charge, Doyen, so I won't lay hands on him while I'm mad. He's caused me more mortification than I've felt since I was taken prisoner by the Confederates!"

The Chinese told us next morning that grapevine news had just come to them that a band of insurgents armed with knives and bolos had planned to surprise and kill the sentry before he could give an alarm, then creep along the track in front of the station platform, steal as many rifles as they could carry and, if discovered, set fire to the station to cover up their escape.

Our terrified rookie may have saved us from a serious catastrophe in an unorthodox manner.

Our outposts were doubled.

"I only hope they'll try it again," said Meade.

THIS incident and the increasing obstructive tactics of Aizpuru at Panama convinced our government that a larger force was needed on the Isthmus than could be provided from our ships, and a large expedition was prepared to be despatched from a home port. Some weeks of alert watchfulness on our part, however, followed before its arrival under Cmdr B. H. McCalla and we were relieved.

And what of Prestan? After remaining under cover with insurgent sympathizers on the Atlantic Isthmian coast he attempted to escape to Jamaica when the insurrection was suppressed by the Colombian General Reyes but was captured, brought back to Aspinwall and hanged, with Cocobolo, in the midst of their devastation. USMC









# THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE

*By Col James C. Bigler*

## **What Changes in Nomenclature Are Instituted by the UCMJ?**

☛ WE WILL NO LONGER REFER TO THE ARTICLES FOR the Government of the Navy as the basic law of the court-martial system we administer. One year after the President signs the UCMJ we will refer to the code of laws underlying the naval court martial system as the Uniform Code of Military Justice. This date will be May or June of 1951. The manual we will use in place of Naval Courts and Boards is as yet unnamed and unpublished although its first draft is almost complete. This manual will be identical in each of the services.

Under UCMJ a General Court Martial is the name of the highest and most powerful military tribunal. However the Army parlance is adopted throughout the other two tribunals. Our existing Deck court will be called a Summary Court Martial and our current Summary Court Martial will then be referred to as a Special Court Martial.

The term Judge Advocate General will remain the title of the senior judicial officer of each service viz: the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. The prosecutor of the General Court Martial is no longer a Judge Advocate and that of a Special or Summary Court Martial is no longer a recorder. The prosecutor before each of the three tribunals is called a Trial Counsel. His opponent, the representative of the accused, is still known as the Defense Council. However when a case goes up for review by a Board of Review or the Court of Military Appeals the government is represented by Government Counsel and the accused by Appellant Counsel. The lawyer who sits with the General Court Martial, but not exactly as a member, will be called the Law Officer of the court. The adviser to the convening authority is a Staff Judge Advocate or a Staff Legal Officer. Those naval officers limited

to legal duties only are Legal Specialists. Our old terms, mast punishment, office hours, or Commanding Officer's Punishment is called Non judicial Punishment by the UCMJ.

## **Does the UCMJ Create a Separate Legal Corps in the Navy and Marine Corps?**

☛ NO IT DOES NOT. The House of Representatives passed a bill that required the creation of a separate legal corps in the Navy similar to that the Army and Air Force now use. The Senate Bill permitted any officer who was admitted to practice before a Federal Court, or of the Highest Court in a State or Territory to act anywhere that a law specialist could act. In conference the House conferees accepted the Senate version. This naturally obviates the necessity of creating a corps of specialists but still requires the presence of officers who are qualified as members of the bar. It is estimated that the UCMJ will require the Navy to have performing legal duties a minimum of 450 officers. The Marine Corps will probably be expected to furnish one sixth of these officers. This means a minimum requirement of 70 odd qualified marine lawyers. The Corps can muster about 35 officers who are qualified and about 18 more who are qualified but retired and less than 62 years of age. It would appear the remainder will have to come from the reserve or the outside. In either case enabling legislation will be required. The current training schedule produces four officers a year from the course supervised by the Judge Advocate General. Inasmuch as the number of officers acquired from this source can be increased and will eventually provide a sufficiency of trained lawyers it is believed that a temporary stop-gap of accepting officers from the reserve for a period of five to seven or 10 years will be a plausible solution.

**New legislation provides one uniform code of justice for all of the armed services. The new code differs from the old ones mainly in procedural matters, and is based on procedures adopted by our Federal courts over 10 years ago**



### What are the Constitution and Powers of the Various Courts?

✿ THE GENERAL COURT MARTIAL will consist of a Law Officer and five or more members. The authority to convene a General Court Martial will remain roughly at its current level. The General Court Martial may try any person subject to the code for any offense described therein and may award punishment within limitations prescribed by the President of the United States extending to the infliction of death where expressly provided in the UCMJ.

The Special Court Martial will consist of not less than three members and it may try any person subject to the code for any offense described therein except a capital offense. It may not adjudge a sentence of death, dismissal of an officer, dishonorable discharge, confinement in excess of six months, or, loss of pay exceeding two thirds of the monthly pay nor a period in excess of six months. Authority to convene a special court martial is roughly at the level where the present summary court martial can be convened.

The new Summary Court Martial will consist of one commissioned officer and it may try any person subject to the UCMJ except an officer or warrant officer, a cadet, or midshipman. The accused may decline to be tried by Special Court Martial so long as he was not ordered tried by summary court as a result of his declining non-judicial punishment. The level at which the summary court martial will be convened is reduced below that at which the current deck court is convened to approximately the company level.

Any commanding officer may award nonjudicial punishment consisting of admonition or reprimand, the withholding of privileges for two weeks, restriction to limits suspension from duty for two weeks, extra duty not in excess of two hours per day nor for longer than two weeks holidays included, or reduction to the next inferior rank if a rank established by himself an equivalent or junior command. If the commanding officer is empowered to convene a general court martial he may also order a forfeiture of pay not in excess of one half of one month's

pay. A person may decline nonjudicial punishment and be awarded trial by Summary or Special Court Martial as appropriate, or he may accept same and appeal to not more than the next higher administrative echelon if he feels the nonjudicial punishment excessive or undeserved.

It is interesting to note that the current lesser courts martial are awarded certain sentences one or more of which they may adjudge. The UCMJ limits the sentences awardable by the courts by enumerating the maximum sentences. The result of this inversion will be that the court may go afield and award sentences not specifically enumerated in the code or more than one mentioned therein. However, the only place that bread and water confinement is authorized is when a man is attached to a public vessel and then the period of confinement on diminished rations is limited to seven days.

Warrant officers as well as commissioned officers may sit as members of General and Special Courts Martial. However the usual requirement that all members of a court be senior to the accused if possible will preclude their sitting in an officer's case. If prior to trial the accused requests in writing that enlisted persons sit as members of his court, other than a summary court martial, the convening authority is required to appoint not less than one third the members of the court from among enlisted persons from units other than the accused's. The unit for this purpose is the same company or the same ship. Reserves on active duty may sit as members of the court, or if qualified, may act as one of the lawyers serving the court.

### Who is Subject to Court Martial Jurisdiction?

✿ EACH ARMED SERVICE has jurisdiction over all members of the armed forces. Ordinarily an accused will be tried by a court convened by a member of his own service of members of his own service, but, the President of the United States is empowered to promulgate regulations extending this power to members of other services. However, regardless of what service tries the individual the review of the case at department level will be conducted by the department under which the accused serves. No provision is made for the review of trials in joinder of persons of different services but such a case would be probably successively reviewed by the interested departments each conducting the review only so far as it pertained to the personnel of that particular service. Court martial jurisdiction commences with the acceptance of an individual in the services or his induction and continues until his discharge regardless of the date of the expiration of his enlistment. In the cases of persons serving sentence imposed by court martial the jurisdiction extends until the completion of the sentence regardless of the date of discharge. Reserve personnel on active duty, or on inactive duty training pursuant to written orders and members of the Fleet Reserve are subject to court



martial, as are retired personnel entitled to pay or undergoing hospitalization.

In time of war, prisoners of war and persons serving with or accompanying the Armed Forces in the field are subject to military justice. At any time, when outside of the continental United States, Alaska east of longitude 172 degrees west, the Canal Zone, the Main Group of the Hawaiian Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, all persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the Armed Forces, or living within an area leased for or acquired by the United States and placed under the control of the Defense Department may be tried and sentenced by court martial.

#### **What in General will be the Effect of the Above Reorganization?**

THE ENLARGEMENT of the sentences awardable by Summary and Special Court Martial and the subjection of officers to Special Court Martial jurisdiction will naturally soak up a lot of the cases presently of General Court Martial stature. The enlargement of jurisdiction over the camp followers and civilians subjected to court martial will not presently create much additional court martial work. The effect of the inclusion of enlisted personnel as members of courts is beyond speculation. The extension of court martial control over civilians in the field with the armed forces is not new to the Army and Air Forces. The Articles of War have long provided for same. This extension of authority in so far as the Navy is concerned will not have much effect due to the limited number of foreign bases outside of the mentioned areas under naval control.

#### **What is the Naval Lawyer and Where and How is He Used?**

THE NAVAL lawyer must be a graduate of an accredited law school and admitted to practice before a Federal Court or the highest court of a state or territory. He may or may not be a line officer or a law specialist. Such an officer is required to sit as the law officer of a general court martial, the trial and defense counsel in a general Court martial and as the staff judge advocate or legal officer. Where the trial counsel in a lesser tribunal is a lawyer you must furnish a defense counsel of equal stature. The same lawyer can serve in no two of the four positions enumerated. Hence four different lawyers are required to operate a general court martial.

The law officer of the court has long been known to the Army system but is the principal innovation to the naval court martial. He acts in relation to the members of the court in the same capacity as does a judge to a jury with certain modifications. He may meet with the members of the court in closed session to assist in the


form of the findings and sentence but at any other time he meets with the court in closed session the trial counsel and the defense counsel must be present. He has no vote with the members. During the course of the trial the law officer will rule on all interlocutory questions of evidence and procedure except the challenge of a member of the court. His rulings are final and binding on the court except that by a majority vote the members can reverse his decision on a ruling on a motion for a directed verdict or of the sanity of the accused. Before the court closes for findings the law officer is required to instruct them on the elements of the offenses charged, the presumption of innocence and the law of reasonable doubt.

The duties of trial and defense counsel are changed very little from those of their existing counterparts except for the modification of trial counsel's duties to instruct the court on matters of law resulting from the creation of the law officer of the court.

The staff judge advocate or legal officer is assigned definite duties by the UCMJ. He must be a completely disinterested person. After the charges have been investigated and forwarded to the convening authority the convening authority must obtain the legal officer's opinion in writing as to the sufficiency of the evidence and the appropriateness and form of the charges. On completion of the case the legal officer must file his opinion on the case. This opinion will consist of his review. The convening authority need not follow the legal officer's advice but he must forward the legal officer's opinion along with the case for review.

#### **What Are the Principal Changes in Procedure Introduced by UCMJ?**

THE LAW OFFICER court relationship has been previously explained. The motion for directed verdict there mentioned is a procedural innovation previously unknown to naval law. At the close of the prosecution's case the accused may move a directed verdict. He thereby tests the sufficiency of the evidence against him. If his motion is granted the case is at an end in acquittal, and if overruled he has his right to a review of the correctness of





the overruling preserved for consideration on review.

The use of depositions is enlarged and modified by the UCMJ. Involved questions are no longer propounded in advance as currently required by Naval Courts and Boards. On notice to interested parties the witness is questioned before an officer empowered to issue an oath by representatives of the prosecution and defense and his testimony is recorded by a reporter and forwarded as the deposition. Such a deposition may be used in any non-capital case. Where it appears (i) that the witness is beyond the state territory or district wherein the court sits, ii) beyond 100 miles from the place where the courts

sits, iii) the witness is unable to appear by reason of death, age, infirmity, or military necessity, or iv) the witness can't be located at time of trial.

Records of testimony are submitted only by general courts martial and special courts martial wherein a bad-conduct discharge is awarded. Otherwise the record of the court shows only the procedural steps the charges and specifications, findings, sentence, and action of convening authority. Wherever testimony is taken it must be recorded and furnished if called for by higher authority.

• To INSTITUTE trial, charges under oath averring the accuser has personal knowledge or that charges are filed on information, investigation, and belief, must be filed. If the accuser is the person ordinarily convening the court he is precluded from acting as such and the court must be convened at the next higher echelon. Where the charges tend to require trial by general court martial they must be forwarded to a completely disinterested officer for investigation. This investigation must be conducted in the presence of the accused and he is entitled to be defended by counsel, to call witnesses and to cross examine witnesses called to testify against him. If a formal court of inquiry, or board of investigation has preceded the trial the herein mentioned investigation may be dispensed with. The investigating officer will forward his report in writing including a summary of the testimony of each witness and his findings. Charges may not be held more than eight days after the accused is ordered into arrest without accompanying same with a full and complete reason for the delay. No person can be brought to trial in less than five days following service of general court martial charges, or three days following service of special court martial charges.

Any court martial or military investigative court or board, or any officer empowered and directed to take a deposition may subpoena any civilian witness and the United States Courts are directed to punish any duly subpoenaed witness who willfully neglects or refuses to appear. The maximum penalty is \$500 fine and six months imprisonment. Any person civil or military who is found guilty of a contempt of a court may be by that court punished. If he has used menacing words, signs, or gestures in the presence of the court or if he has disturbed the proceedings by a riot or disorder he may be imprisoned for 30 days and fined \$100, or both.

The Code also contains criminal provisions applicable to persons attempting to distort justice by influencing the court or persons connected therewith, or persons attempting to impede or delay justice. It is also made a punishable offense to cause a person to incriminate himself.

The Code establishes at Defense Department level a Court of Military Appeals consisting of three judges appointed from civilian life. The tenure of office is 15 years and the salary is that of a Federal Appellant court justice or \$17,500 per annum. This court will review



all cases affecting a general or flag officer, extending to a sentence of death or where other good and sufficient reason is shown. Boards of Review are established in the Office of each Judge Advocate General to consider all cases referred to them. Any case going before a Board of Review or the Court of Military Appeals will be assigned to a government counsel and an appellant counsel for preparation and presentation.

In general, cases will be disturbed on review only where substantial error is disclosed. Ordinarily the case will be remanded for new trial before a new court. No record will be returned for reconsideration of an acquittal a directed verdict of acquittal, or to increase the severity of a sentence. The former jeopardy rule is modified accordingly so that former jeopardy will not attach until the case has been finally and ultimately approved.

As is the current practice any authority sufficient to approve a sentence is empowered to withhold same, subject to a period of probation. However, a definite procedure is established which must be accomplished in effecting the vacation of a probationary period and execution of sentence. The accused must be afforded an open hearing, defense by counsel, the right to introduce and cross examine witnesses. A record of the hearing must be maintained and the action approved by an officer empowered to convene a general court martial if a bad conduct discharge is involved. Otherwise the approval of an officer empowered to convene a court of the same dignity as that which awarded the sentence originally is all that is required.

The unanimous vote of all members of a court is necessary to find an accused guilty of a capital offense and to sentence him to death. Other findings may be entered

on a concurrence of two thirds of the members present. A sentence of life imprisonment or confinement in excess of 10 years requires the concurrence of three-fourths the members present and any other sentence requires the concurrence of two-thirds of the members. All other questions submitted to a vote are determined by a mere majority. In case of a tie vote on a challenge the challenged member is excused from sitting, but a tie vote of the question of directed verdict or of the accused's sanity must be resolved against the accused.

As before, the prosecution and defense may challenge witnesses for cause and the validity of the challenge is decided by the court. There is no limitation on the number of such challenges. However each side is given a single peremptory challenge by the UCMJ. A peremptory challenge is a challenge made without disclosing the reason. Each side may so challenge and bar from sitting one member.

### Conclusions

THE WRITER considers this piece of legislation a fine piece of work. Naturally his opinions as to procedure in some matters differ from those adopted in the final draft; but no substantial reason for complaint based on the provisions of the Code can be pointed out. The punitive articles, those describing the various offenses, are changed very little. The substantive rights of the accused are unaffected. The changes announced by the code are almost entirely procedural. Inasmuch as the new procedure is patterned on that adopted by the Federal Courts about a decade ago and found very adequate there is no reason for apprehension.

USMC



## IT IS NOW D-MINUS-60

By D we mean *deadline day* for the 175th Anniversary Issue of the GAZETTE which is just 60 days away.

We have been trying for several months to tell you readers who are not subscribers that we are going to print copies only for our regular subscribers. Therefore the only way you can assure yourself a good, clean copy of the November GAZETTE to put away as a keepsake and ready reference is to subscribe now. If you keep putting it off, this large, interesting, and fact-loaded issue will be in the mails. Your friends will have one but you won't.

For our regular subscribers whose steady support has helped make this issue possible we have a *special offer*. We know there is a relative or friend to whom you would like to send the Anniversary Issue. We will send 12 issues of the GAZETTE, including the Anniversary Issue, to anyone you name for only \$2.00 if you will send us your remittance before 1 November 1950. We sincerely believe the Anniversary Issue alone will be worth more than that amount.

# Passing in Review

BOOKS OF INTEREST TO MARINE READERS

## South of the Border Policy . . .

THE EVOLUTION OF OUR LATIN-AMERICAN POLICY: A Documentary Record—James B. Gantenbein, Editor and Compiler. 979 pages, indexed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1950. \$12.50

This volume, as its title implies, is a compilation of official papers and pronouncements regarding the development of United States policy in Latin America. Here, in a single book divided into six logical categories, the student finds many of the more significant documents dealing with our Latin-American diplomatic history. Within each of the categories—General Principles, Monroe Doctrine, Cuban Independence, Panama Canal, Mexican Controversies, and Caribbean Interventions—Mr Gantenbein has set forth in chronological order appropriate materials (or in some cases extracts therefrom) which demonstrate the development and progress of our Latin-American policy.

*The Evolution of Our Latin-American Policy* opens with George Washington's stirring Farewell Address of 1796, wherein our first President enjoined his fellow citizens to avoid involvement in European controversies and "To steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world." The most recent document included is the speech delivered by Secretary of State Acheson before the Council of the Organization of American States just one year ago (14 April 1949). The book is precisely what it purports to be: It is a documentary record, nothing more. It includes speeches, messages and statements by Presidents and Secretaries of State, dispatches, letters and reports from our representatives abroad, the texts of treaties, protocols and resolutions.

Mr. Gantenbein has made no attempt to evaluate critically any of the material, nor has he prepared any commentary giving background or an explanation of the situation to which the various documents refer. Beneath the title of each document, however, the compiler has given the bibliographic source thereof. Although the work makes no pretense of completeness, Gantenbein's failure to prepare a running narrative "to tie his documents together" is to be regretted. Without certain background or related information a student may have difficulty in appraising the value of the items included, and will still have to turn to some such recognized authority as Whitaker, Parks, or Bemis for that information. With a

cursory knowledge of Latin-American affairs, however, the student will find *The Evolution of Our Latin-American Policy* invaluable as a reference for source materials. Marine readers in particular will find interesting the section treating our diplomacy in the Caribbean, for it is herein that Marines and the Marine Corps activities are discussed.

Reviewed by Maj J. N. Rentz

## Western Democracies in Asia . . .

HALF OF ONE WORLD—Foster Hailey, 201 pages. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$3.00.

Foster Hailey is now European correspondent for the *New York Times*, a paper he has worked for since 1937. At the outbreak of the Pacific war he became war correspondent with the fleet in that theater and in 1944 his book, *Pacific Battle Line* was published. The next two years were spent in Latin America and in 1946 he went to the Far East. He visited all the Asiatic countries except Burma and India and talked to the leaders of the various national, revolutionary, and colonial governments in those countries. His impressions and the information he gathered in the Far East form the core of the book which he has written, "Not because I believe myself better informed . . . but because I believe I do have some information about Asia and some ideas . . . that will help to that better understanding . . . necessary if we are ever to have a peaceful world."

*Half of One World* is a serious indictment of the Western democracies for their actions in Asia since the end of the war in 1945. The charges of exploitation, duplicity, and government by force will not be easily refuted. They are logically presented with sincere conviction.

Mr Hailey points out that the great promises, made during the war, about the four freedoms, were believed by the teeming millions in Asia. In India, the Philippines, and Japan, where those promises have been carried out, there has been little, if any, progress made by communism. On the other hand, China, Indo-China, Korea, and Indoesia have flourishing Red parties. In the words of the author, "Communism flourishes only where there are great and evident evils." Unless we eradicate those evils, Moscow will win Asia by default.

About the popularly accepted idea that the civil war in China is primarily a struggle between the United States



and Soviet Russia, the author says, "That is nonsense . . . the United States support made it possible for Chiang Kai-shek to wage war. . . There is no creditable evidence . . . that Soviet Russia has given any large-scale support to the Chinese Communists." China is merely trying to rid herself of the Chiang Kai-shek dictatorship which attempted only to enrich its friends and backers and consolidate its power. American aid to the Generalissimo enabled him to exploit the Chinese and deny them freedom.

The program of the Chinese Communists is one with which the United States can find no fault unless it is with the forced division of land. In a radical departure from Marxism, the Reds state that "reasonable profit" will be guaranteed industry and that foreign investments will be welcomed. The program is not socialistic or communistic, rather it is a reiteration of the avowed policy of the Western powers during the war years. Furthermore, in areas where they have been in power for any length of time, the Chinese Communists have carried out this program.

Prior to the war, Indo-China was a French colony and was exploited unrestrainedly. During the war, the French collaborated shamelessly with the Japanese, aiding them in continuing this exploitation. After the war, when Ho Chi Minh proclaimed and established an independent government, the French refused to recognize it. Finally signing an accord, France ignored its terms and set about strengthening her army. She sent Germans, who were recruited into the French Foreign Legion out of prisoner-of-war camps, to Indo-China, thereby building up what she thought was sufficient strength to conquer Ho Chi Minh. A civil war resulted that is not yet over.

The author has some words of praise to say about the British policies in the Far East since 1945. Their granting of independence to India and their attempts to work out a satisfactory solution to a perplexing racial problem in Malaya and Singapore are steps in the right direction. The original support given to the Dutch in Indonesia and the French in Indo-China has been withdrawn and acknowledged as a mistake. However, the British-owned Pacific Islands, while not being exploited, are ready for self-government and should be given their freedom.

The United States, like Great Britain, has island possessions which are in various stages of readiness for self-government. Whatever measure of independence these possessions are capable of assimilating should be granted immediately. This action will win more communists away from Moscow than she could gain in a decade.

This book is an important one. The Oriental peoples are desperately trying for self-government and are willing to fight to get it. If communism offers the only avenue along which independence can be reached, the bare feet of Asia will tread along that path. Is this our desire? The record seems to say so. *Half of One World* will make

everyone who reads it think and his thoughts will not be pleasant. This book should be read by everyone who sincerely believes in freedom and democracy. Peace is based on understanding and this book will aid the reader to understand Asia.

Reviewed by LtCol W. F. Prickett

### Young Horatio . . .

MR MIDSHIPMAN HORNBLOWER—C. S. Forester, 310 pages, Boston: Little, Brown and Co. \$3.00.

" . . . a skinny young man only just leaving boyhood behind, something about middle height, with feet whose adolescent proportions to his size were accentuated by the thinness of his legs and his big halfboots. His gawkiness called attention to his hands and elbows. . . a skinny neck . . . a white bony face. . . the eyes, despite their owner's seasickness, were looking about keenly . . . there was curiosity and interest there which could not be repressed and which continued to function notwithstanding either seasickness or shyness."

So is the reader introduced to Mr Hornblower, Midshipman, in this book; newest, and the first, chronologically, in C. S. Forester's series concerning the heroic seafarer.

Unlike the first Hornblower stories, this one is composed of a number of short stories, each complete within a chapter, but arranged in a sequence to give the continuity usually found in a novel. Each of the chapters, with one exception, has previously appeared as a short story in the *Saturday Evening Post*.

Without keeping the reader waiting as much as a paragraph, the story plunges into one adventure after another, starting with Hornblower's first "demand for satisfaction," resulting in a duel fought with only one gun being loaded, and ending as Hornblower, while a prisoner of Spain, receives word that he has been promoted to the rank of lieutenant in the King's navy.

Between these extremes Hornblower is given his first command as officer in charge of a prize crew aboard a captured French brig, which he subsequently loses when defeated by a cargo of rice. This eventually leads to his capture by a French privateersman from which he is rescued by a coincidental quirk of fate. Then on through other episodes with such intriguing chapter titles as *Hornblower and the Man Who Saw God*, *Hornblower the Frogs* and *the Lobsters*, (which had nothing to do with either frogs or lobsters), *Hornblower and Noah's Ark*, and *Hornblower the Duchess and the Devil*, in which the "Duchess" wasn't a duchess and the devil was temptation.

For the person who has not met Hornblower, this is an excellent introduction, and one which will foment a desire in the reader to become better acquainted. For the Hornblower intimate, this book gives an insight into his past, and furnishes another chapter in the biography of this fabulous character.

Forester has again proved himself a master of descriptive detail. From his books the sailing initiate can glean enough information and technical data to "turn-to" with the saltiest tar. Yet it is not the purpose of the books to instruct in the art of sailing, or the mechanics of sea warfare. They are for entertainment; the accurate details only help the reader to feel more a part of the life and times of that period, and help in his enjoyment of the story. The great majority of people will enjoy this book immensely. Because of its lay-out as a group of self-contained short stories, it is easily read by the busy reader who can go through only a portion at a time. But that person will find that he can not lay the book down until he has reached the end of a chapter.

C. S. Forester has been accredited with "the capacity of Conrad, the ability of Masfield, and the adventurous spirit of Lever." This latest book lives up to this description and bolsters his reputation as a fascinating storyteller.

Reviewed by Maj Gordon E. Gray

### Strategic Air Laid Bare . . .

DISASTER THROUGH AIR POWER—Marshall Andrews, 143 pages. New York: Reinhart and Company, 1950. \$2.00

The shibboleths of proponents of strategic air power are shattered by logic, dragged over the rough ground of reason, and trampled upon by heretofore suppressed cold, hard fact. The advocates of a chimerical cause—the scintillating doctrine of easy victory in war by employment of masses of atomic bombers—are exposed to the purifying analytical gaze of the thoughtful reader by a realistic and able writer.

Marshall Andrews, the well-known and widely-read *Washington Post* reporter, has at last presented the American public with the first real break in the previously solid "Air Force Front." Throughout this book one finds evidence that the bill of goods laid upon the altar of Mars by the priesthood for strategic air power finally surfeited the author, who was once a spokesman for unification. Canned propaganda, prepared without regard for truth and filled with fantastic claims, inevitably nauseates a discerning man.

Fighting men in particular should find this book exceedingly interesting; undoubtedly study and analysis of *Disaster Through Air Power* will give them additional ammunition—blunt proof of the continuing indispensableness of ground troops and a balanced force—so necessary at cocktail and bridge parties where bright-eyed young air enthusiasts abound.

*Disaster Through Air Power* strikes a savage blow at duplicity and false claims which threaten this nation's very security. It clearly demonstrates the fallibility of the thesis which unequivocally states the ability of strategic bombing to supersede not only battleships and sub-

marines, but also landing forces and tactical air as well. The vast devastation resulting from an atomic bomb saturation of a target or an enemy nation would obviate the possibility of obtaining the fundamental objective of war: The establishment of a more stable peace on the terms of the victor.

Mr. Andrews supports the century-old thesis of the great Dragomirov: "Man, always man, this is the first of all instruments for battle. . . ." He goes on to point out the fallacy of the theory that an enemy can be bombed into submission. He contends—and correctly—that development of earth-bound tactics and training should not cease. In any future war it will be the landing forces which will have to establish the beachheads and seize the advanced airfields so essential to the conduct of a campaign. He bases his contention on the fact that American philosophy will not permit the United States to abandon its Allies to the fate of enemy aggression by land, nor will it permit the United States to rain bombs indiscriminately on friend and foe alike.

The mission conceived for Marine Corps aviation—support of the Fleet Marine Force and naval forces (afloat) in amphibious operations—entails maintenance of air superiority, isolation of the battlefield, and close support of ground forces. *Disaster Through Air Power* contains an implied commendation of at least a part of this concept. Marshall Andrews recommends more attention to equipping and training tactical aviation and advocates the transfer of all tactical aviation from the Air Force to the Army, where it can be made "an organic part of the Army's structure."

It is refreshing to read this book, particularly when one realizes that it was written by a well-qualified author who was never a spokesman for the Marine Corps concept of a balanced fleet and a balanced force. To attain true unification, Mr. Andrews suggests the reorganization of our Armed Forces along functional lines.

Despite a few great gaps and several vulnerable spots in the logic of *Disaster Through Air Power*, this book is *must* reading for every citizen interested in maintaining a strong national defense. It is invaluable for refuting the dangerous single-purpose stratagem arguments advanced by advocates of the air power shibboleth. Since he will not find the book a profound study, the reader must remember that Mr. Andrews, a high-calibre journalist who desires to tell a simple, direct story, was attempting only to reveal basic truths and facts. Fact finders do not write profound studies nor do they intend their work to be considered as such. His facile pen, nevertheless, makes Andrews' work most readable, interesting and thought provoking. When you pick it up and start reading, you won't put it down until you've finished it. Moreover, having read it, you will be better equipped to view future fantastic pronouncements in their true perspective.

Reviewed by Maj J. N. Rentz



**For The Shooters . . .**

OFFICIAL GUN BOOK—edited by Charles R. Jacobs, 178 pages, illustrated. New York: Crown Publishers, 1950. paper \$1.50 cloth \$2.50

It is not clear who sanctions this book as official but this notwithstanding it is my nomination for the best value in gun literature, a field not noted for its inexpensive books.

This is truly as encyclopedic a work as could be compiled within the limits of 178 pages and 700 illustrations. The best information on guns, ammunition, and shooting can be divided into fact and expert opinion. This book deals competently with both. The facts have been compiled from the best sources; manufacturers, importers, experimenters, laboratories, and shooters associations. The opinion is given by a formidable array of experts; noted hunters, shooters, technicians, gun editors, experimenters, and gunsmiths. To mention a partial list there are; from the staff of the *American Rifleman* Lister, Hatcher, Barr, Brown, and Keith; gunsmiths Holmes, and Simmons; ballisticians Sharp, Powell, and Haven; and exhibition shooter Parmelee.

A short course in ballistics followed by complete specifications on all pistol, rifle, and shotgun cartridges currently in use begins the book proper. A section on reloading cartridges covering methods, tools, bullet making, and powders complete the ammunition chapter. Notes on metallic cartridge development and advice on selecting the proper cartridge for the job are also included.

Specifications on all current domestic and imported handguns comes next with notes on handgun development included. How to shoot with the handgun; target, game, trick, and defensive is given ample coverage as are accessories such as holsters, grips, and sights. Rifles, .22 and high power of all types, are covered in a similar complete manner as are metallic sights, telescope sights and mounts, spotting scopes, and target shooting. Shotguns also receive similar treatment with discussion of muzzle devices, fitting the gun to the individual, and shooting trap, skeet, and upland game.

Possibly the most important section of the book is that by C. B. Lister, executive director of the National Rifle Association, on the shooter's number one problem—anti-gun laws which both do-gooders and certain subversive groups are continually attempting to foist on the public. He shows how they would disarm the law-abiding citizen but would have no effect on the criminal who would ignore the law anyway. Lister gives the history of these laws and surveys the current situation of desirable federal and certain state laws and the undesirable state and local regulations.

This is a book which holds much of interest for the old shooter and is a must for the newcomer to the game. It

is highly recommended for both, not only for its complete treatment of gun and ammunition facts but for its common sense opinion and discussion of many shooting subjects.

Reviewed by LtCol F. B. Nihart

**Naval Gun Factory's Story . . .**

ROUND SHOT TO ROCKETS, Taylor Peck. 267 pages. 1949. Annapolis: The United States Naval Institute.

The Naval Gun Factory, like the Navy which it serves, has come a long way since Old Ironsides was careened and coppered in the old Yard.

The mission of the Washington Navy Yard, as the Gun Factory was known until recently, has undergone a gradual sea-change—from refitting and building the ships of the Navy to manufacturing a bewildering diversity of ordnance materiel, electronic equipment, and, indeed, almost anything requiring the skill of practiced craftsmen and the versatility of modern machines. This metamorphosis was due in part to the imagination of its skippers—such men as Commodore Tingey, the first Commandant (whose 29 year tour of duty at the Yard must surely make him the record "plank-owner" of naval history) and Adm Dahlgren, that creative genius of naval ordnance. In large measure the change from Navy Yard to Gun Factory was the result of the ability of the workmen at the Yard to turn out anything from guided missile components to sixteen inch guns, from round shot to rockets.

To commemorate the 150th birthday of our first Navy Yard, this chronicle of its history and development was undertaken by Taylor Peck, a young history graduate of Georgetown University. The events recorded in this volume are a mirror of the Navy, its achievements and great moments, its life and hard times. The lively days of 1812-14 are especially good reading, for the old Yard played a prominent role in this predominantly naval war. After Dahlgren's tenure, when the Yard was becoming increasingly concerned with the manufacture of naval ordnance, the pace of the narrative understandably droops. The author has a tendency to become becalmed in a sea of statistics, probably through his zealous efforts to insure that no accomplishment of the Yard is forgotten. After all, it is no easy task to bring spine-tingling action and romance to the production of non-ferrous castings.

Although stodgy in spots, the book has effectively snared the atmosphere of the earlier days, simply by an accurate rendering of events, no matter how trivial. The excellent illustrations, of which there are many, add much to the effectiveness. All in all, Taylor Peck has wrought a worthy memorial to our oldest Navy Yard and to the greatest producer of naval armament in the world.

Reviewed by Maj J. H. Naylor

# Hood Of Texas . . .

HOOD: CAVALIER GENERAL, Richard O'Connor. Prentice-Hall Inc., New York, 1949. \$4.00

Out of the gray annals of the War Between the States, a long file of dim and shadowy figures has come riding down into the literature of the Twentieth Century. Shining like a burnished blade among them, lifts the figure of John Bell Hood—like Jeb Stuart, George Pickett, and the gallant Pelham, truly the cavalier, the last of a passing breed. While Hood urged his rawboned horse across the battlefields of the southlands, chivalry yet lived. With his passing, and the passing of men like him, shattered in body and spirit, finally died the feudal ages—with Hood, and Stuart, surrounded by Sheridan's thousands at Yellow Tavern, Jackson, shot down in the gloomy wilderness at Chancellorsville, Lee, riding the doomed way alone to Appomattox Courthouse. Richard O'Connor has striven to catch and confine in his brief pages some part of the lost glory of this last stand of chivalry in his story of John Hood, and in many respects he has supremely succeeded.

In *Cavalier General*, O'Connor justifies Hood's failures at Atlanta, Franklin, and Nashville—and he outlines carefully Hood's successes in the earlier days of the war, at Gaines' Mill, Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg, and Chickamauga. The military-minded reader can rejoice at his many clear-cut pictures of the action in some of these vast, confused conflicts, though the focus is directed primarily and of necessity upon the scenes in which Hood himself played the more vital roles. O'Connor details also, in passing, the valiant story of the Texas Brigade, the 1st, 4th, and 5th Texas Regiments that Lee called his "deadliest fighting machine," and Texas Marines will probably swell with pride as they follow the legions under Hood's command through a dozen campaigns in Northern Virginia.

O'Connor falls short in his scholarship in a few instances. His work is not the comprehensive, documented, painstakingly detailed we enjoy in Freeman's *Lee's Lieutenants*. He omits the convenience of footnoting and hazes over, a la Fletcher Pratt, a few portions of the battles that, as military men, we might have wished were better delineated. *Cavalier General* was not intended, however, to be another *Lee's Lieutenants*. O'Connor has set out simply to present John Hood as he should actually be remembered by posterity, "one of the greatest of American generals as commander of a brigade, division, and corps;" and he uses every literary art he possesses to correct the misguided portrait of Hood most generally handed down, that of "a fearless but brainless fellow, a hard fighter (but) a dim thinker."

In *Lee's Lieutenants*, Dr Freeman felt that Hood "might have stepped directly out from the pages of Malory." O'Connor accepts with delight this characteristic knightly categorization, but reveals Hood also to have been a

brilliant and unflinching leader and a shrewdly calculating planner in the field. From the military viewpoint, we can be especially interested in Hood's inspired insight at Gettysburg, where he had the key to the battle's outcome almost within his grasp on the second day and was overruled only by the obdurate defeatism of his immediate superior, Longstreet. We follow his remarkable planning before the final debacle at Atlanta and find, along with such respected critics as Thomas Hay and Stanley Horn, that he failed there only in lacking "better subordinates and heavier battalions," and that Sherman's victory in the deep south was a closer shave than historians heretofore have admitted. Perhaps now, after 86 years, we can forget the sad gibe of the rank and file trooping southward from Nashville in that icy winter of '64 when they sang:

". . . The gallant Hood of Texas  
Sure played Hell in Tennessee."

Hood's left arm was shattered by a minie at Gettysburg, and he lost his right leg leading his hosts in the terrible break-through at Chickamauga where two entire Union corps were swallowed up in the annihilating roar of combat.

*Cavalier General* catches the glory and the panorama of the great Civil War conflicts as well as the vital personality of the giant Texan who is its central figure. It is history, rich in sweep and in detail, balanced and presented with a graceful style; and O'Connor aptly sums up Hood's remarkable successes and catastrophic failures in life in the penetrating remark of a Federal colonel the night before the fatal battle of Peachtree Creek. Gen Sherman had asked the old Colonel, one of Hood's pre-war comrades in Kentucky, what he thought of the deadly southerner's character. Did Hood dare attack the overwhelming hordes of the North on the morrow with his own depleted rank of Gray?

"Well," the old man responded, looking Sherman straight in the eye, "I once seed John Hood bet \$2500 with nary a pair in his hand!"

Reviewed by Lt J. M. Patrick

# Foreign Policy Psychoanalyzed . . .

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND FOREIGN POLICY—  
Gabriel A. Almond, 244 pages. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company \$3.75

Today, when it seems to be the thing to do to be psychoanalyzed, the author has in this book attempted by mass psychoanalysis to explain the whys and wherefores of American foreign policy and to predict its future trends. By applying the principles of the social scientist, he has succeeded rather well. Russia and her foreign policy are discussed briefly to provide the necessary background.

The author, a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, is now a staff member of the Yale Institute of Interna-



tional Studies. He is well acquainted with American foreign policy, having served in the Office of War Information and the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. His book is one of a series which the Yale Institute has prepared on international relations in both hemispheres.

In the opening chapters, the book establishes as a basis of fact that world leadership must be assumed or won by either the United States or Russia; that, in the past, the "balance of power" in Europe gave the United States time to discover where her interests lay and then formulate foreign policy; that, in the absence of this balance, the United States must make and adhere to decisions which involve the deliberate assumption of war; and, that war has become an unlimited risk.

Having established these facts, the author examines American character and finds that individual Americans are self-centered, competitive, concerned with success and material things, and are constantly participating in a race toward changing goals—"the 'newest' in housing, the 'latest' in locomotion, the most 'fashionable' in dress and appearance." While he is nominally a Christian, the American is disturbed by conflicts between his "market place" ideas and his morals, and believes in cutting corners to "get things done." He is extremely responsive to changes in the pressure of the cold war, returning to his self-centered world during periods of quiet and demanding in a crisis that something be done. He delights in cloaking a profitable business deal in the cloth of high idealistic motives.

The author claims a basic difference in the formulation of the foreign policies of the US and the USSR, stating that the men in power in Russia make their basic decisions and, through the media of the press and radio, sell that decision to the populace in such a way that they are convinced it is their own idea; whereas, in the United States, foreign policy reflects the will of the people and is, in a great many instances, arrived at after the electorate has heard conflicting opinions and recommendations from politicians, diplomats and "experts" (soldiers, teachers, etc.).

By use of the results of the various public opinion polls an analysis is made of the foreign policy consensus. The information obtained from these polls is studied in mass and then broken down for further examination into social groupings, age groupings, sex groupings, occupation groupings, ideological groupings, and educational groupings. A large number of interesting conclusions are reached from these studies. For instance, age is more isolationist and less idealistic than youth as are men than women; the trend of all groupings is toward limited, instead of absolute, objectives; the college graduates are more informed internationally than those without such an education; and the foreign policy consensus of the pacifists, Wallace-ites, socialists and the Mid-Western farmers is about the same.

The book concludes that there are a great many weak spots in the present method of arriving at foreign policy in the US. However, many of these weaknesses are rapidly disappearing before the onslaught of the cold war which is awakening a large section of Americans to the necessity of a firm long-term foreign policy. Certain weaknesses, such as the lack of interest of the lower-income and poorly educated groups, have not been overcome and there is no perceptible progress being made toward overcoming them. However, the author advocates the creation of trained leadership within these groups to solve this problem. The one thing to be feared most by the US is that the USSR will see fit to compromise and be amenable to legitimate demands of other nations. This would lead almost inevitably to the complacent return of the American individual to his self-centered pursuits and leave the US without a foreign policy or a means of enforcing one. The resulting weakness would be catastrophic and certain to turn over the world to the USSR. The problem of preventing this return to complacency has two sides: "A premature mass campaign in the absence of an immediate threat might create 'wolf, wolf' reactions . . . failure to prepare for these contingencies would leave us vulnerable to possible future panic." However, the author is of the opinion that the Soviet leaders can not be conciliatory for long without losing their power.

To anyone who has wondered why the United States has failed on so many occasions to adopt a continuing foreign policy, *The American People and Foreign Policy* will provide the answers in well thought out, fully documented (in the footnotes), and logically presented form.

Reviewed by LtCol W. F. Prickett

### Our Errors . . .

GREAT MISTAKES OF THE WAR—Hanson W. Baldwin,  
114 pages. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950.  
\$1.50

Since the end of World War II there have appeared in memoirs and commentaries many allusions to our war-time mistakes, real and fancied. Baldwin, on the other hand, offers for the first time a comprehensive, well documented, listing and analysis of our foremost mistakes. As the author himself makes clear, this is no exhaustive compilation of all error nor is he concerned with tactical mistakes or faulty military decisions with no political consequences. But, he continues, "These are a selected few of the broad and far-reaching errors which history will supplement, which influenced the course of the war or affected the peace."

The basic fallacies in our conduct of the war, in Baldwin's opinion, were two. First, the U.S. fights wars differently from other nations. We fight for today's victory instead of tomorrow's peace. While Britain and Russia fought with the big picture of the post war world in mind, we fought merely to win. Bluntly, our military genius

was outweighed by our political immaturity; a characteristic prevalent among our military men as well as our statesmen. Second, to our great detriment, we made a faulty analysis of Russia's aims, methods, and basic philosophy.

The biggest mistake was Roosevelt's cry for unconditional surrender which served to weld the German people and the Nazi party together to the bitter end instead of driving a wedge between the people and their leaders as had Wilson in the first war. This prolonged the war and upset the balance of power in that the destruction of Germany was necessary to achieve unconditional surrender. This left Russia supreme on the continent.

Our next great mistake was the loss of Eastern Europe to the Russians instead of securing it ourselves by a Balkan invasion as urged by the British. We insisted on the slightly more militarily feasible cross-channel invasion and in the councils of the mighty our military genius won out over British political realism.

Our next chance to thwart Russian designs on Europe was likewise muffed. Our armies, in the spring of 1945, had the capability of reaching Berlin, Prague, and Vienna ahead of the Russians. Churchill urged that this be done but he was voted down and Allied troops were halted on the Elbe, withdrawn from Czechoslovakia, or dispatched to secure the non-existent Bavarian redoubt. Meanwhile the Russians secured strategical and political objectives of unestimatable importance in Central Europe. Again our political naivete won out.

Our errors were by no means confined to the European Theater; the Pacific and Far East had their share too. Mistakes in the Pacific began before the war, contends Baldwin, with an underestimation of Japanese capabilities and an overestimation of our strategic air force's capabilities. As if these errors weren't enough we started the war with not a war plan but *three* war plans, Orange, Rainbow Five, and MacArthur's own brain-child for Philippine defense. The defense of the Philippines, our first major operation, was predicated to varying degrees on all three plans but the three were mutually exclusive. Differences, frictions, discords, and then recriminations between services, due first to planning confusion and later to MacArthur's high handed relations with Navy and Marine units in the Philippines, set the pace for interservice distrust which continued during the war and which has since been kept aflame to the continuing detriment of national defense.

Later, a mistake in intelligence of major proportions shaped the peace to our disadvantage. This mistake was the failure to appreciate fully the hopeless strategical position of Japan at the time of Yalta or even before our bombing of Japan began in earnest. More shocking is the fact that this intelligence was available but it either was not evaluated properly at the highest levels or, worse yet, it never reached those levels.

The results? We lost China to our side. We begged Russia to enter the war against Japan, giving in return for this unneeded aid, strategic control over Manchuria. Manchuria was not ours to give and in Red hands immeasurably aided the Communists to take over the rest of China. Further, we felt that it was necessary to drop the atomic bomb on Japan to clinch a victory already won. This, when Japan was already strangled by the effective application of sea power and suing for peace. Beneath their natural surface tranquility the Japanese probably will never forget the holocaust of Hiroshima and Nagasaki where we sowed the seeds of hate which we may in time reap. Also, no longer can we claim the self-bestowed title of moral leader of the world. We are now, Baldwin believes, one with Genghis Khan and the Huns whose ruthlessness knew no bounds, Germany who first used gas, and Japan who introduced bacteriological agents in modern war.

The author concludes with the disturbing observation that these mistakes, "—the attempt to find total victory, to inflict absolute destruction, to use unlimited means, and to mistake military victory for political victory—have been heretofore in history the peculiar characteristics of totalitarian or dictator-led states." One cannot help but wonder, Where have we been? and more important, Where are we going? with these fallacious policies which apparently are still with us.

Hanson W. Baldwin, Naval Academy Class of 1924, is, of course, the noted and discerning military editor of the *New York Times*. He is also author of the recent much discussed *The Price of Power*.

Reviewed by LtCol F. B. Nihart

### Outer Mongolia . . .

OUTER MONGOLIA, AND ITS INTERNATIONAL POSITION. Gerard M. Friters. Introduction by Owen Lattimore. Baltimore, the Johns Hopkins Press, 1949. 358 + xlvii pages. Indexed, map end papers. \$5.00

In effect, this is two books. The central portion is an account of the foreign relations of the little known piece of central Asia called Outer Mongolia. The most interesting introductory portion is an explanation of some of the things that gave those relations their character. It is in the form of an essay by Owen Lattimore.

Both parts of the book made badly needed contributions to current knowledge, each in its own special way. Friters' share of the task, the main portion of the book, is a nearly monumental study, wholly from documentary sources, of Outer Mongolia's place in the family of nations. It indicates rather than explains the problems faced by an extremely restricted society from the moment it began to feel itself pinched between an ancient empire, already in the process of disintegration, and a new young, vigorous country.

Friters' work begins with an attempt to explain and



describe the geographic aspects of Outer Mongolia's position with regard to China and Russia. He deals with spatial factors adequately, but his descriptions never make the country come alive. We learn the country known from ancient times as "Outer" Mongolia lies between the Great Wall, the Hsingan Mountains, Siberia, and that great vague region known as the Altai, which gave the generic name to a family of languages. We do not learn what the country looks like or feels like or smells like. We do not see the Mongolian at home or at work. He is reduced to the status of a factor in a series of statistical calculations. Now and again we get, as from a great distance that absorbs all the real impact and meaning, a hint of what he faces in the way of obstacles on the path which he follows in the pursuit of happiness. Thus, on page 12, we read that in the district of Dariangga "the winter storms and frosts of 1923-24 destroyed in some regions all the livestock down to the last head." From context we gather that ultimate calamity had struck at the affected regions, but all we realize is that it did strike. Nothing of the tragedy itself is brought home to us, nor any detail of how recovery took place.

The author then takes us into the surprisingly complex history of the three way tug of war that was Outer Mongolia's foreign relations. He picks up the account in 1727, when by terms of the treaty of Kiakhta a series of border posts was set up along the common Russian-Mongolian frontier. He takes us step by step through all the dim, tortuous negotiations that resulted ultimately, in July of 1919, in Russia's declaring that Outer Mongolia was a free country, that all power within the country belonged to the Mongols, and that the Russian people would welcome diplomatic relations with the newly established sovereign state.

In the section dealing with relationship with China, the author sets forth at some length the effect of the penetration by Japan into Manchuria upon the status of Outer Mongolia. Inner Mongolia having fallen under the influence of Japan, China was forced to placate Outer Mongolia to prevent spread of the infection and to seek closer relations with Russia. He points out how, in the events which followed, Outer Mongolia was finally lost to China and entered the ranks of countries peripheral to, and in sympathy with, the Soviet Empire.

By far the most readable part of the book is the penetrating introduction entitled "Mongolia's Place in the World." Written by the man who, by repute, knows more of the area than any other living American, the introduction is in the form of an essay. It is written simply, with a most commendable leaning toward the active voice and the simple declarative sentence, and before we have covered more than five of its thirty some pages of length, we realize that the writer knows his subject intimately. He describes, succinctly and understandably, the character and aspirations of the Mongol. He points out how the

# ✓ Check List

## About Marines

A RIBBON AND A STAR	Monks & Falter	\$2.75
BATTLE FOR TARAWA	Monograph Hq USMC	1.50
BETIO BEACHHEAD	Marine Combat Corres.	2.50
BOOT	Cpl Gilbert Bailey	2.50
BOUGAINVILLE AND THE NORTHERN SOLOMONS	Monograph Hq USMC	2.00
CORAL AND BRASS	Gen H. M. Smith	3.00
CORAL COMES HIGH	Capt George P. Hunt	2.00
DEFENSE OF WAKE	Monograph Hq USMC	1.25
DEVIL BIRDS	Capt John A. DeChant	4.00
FIX BAYONETS	Col John W. Thomason, Jr	3.00
FOLLOW ME—2d Marine Division	Unit History	6.00
THE FOURTH MARINE DIVISION	Unit History	5.00
GUADALCANAL DIARY	Richard Tregaskis	.25
HISTORY OF THE U. S. MARINE CORPS	Col Clyde H. Metcalf	5.50
HIT THE BEACH	Maj William C. McCahill	4.95
THE ISLAND (Guadalcanal)	Capt Herbert Merillat	3.00
THE ISLAND WAR	Maj Frank O. Hough	5.00
THE LONG, THE SHORT, AND THE TALL	Sgt Alvin M. Josephy	3.00
THE MARINE CORPS READER	Col Clyde H. Metcalf	3.00
MARINES AT MIDWAY	Monograph Hq USMC	.50
MARINES AND OTHERS	Col John W. Thomason, Jr	3.00
THE MARINES' WAR	Fletcher Pratt	5.00
THE NINTH MARINES	Unit History	5.00
ON TO WESTWARD	Robert Sherrod	3.00
SEMPER FIDELIS, an Anthology	Marine Combat Corres.	3.50
SIXTH MARINE DIVISION	Unit History	5.00
THE STORY OF WAKE ISLAND	Col James P. S. Devereux	2.75
THE THIRD MARINE DIVISION	Unit History	5.00
UNCOMMON VALOR	Six Combat Corres.	3.00
U. S. MARINES ON IWO JIMA	Capt Raymond Henri, USMC	3.50
YOUR MARINE CORPS IN WORLD WAR II (Pictorial)		3.00

This list is revised monthly to include the latest in military and popular books. Are there some new titles that should be added to your library? Remember, there is a ten per cent discount for Association members.

## World War II

AN ARMY IN EXILE	Gen Wladyslaw Anders, CB..	\$5.00
BATAAN UNCENSORED	Col E. B. Miller	3.50
BATTLE REPORT Vol I (Pearl Harbor to Coral Sea)	Karig and Kelly	3.50
BATTLE REPORT Vol II (Atlantic War)		3.50
BATTLE REPORT Vol III (Pacific War—Middle Phase)		5.00
BATTLE REPORT Vol IV (The End of an Empire)		5.00
BATTLE REPORT (Vol. V) (Victory in the Pacific)		5.00
THE BISMARCK EPISODE	Capt Russell Grenfell, RN	3.50
THE CAMPAIGNS OF THE PACIFIC WAR	U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey	3.00
COMPANY COMMANDER	MacDonald	3.00
CRUSADE IN EUROPE		
	Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower	5.00
THE EAGLE IN THE EGG	Oliver LaFarge	3.50
THE GERMAN GENERALS TALK		
	B. H. Liddell Hart	4.00
GUADALCANAL: FIRST OFFENSIVE	GPO	4.00
HISTORY OF U. S. NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II: BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC 1939-1943	Samuel Eliot Morison	6.00
HISTORY OF U. S. NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II: Operations in North African Waters		6.00
HISTORY OF U. S. NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II: RISING SUN IN THE PACIFIC 1941-1943	Samuel Eliot Morison	6.00
HISTORY OF U. S. NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II: CORAL SEA, MIDWAY, AND SUBMARINE ACTIONS	Samuel Eliot Morison	6.00
HISTORY OF U. S. NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II: The Struggle for Guadalcanal		6.00
HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II	Francis T. Miller	5.00
INTERROGATIONS OF JAPANESE OFFICIALS 2 Vol. U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey—Set		3.00
MacARTHUR'S JAPAN	Russell Brines	3.50
MASK OF GLORY	Dan Levin	3.00
THE NAVY'S AIR WAR	Lt A. R. Buchanan, USNR	3.50
OKINAWA: THE LAST BATTLE	GPO	7.00
PATTON AND HIS THIRD ARMY		
	Col Brenton G. Wallace	3.00
THE SECOND WORLD WAR		
	MajGen J. F. C. Fuller	5.00
STRANGE ALLIANCE	MajGen John R. Deane	3.75
STRATEGY IN WORLD WAR II		
	LtCol Alfred H. Burne	1.75
TALES OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC		
	James A. Michener	3.00
THUMB NAIL HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II		
	H. H. Husted	5.00
TO HELL AND BACK	Audie Murphy	3.00
TOP SECRET	Ralph Ingersoll	3.00
WORLD WAR II		
	Roger W. Shugg & Maj H. A. DeWeerd	3.00

## Texts and References

AIRBORNE WARFARE	MajGen James M. Gavin	\$3.00
A SHORT HISTORY OF RUSSIA	B. H. Sumner	5.00
THE ART OF PLAIN TALK	Dr Rudolph Flesch	2.50

Mongol fits into his environment, and he shows how the very nature of that environment made easy the transition from the nominal serfdom under the old feudal system to the present somewhat less nominal serfdom of life *a la mode Soviet*.

This volume, dry though it be as the very sands of the Gobi and the dessicated camel shinbones thereon, is a most valuable one. As a reference work, indeed, it may well prove to be invaluable, for it deals with an important territory which up to now has been far too little known and understood. It will be indispensable for the student of Far Eastern affairs.

Reviewed by Maj J. L. Zimmerman

## Strange Fiction . . .

THE STRANGE LAND—Ned Calmer, 327 pages, not illustrated. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. \$3.00

*The Strange Land* is the story of 12 Americans—one a female—whose destinies are seemingly fused during six days of the Siegfried Line offensive in autumn of 1944. You see the offensive individually and collectively through the eyes of war correspondent John C. Wexel and the other characters who make up the central theme, through the planning stages in luxurious Paris offices, all the way down to subordinate echelons to the final execution of the plans.

The flesh-pot of life behind the lines is brought into the scene with a passionate love affair between an American soldier and a WAC officer. You see a driving commander whose limits are his own end, and you touch on a replacement and his captain.

The story opens in the gilt salon of Hotel Scribe where correspondent Wexel and his associate scribes await the start of a SHAEF public relations conference for some measure of enlightenment about operations current to the period. From the outset, Wexel impresses you as being, besides a tenderfoot correspondent, a cynical, cold character dubious of war, and strictly bent on proving to himself and other newsmen that he is the untimate in news gatherers; also, that he won't let himself be bothered by the human element of war.

Subsequently, the book takes you to the front itself, bringing in the romantic experiences of the soldier and the WAC. It moves into the Siegfried offensive with much to do about bombing, machine gunning, and assault.

The book closes with the revelation of the fact that the troops not only failed to obtain their objective, but that they were not adequately trained to undergo a full-blown operation and carry it to the ultimate end.

Without a doubt, Ned Calmer should have made this a factual book, based in large part on his actual experience as a war correspondent, in the same reportorial manner which gained him popularity. The book would have had a great deal more impact, interest, and sufficient *suivezmoi*.

Reviewed by Cpl L. M. Ashman



ART OF WAR	Sun-Tzu	1.50
THE ART OF WAR ON LAND		
	LtCol Alfred H. Burne	2.50
AXIS GRAND STRATEGY	Compiled from Original	
	Material Prepared by Staff Officers of the Ger-	
	man Army, Navy & Air Force	5.00
WHY NOT LOAD YOUR OWN?		
	Col Townsend Whelen	3.50
MODERN ARMS AND FREE MEN		
	Dr Vannevar Bush	3.50
NO CAUSE FOR ALARM	Virginia Cowles	3.75
BASE PLATE MCGURK, COMPANY OFFICER		
	LtCol W. K. Jones	.50
BOMBING AND STRATEGY		
	Adm Sir Gerald Dickens, RN	1.75
THE CORAL SEA	Alan Villiers	4.00
DO OR DIE (Judo)	Col A. J. D. Biddle	1.00
DRILL AND COMMAND	Infantry Journal,	
	Cloth 2.50, Paper	1.00
ELEVEN GENERALS	Fletcher Pratt	5.00
GUIDEBOOK FOR MARINES		1.00
FEAR, WAR AND THE BOMB	P. M. S. Blackett	3.50
FRONT-LINE INTELLIGENCE		
	LtCol Stedman Chandler & Col Robert W. Robb	2.50
THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HIS-		
TORY	Capt A. T. Mahan	5.00
INTELLIGENCE IS FOR COMMANDERS		
	LtCol P. B. Davidson & LtCol R. R. Glass	3.85
HATCHER'S BOOK OF THE GARAND		
	MajGen Julian S. Hatcher	6.00
HATCHER'S NOTEBOOK		
	MajGen Julian S. Hatcher	5.00
HOW TO SHOOT A RIFLE—NRA		
	Infantry Journal	1.75
JOMINI'S ART OF WAR	LtCol J. D. Hittle	2.50
THE LIFE OF NELSON	Capt A. T. Mahan	5.00
MACHINE WARFARE	MajGen J. F. C. Fuller	2.50
MAHAN ON NAVAL WARFARE		3.00
MAHAN ON SEA POWER	William E. Livezey	3.50
MASTERING THE RIFLE	(Bud) Fisher	2.75
THE MILITARY STAFF	LtCol J. D. Hittle	2.50
MODERN JUDO, 2 Volumes	Charles Yerkow	6.00
NEW DRILL REGULATIONS, 1949 Edition		1.50
THE NONCOM'S GUIDE	MSPCo	2.50
NRA BOOK OF SMALL ARMS Vol I (Pistols)		10.00
NRA BOOK OF SMALL ARMS Vol II (Rifles)		12.50
THE OFFICER'S GUIDE (Army)	MSPCo	3.50
OPERATION SANDSTONE		3.50
PICTURE HISTORY OF RUSSIA		3.75
RAND McNALLY ROAD ATLAS		1.25
RIOT CONTROL	Sterling Wood	2.50
ROCKETS AND JETS	Zim	3.00
RUSSIA AND THE WEST IN IRAN		
	George Lencowski	4.50
SMALL ARMS OF THE WORLD	W. H. B. Smith	6.00
SOVIET ARMS AND SOVIET POWER		
	Gen Augustin Guillaume	3.50
SPEECH FOR THE MILITARY	Brenleck & Rights	2.00
STRATEGIC AIR POWER: THE PATTERN OF		
DYNAMIC SECURITY	Stephan T. Possony	5.00
WALTHER PISTOLS	W. H. B. Smith	2.50
WAY OF A FIGHTER		
	MajGen Claire Lee Chennault	4.50

## Historical

AMERICA AND WAR	Col Marion O. French	\$5.00
ADVENTURES OF GENERAL MARBOT		
	Col John W. Thomason, Jr	3.75
A STUDY OF HISTORY	Arnold J. Toynbee	5.00
BATTLE STUDIES	Col Ardant DuPicq	2.00
CAESAR'S GALLIC CAMPAIGNS		
	LtCol S. G. Brady	2.50
FAMOUS AMERICAN MARINES		
	Charles Lee Lewis	3.75
JEB STUART	Col John W. Thomason, Jr	5.00
HITLER AND HIS ADMIRALS	A. K. Martienssen	4.00
INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS GENERALS		
	Frederick the Great	1.50
LEE'S LIEUTENANTS, three volumes,		
	Douglas S. Freeman	21.00
LINCOLN FINDS A GENERAL		
	Kenneth P. Williams	12.50
NAPOLEON IN ITALY 1796-1797	Elijah Adlow	3.00
ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIVE BATTLES		
	Roger Shaw	2.50
ORDEAL BY FIRE	Fletcher Pratt	5.00
ROCK OF CHICKAMAUGA	Freeman Cleaves	3.75
ROOTS OF STRATEGY	Col Thomas R. Philips	3.00
THE WAR OF 1812	Francis F. Beirne	5.00
YOUNG WASHINGTON—Freeman 2 Vol—Set		15.00
HISTORY OF U. S. NAVAL AVIATION		
	Turnbull and Lord	5.00
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN NAVY		
	Howard I. Chapelle	10.00

## Fiction and Non-Fiction

A MEASURE OF FREEDOM	Arnold Forester	\$2.50
CIVILIZATION ON TRIAL	Arnold J. Toynbee	3.50
HALF OF ONE WORLD	Foster Hailey	3.00
MR. MIDSHIPMAN HORNBLOWER		
	C. S. Forrester	3.00
THE NAVAL OFFICER'S GUIDE		
	Comdr Arthur A. Ageton	4.00
NAVY WIFE	Nancy Shea	3.50
ON POKER	Oswald Jacoby	1.50
PROWLING RUSSIA'S FORBIDDEN ZONE		
	Werner Knop	2.75
PUT YOURSELF IN MARSHALL'S PLACE		
	James P. Warburg	1.00
SEEDS OF TREASON	de Toledano and Lasky	3.50
SCARNE ON CARDS	John Scarne	3.95
SCARNE ON DICE	John Scarne	5.00
THE STRUGGLE FOR GERMANY		
	Drew Middleton	
THE WALL	John Hersey	4.00
NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR	George Orwell	3.00

## FICTION

The GAZETTE Bookshop can supply all current novels. Older titles may be out of print, but the Bookshop will attempt to obtain any work of fiction desired by its customers.

Marine Corps Gazette, Box 106, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va.

## Subscription

Please enter my subscription to the GAZETTE. I understand that as a member or former member of the Marines or other of the Armed Forces I am eligible for membership in the Marine Corps Association.

- ☐ I enclose \$3.00 for a one year subscription to the GAZETTE.
- ☐ I enclose \$5.50 for a two year subscription to the GAZETTE.
- ☐ As I am qualified for membership, enroll me as a member of the Marine Corps Association.\*
- ☐ I am a regular subscriber. Enclosed is \$2.00. Send 12 issues of the GAZETTE, including the 175th Anniversary Issue, to:

NAME AND RANK (Print) \_\_\_\_\_

ADDRESS (Print) \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signed

\*Membership in the Marine Corps Association includes your subscription to the GAZETTE and a 10 per cent discount on purchases from the GAZETTE Bookshop.

Gazette Bookshop, Box 106, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, Va.

## Book Order

Enclosed is my check/money order for \$\_\_\_\_\_ for which please send me the following books which I have listed by title and price.

	Title	Price
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		

NAME AND RANK (Print) \_\_\_\_\_

ADDRESS (Print) \_\_\_\_\_

Members of the Marine Corps Association are entitled to 10 per cent discount on books. Make checks or money orders payable to GAZETTE Bookshop. Sorry, no C.O.D.'s, please



# How Would You Do It?



By LtCol W. F. Prickett



IN THE SUMMER OF 1942 THE JAPANESE organized their prisoners of war into 10-man squads, the idea being that if any one squad member escaped, the other nine were to be shot. In April, 1943, 10 prisoners escaped from the Davao Penal Colony. These escapees represented seven "shooting squads."

All prisoners were confined to the Colony's compound for three days while the Japanese deliberated on the fate of the "shooting squads." About 10 o'clock the fourth morning word was passed that the four barracks from which the men had escaped would be marched to the sick compound immediately after the noon meal. The four barracks housed approximately 450 officers and men. On the way to the sick compound they were met by the sick being marched in the opposite direction.

Three days were spent in waiting in the sick compound and then, at a formal formation, the Japanese camp commander read the imperial sentence. All members of the barracks from which the men had escaped were sentenced to two months' solitary confinement and meditation. Individuals who had slept next to the escaped men were fined a month's pay (POWs pay was deposited for them in a Davao bank). During the period of confinement and meditation there would be no games played, no books read, no singing, nor anything similar in the way of recreation. The cells for solitary confinement were four barracks, each housing 100 to 130 people.

The prisoners slept in double-decker bunks which were enclosed in screen wire with a board top. The sides and ends of the barracks were solid from the floor up for about three feet, and open the rest of the way to the overhanging thatch roof. Stanchions spaced about 20 feet apart supported the roof. The compound had a wire fence around it except at the entrance where an eight foot high

board fence and gate were installed. Adjacent to the gate was a guard shack.

After the reading of the imperial sentence and the departure of the guards, all the prisoners grinned, broke out books and games, and turned to enjoy the sentence. About 15 minutes later an inspecting party came through and beat up about a dozen violators of the imperial command. The remainder of the day at odd intervals, and at least once each hour, inspecting parties came through. More prisoners were beaten up. Prospects of meditating for two months under these conditions were somewhat less than attractive.

Something had to be done to cheat the Japanese of their moral victory in this matter, as well as to provide the prisoners with the recreation they needed.

## HOW WE DID IT


A chair was made up and placed on top of one of the bunks. From the chair it was possible to look under the roof and over the compound fence to the guard shack at the gate. A sentry was posted in the chair from reveille till taps. When a Jap guard came out of the guard shack, the sentry yelled "Heigh ho, Silver!"

Under this system bridge, checker, domino, acey-deucey, and chess tournaments were held by the prisoners. Due to dietary deficiencies a large group of the prisoners were unable to read and for their benefit reading clubs were formed. At the cry of "Heigh ho, Silver" games and books were put away and meditation began in earnest.

It was a delightful interlude, the only fly in the ointment being that after three weeks, in a big ceremony designed to demonstrate their forgiving natures, the Japanese modified the sentence to permit the POWs to work in the rice fields.

USMC

*The GAZETTE will pay \$25.00 for service-connected problems and their solution.*



**MARINES IN KOREA** are nothing new. Back in 1871 Marines landed near Seoul to storm Fort Cho'ijin on the Salee River, as artist John Clymer has shown with this picture. And now 1950 has seen their return to Korea. It just goes to prove that old saying: *History repeats itself*. And history will indeed repeat itself — Marine history, that is — in the November GAZETTE. For those who like to read about and re-live the battles and expeditions that made our Corps famous, our Anniversary Issue will be unusually attractive, a collector's piece so to speak. We don't want anyone who might be interested in this issue to be disappointed by not getting his copy. Our subscribers are guaranteed their copies. There are many others who, we think, will want this issue. Since production costs will be high we are printing only for regular subscribers. As a special favor, please pass the word about this extra special issue and how to get it.